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The debate over climate change has evolved over the past several years; while it began as one about the need for action, it is now one of degrees. This debate has pro-
gressed from discussions regarding climate change to concrete 
actions by every industrialized country to reduce their CO2 emis-
sions, except the United States. However, at the state level, the 
United States has taken steps to reduce its carbon emissions and 
it appears that whoever Americans elect as their next president 
will commit the country to any post-Kyoto framework. 
We are seeing the canaries in the coal mine with regard to 
climate change, including the dying of coral reefs, the melting of 
glaciers, and the increase in severe weather events. Every degree 
we allow Earth to warm we open Pandora’s box wider. Many 
have already conceded a one-degree Celsius rise in global tem-
peratures, at which we will increase the spread of severe droughts 
across the globe. A one-degree rise will force many species to 
migrate over 100 kilometers towards the poles or face extinc-
tion. A one-degree rise will raise sea levels, potentially placing 
many large coastal cities below sea level. A one-degree rise in 
global temperatures will cause many foreseeable and unknown 
consequences; however, this is not to discount the effects of a 
two- or even three-degree rise in global temperatures. As global 
temperatures increase the consequences increase exponentially. 
The economic, ecological, and human costs, devastation, and 
consequences are what makes the future fight over climate 
change one of degrees. 
It is time for all countries, regardless of industrial status, 
economic, or population size, or even economic efficiency, to 
start addressing the carbon emission issue seriously and commit 
to binding reductions. The United States once led this effort with 
SO2 reductions to prevent acid rain, and showed that phasing out 
emissions under a cap-and-trade scheme does not have to result 
in economic downturn, and may even boost an economy. It is 
time for the United States to start participating at the interna-
tional level and show its leadership once more.
This is SDLP’s fourth installment on climate law. From the 
beginning we have seen the issues evolve from whether to act 
transform to an issue of how to act. This issue includes a wide 
range of topics such as how state and federal climate change 
actions impact litigation, trade, and taxes; the developing domes-
tic law in the United States and Australia; and encompasses the 
Clean Development Mechanism as well as successful efforts to 
combat climate change through the international ozone regime. 
We are proud to be one of the venues in the climate debate and 
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InTroDucTIon
Climate change is one of humanity’s most pressing and dif-ficult challenges. Without urgent and concerted action, climate change will seriously affect the way of life in all 
countries, damage fragile ecosystems and threaten global secu-
rity through migratory pressures and resource conflicts. Since 
climate change is a long-term problem, it cannot be addressed 
successfully through short-term, country-based actions alone. 
Resolving the climate crisis will require international coopera-
tion at all levels—from bilateral to regional to global. 
Climate change, its causes, and its adverse impacts are 
closely linked to economic development, the alleviation of 
poverty, and energy security. While solutions will require har-
monization of economic growth and poverty alleviation with 
an oveRview oF thiS iSSue: 
FRamewoRk FoR a poSt-kyoto climate change agReement1
by Mohamed T. El-Ashry*
ambitious emissions reductions, they also present tremendous 
opportunities for innovation and technological development, 
especially in the energy field. 
A future global agreement, negotiated under the auspices of 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(“UNFCCC”) must have a long-term target to stabilize the 
“greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that 
would prevent dangerous interference with the climate system.”2 
Parties must agree on four pathways for negotiation that address 
mitigation, adaptation, technology, and finance. Any agreement 
must be comprehensive, including all countries, all sectors, all 
sources and sinks, and mitigation as well as adaptation. The cost 
of taking action now is small—about one percent of global gross 
domestic product, according to the Stern Review—and the ben-
efits are large compared with the much heavier penalties of post-
poning action.3 The costs of both mitigation and adaptation will 
rise substantially with delay. A new agreement, however, will be 
successful only if it is perceived by all participating countries to 
be equitable.
mITIgaTIon
Mitigating emissions sufficiently to protect the Earth’s cli-
mate will require vast international cooperation. A post-2012 
agreement under the auspices of the UNFCCC should recognize 
the differentiated responsibilities underpinning the UNFCCC, 
specifically that “developed countries should take the lead in 
combating climate change.”4 However, “dangerous anthropo-
genic interference” cannot be avoided by developed countries 
acting alone. Even an eighty percent reduction of greenhouse 
gas (“GHG”) emissions in all developed countries by 2050 
would not achieve this objective without emissions reductions 
by rapidly industrializing and developing countries. All coun-
tries should commit to reduce collectively global emissions by 
at least sixty percent below the 1990 level by 2050 to avoid the 
most serious impacts of climate change. 
As a first step, developed countries should reduce their col-
lective emissions by thirty percent by 2020. Rapidly industrial-
izing countries on the other hand should commit to reduce their 
energy intensity by thirty percent by 2020, an average of four 
percent per year, and agree to emissions reduction targets after-
wards. Other developing countries should commit to an energy 
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intensity target differentiated by their responsibilities and capa-
bilities. The international community should develop a monitor-
ing and review system and clear criteria for determining when 
and how various categories of countries should assume stronger 
climate commitments.
A comprehensive emissions-based agreement sends a clear 
signal to the market and offers countries flexibility to implement 
emissions reduction strategies that are most appropriate to their 
national circumstances. Smaller, targeted agreements, on the 
other hand, offer the potential of early action by countries that are 
not ready to accept emissions limits and could be incorporated 
into a comprehensive climate change agreement. The objective 
should be to make the comprehensive agreement and smaller 
targeted agreements mutually supportive and  complementary. 
Country-based agreements among the top-emitting coun-
tries in the world, or alternatively between smaller geographic 
groups, may offer a simpler negotiating process and the potential 
to address a large fraction of the 
world’s emissions. Sector-based 
targeted agreements should be 
encouraged; such agreements 
can avoid competitiveness con-
cerns by setting emissions targets 
for particular industries—e.g., 
power, transportation, aluminum, 
steel, cement, appliances, build-
ings, and forestry—including 
those located in developing coun-
tries. Policy-based agreements 
could require harmonized carbon 
taxes or reductions in emissions 
intensity, for example, or support clean technology dissemina-
tion. Measures-based agreements could involve specific emis-
sion reduction strategies—e.g., energy efficiency, renewable 
energy, and land-use regulation. 
Energy security and climate security are intertwined and 
should be addressed at the same time. Renewable energy and 
energy efficiency can contribute to such a strategy. Renewable 
energy is a win-win proposition for all countries as it (1) pro-
vides opportunities for poverty alleviation and for satisfying 
the energy needs in rural and remote areas; (2) helps generate 
employment and creates local economic opportunities; (3) helps 
curb climate change and contributes to the protection of human 
health caused by air pollution; and (4) enhances energy secu-
rity through reliance on domestic energy sources. The technical 
and economic potentials of improving energy efficiency, includ-
ing building efficiency, are also enormous and should be pur-
sued as aggressively as new supply. In addition, technological 
 innovations can cost-effectively reduce the risk of large-scale 
impacts of energy supply disruptions, especially in the electric-
ity sector. 
To reduce the emissions of carbon dioxide cost-effectively, 
a full range of interventions to create and maintain biological 
sinks of carbon should be included in a post-2012 climate change 
regime in order to capture the many co-benefits of sustainable 
livelihoods, land management, forestry, and biodiversity con-
servation. Land-use changes, mainly deforestation, account for 
more than twenty percent of global emissions, a share greater 
than either the global transport or industrial sectors. With 
increasing emphasis on growing biofuels for transport, there will 
be increasing pressure to convert remaining forests to other uses. 
Both Article 3.3 of the Framework Convention and the history 
of Kyoto Protocol negotiations point to the need to include GHG 
sinks in any agreement. Difficulties in monitoring and verifying 
both above ground and below-ground stocks of carbon need to 
be overcome. Because not all forests are alike in their capacity to 
sequester carbon dioxide (“CO2”), additional research is needed 
to account for their differences. 
Because of the size of the forest resource, credits for avoided 
deforestation must be coupled with sharply reduced emissions 
targets or they could destabilize carbon markets. Reducing 
deforestation presents an opportunity to sequester CO2 in the 
atmosphere with additional 
benefits—the conservation of 
biodiversity, the provision of 
ecosystem goods and services, 
especially water resources, and 
the improvement of livelihoods 
for neighboring communities. 
In this regard, the carbon mar-
ket offers an opportunity to 
change forest management and 
improve livelihoods in rural 
areas of developing countries. 
Markets should be orga-
nized to have a reasonable 
promise of achieving the policy goals of carbon reductions in 
an efficient manner. Most economists agree that to achieve the 
greatest climate benefits efficiently and effectively, a carbon 
price should be set through carbon taxes or trading. Carbon 
taxes are easier to implement than cap-and-trade schemes, are 
economically efficient, and would generate significant finan-
cial resources. A system of harmonized, universal carbon taxes 
should be agreed by the international community. 
Recognizing that many in industry prefer a cap-and-trade 
system, there is a need for well functioning and financially linked 
carbon markets to be developed across the globe, incorporating 
various national and regional cap-and-trade programs. In gen-
eral, emissions allowances should be auctioned, thus raising 
resources that can be allocated by national governments for other 
purposes, such as clean energy development and  adaptation. 
aDapTaTIon
Adaptation is a key component of an effective strategy to 
address climate change. Adaptation is not simply a matter of 
designing projects or putting together lists of measures to reduce 
the impacts of climate change. A national policy response would 
increase resilience to climate vulnerability and change and should 
be anchored in a country’s framework for economic growth and 
sustainable development and integrated in its poverty reduc-
Dangerous 
anthropogenic interference 
cannot be avoided by 
developed countries 
acting alone.
4wInTer 2008
tion strategies. Responses to climate change need to encompass 
several levels including access to clean energy for vulnerable 
populations, crop and farm-level adaptations, national level agri-
cultural and supporting policies and investments. 
Businesses and international financial institutions also need 
to integrate climate change into their activities and make their 
investments less susceptible to climate change. International 
technical and financial assistance should be strengthened and 
made more coherent in order to respond at the requisite scale to 
the needs of least developed countries. The United Nations has 
a pivotal role to play in building institutional, public policy, and 
human capacity in support of effective programs of adaptation. 
Because the costs of adaptation were thought to provide 
largely local benefits, were difficult to distinguish from “regu-
lar” development, were suspected to be large, and smacked of 
compensation awarded for damages, developed countries have 
been reluctant to agree to substantial amounts of funds for 
adaptation. Nevertheless, since 
climate change will impede 
development efforts, increase 
risks to public health, frustrate 
poverty alleviation programs, 
and exacerbate migrations from 
waterlogged, water-scarce or 
food-scarce regions, there is an 
important role for official devel-
opment assistance in financing 
adaptation measures, including 
human and institutional capacity building, and in reducing vul-
nerability of agriculture, forests, and water resources. Effective 
adaptation will require broader planning capacity in all relevant 
departments and ministries in developing countries. Local scien-
tists should be supported for monitoring and research on climate 
impacts on various sectors in their own countries. In addition, all 
countries should cooperate in identifying a package of reliable 
funding to help countries build resilience to climate risks. Such 
funding could include public and private finance and the carbon 
market. Development agencies should integrate climate change 
effects into their projects and programs. 
Technology DevelopmenT  
anD cooperaTIon
If the world continues on its current energy path, dominated 
by fossil fuels, energy-related CO2 emissions in 2050 will be 
two-and-a-half times their current levels.5 According to the Inter-
national Energy Agency, these emissions can be returned to their 
current levels by 2050 through a combination of the following 
actions undertaken in all countries: (1) strong energy efficiency 
gains in transport, industry and buildings sectors; (2) increasing 
decarbonization of the electric power generation sector through 
increased deployment of renewables, nuclear, natural gas, and 
coal with CO2 capture and storage; and (3) increased use of bio-
fuels for road transport. However, reducing global emissions by 
at least sixty percent at acceptable costs will require a science 
and technology revolution, at least as large as those in the space 
and telecommunication sectors, to make clean energy technolo-
gies more efficient and affordable. Unfortunately, investments 
in both public- and private-sector energy research and develop-
ment programs have been declining for the last two decades. 
These declines need to be halted and reversed.
Market-based mechanisms are good at identifying the 
cheapest mitigation opportunities amongst existing options, and 
spurring innovations that have immediate cost reductions, but 
are less helpful in encouraging the development of new low-
emission technologies. Innovation targets to bring new, more 
efficient, and less costly technologies to market could be very 
helpful. Incentives could be provided to countries (and busi-
nesses) that beat these targets in the form of credits against their 
future emission targets. 
In addition, the formation of a Consultative Group on 
Clean Energy Research, as suggested by the International Task 
Force on Global Public Goods, could facilitate international col-
laboration on the development of low-cost, zero-carbon tech-
nologies and the exchange of 
information about clean energy 
technologies. 
Sustainable development 
is not possible without making 
energy systems more sustain-
able. All developing countries, 
especially rapidly industrial-
izing countries, should have 
access to clean energy tech-
nologies on preferential terms. 
The barriers that hamper the dissemination of such technologies 
in developing countries, such as intellectual property rights and 
competitive rules, should be overcome. 
FInance
Both public and private finance are essential for adaptation, 
for technology transfer to developing countries, and to imple-
ment successfully any comprehensive and long-term strategy to 
combat climate change. Climate-friendly investments need to be 
multiplied through national and international frameworks, and 
the current international carbon market needs to be enhanced in 
order to scale up private flows. However, external funding must 
be additional to national resources obtained through domestic 
savings and taxation. Governments have an obligation to estab-
lish a supportive framework for private investment. Local capi-
tal markets should facilitate long-term investments in adaptation 
measures. Carbon taxes or the auctioning of emissions allow-
ances can also raise resources that can be used for this or other 
purposes. 
The Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”) was created 
under the Kyoto Protocol to support low-carbon investments 
in developing countries. For the developed countries, the pur-
pose of the CDM is to lower the cost of emission reductions and 
provide an element of flexibility in carrying out their national 
obligations. From the developing countries’ perspective, the 
purpose of the CDM is to promote their sustainable development 
and contribute to the stabilization of GHGs in the atmosphere. 
The CDM has encountered administrative and technical hurdles. 
Renewable energy is a 
win-win proposition for 
all countries.
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Endnotes: Framework for a Post-Kyoto Climate Change Agreement
Initial projects have been limited to a few countries and a few 
gases and have been plagued by bureaucratic procedures, and 
with little contribution to sustainable development. 
The CDM should be reformed in order to deliver its full 
potential during the 2008–2012 commitment period, and in the 
post-2012 regime an additional 
market mechanism should sup-
port sectoral approaches capable 
of transforming whole sectors of 
rapidly industrializing countries 
at a speed commensurate with 
the challenge of taking emissions 
reductions to global scale. The 
CDM’s weaknesses exist because 
it was created as a project-based 
instrument; however, the Execu-
tive Board recently approved 
the inclusion of “programmes 
of activities” in the CDM. In order to promote policy reform, 
underwrite technology development, and stimulate investment 
flows at a scale that is truly transformational, an additional mar-
ket mechanism must take a sectoral approach. The fundamental 
distinction between the sectoral approach and the project-based 
or programmatic approach is that a developing country could set 
sector-wide baselines for carbon-intensive sectors at levels that 
coincide with its economic interest while meeting commitments 
to reduce the energy intensity of its growth. 
Public finance also has an important role, especially in dem-
onstrating new approaches for building human and institutional 
capacity and for mitigation and adaptation in developing coun-
tries. However, the existing funding sources for these purposes 
(for example, the Global Environment Facility (“GEF”) and the 
multilateral development banks (“MDBs”)) are too small for the 
scale of assistance required. They should be strengthened and 
their resources enhanced so that they can play a bigger role in 
leveraging private finance for mitigation and adaptation and in 
assisting developing countries to set appropriate framework con-
ditions for private investment. 
Finance is a critical element of any strategy to address cli-
mate change effectively. Funds will be required for increased 
assistance to developing countries for the adoption of energy 
efficiency and clean energy technologies, and for avoided defor-
estation. Funds will be required for greening power sectors, for 
adaptation, and for increased R&D and deployment in all coun-
tries, focusing especially on technologies that are technically 
viable but not yet financially competitive. 
A climate fund of additional resources, starting at U.S. 
$10 billion and growing to U.S. $50 billion per year, should be 
established to support climate change activities in developing 
countries (adaptation, avoided 
deforestation, and clean energy 
development and deployment) 
and should include both public 
and private resources. It should 
have an innovative structure and 
governance that is transparent 
and inclusive. In addition, exist-
ing mechanisms, such as the 
GEF and the MDBs, should be 
strengthened and their resources 
enhanced to continue their 
important work in demonstrat-
ing new approaches, building human and institutional capacity, 
and leveraging private finance.
conclusIon
With its limited time frame, participation, and inadequate 
provisions for monitoring, the Kyoto Protocol was never seen as 
a solution to the climate problem. It was meant to be a first step, 
preparing for the broader engagement that will be necessary and 
establishing the legal, technical and institutional groundwork for 
future regimes. As we embark upon a more comprehensive and 
inclusive agreement, we need to build on the experience gained 
from Kyoto, particularly in international emissions trading. 
We also need to build on the experience of cities, states, 
communities, businesses, and individuals who have voluntarily 
undertaken important steps to address climate change. As they 
have shown, determined action presents substantial opportuni-
ties for economic growth and job creation, based on the develop-
ment and deployment of clean energy technologies. In addition, 
public advocacy and information programs can play an impor-
tant role in enhancing awareness of the impacts of personal 
behavior and lifestyle. 
Above all, we need to build trust between North and South 
and establish an equitable basis and new modalities for genu-
ine international cooperation to address the linked challenges of 
energy and climate security. For an issue this important to the 
future of the planet, there must be no more broken promises.
1 This Article is based on global leaDeRShip FoR climate action, FRamewoRk 
FoR a poSt-2012 agReement on climate change (2007).
2 Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 2, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M 
849, available at http://unfccc.int (last visited Mar. 23, 2008) [hereinafter 
UNFCCC].
3 SteRn Review, the economicS oF climate change, 212, available at http://
www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/independent_reviews/stern_review_economics_ 
climate_change/stern_review_report.cfm (last visited Mar. 14, 2008).
4 UNFCCC, supra note 2, art. 3 ¶1
5 inteRnational eneRgy agency, eneRgy technology peRSpectiveS—ScenaRioS 
anD StRategieS to 2050 (2006).
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element of any strategy to 
address climate  
change effectively.
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climate change anD the StateS: 
conStitutional iSSueS aRiSing FRom State climate pRotection leaDeRShip
by Robert K. Huffman & Jonathan M. Weisgall*
InTroDucTIon 
As state, local, and federal legislators develop policies to address global climate change, the United States may soon face the difficult political and legal necessity of 
reconciling multiple—and potentially conflicting—state, local, 
regional, and federal climate change programs into a compre-
hensive national policy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. This 
Article reviews some of these programs and explores several 
constitutional issues that may arise from state programs designed 
to combat climate change.
The causes of climate change 
are not completely understood, 
but there is now widespread 
agreement that humans are hav-
ing an impact on the climate, pri-
marily from carbon dioxide and 
other greenhouse gases (“GHG”) 
that are emitted from burning 
fossil fuels. As these gases accu-
mulate in the atmosphere, they 
trap heat close to the earth’s sur-
face, causing myriad effects on 
our delicate ecosystem. 
Regulators and policymak-
ers at the local, state, federal, and 
international levels are taking various actions to understand cli-
mate change and reduce GHG emissions. The first major action 
occurred in 1990, with the release of the first report by the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”).1 This was the 
first time that a detailed scientific endeavor was undertaken to 
study the climate change phenomenon. The IPCC’s first report 
led to international action, with the creation of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”). The 
UNFCCC is an international environmental treaty, adopted in 
1992 at the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development in Brazil.2 It created a UN Secretariat to oversee 
the Convention and substantively serves as a framework for fur-
ther negotiations on detailed protocols aimed at reducing world-
wide GHG emissions. 
KyoTo proTocol
Five years after the UNFCCC was created, at the Third 
Conference of the Parties in Kyoto, Japan, an agreement was 
reached to create binding emission reduction targets for indus-
trialized nations. This 1997 agreement, known as the Kyoto Pro-
tocol, came into force on February 16, 2005, after being ratified 
by the required number of parties that represent a specified mini-
mum percentage of worldwide GHG emissions.3 
The Kyoto Protocol is in effect only through 2012. Negotia-
tions are currently underway to craft a successor agreement that 
would operate through at least 2020. This was the focus of the 
December 2007 Conference of the Parties 13 in Bali, Indonesia. 
These meetings resulted in an agreement, now known as the Bali 
Roadmap, to complete further negotiations over the coming two 
years.4
The United States, how-
ever, has not adopted the Kyoto 
Protocol, objecting to the inclu-
sion of industrialized nations 
(Annex I Parties) but not the 
developing world. Seeing this as 
a competitive disadvantage that 
could cause significant harm to 
the U.S. economy, the govern-
ment has refused to adopt the 
binding emissions limits called 
for in the Kyoto Protocol. Aside 
from the United States, every 
industrialized nation, includ-
ing the European Union, has 
adopted the Kyoto Protocol. 
The Kyoto Protocol provides three “flexibility mechanisms” 
that allow countries to reduce the costs of achieving their emis-
sions reduction targets. These mechanisms are the Clean Devel-
opment Mechanism (“CDM”), Joint Implementation (“JI”), and 
emissions trading. The CDM allows Annex I Parties to imple-
ment projects that reduce emissions in non-Annex I Parties, in 
return for Certified Emission Reduction (“CER”) credits.5 JI 
allows Annex I Parties to implement projects in other Annex 
I Parties that either reduce emissions or enhance carbon sinks, 
in return for Emission Reduction Units (“ERU”).6 CDM and JI 
projects are subject to a verification and certification process, in 
order to ensure the legitimacy of any CER or ERU credits that 
* Robert Huffman is a partner at the law firm of Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld 
LLP.  Jonathan Weisgall is vice president for legislative and regulatory affairs at 
MidAmerican Energy Holdings Company.  Both Mr. Huffman and Mr. Weisgall 
are Adjunct Professors at the Georgetown University Law Center, where together 
they teach the Law Center seminar on Climate Change and Energy Problems. 
Mr. Huffman and Mr. Weisgall wish to thank the following individuals for their 
contributions to this Article: Laurence H. Tribe, Thomas C. Goldstein, Kenneth J. 
Markowitz, and Jeremy A. Schiffer.
Aside from the 
United States, every 
industrialized nation, 
including the European 
Union, has adopted the 
Kyoto Protocol.  
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are generated by the projects. Emissions trading, the final mech-
anism, is a market-based strategy for reducing GHG emissions. 
emiSSionS tRaDing SyStemS
Under the Kyoto Protocol, Annex I Parties may develop 
internal emissions trading markets or link together with other 
Annex I Parties to create larger trading markets. An emissions 
trading market contains a system-wide cap on emissions that 
decreases over time, thus ensuring that overall GHG emissions 
within the system decrease as well. The system-wide cap and 
market features give rise to the general term cap-and-trade to 
describe these emissions markets. 
The emissions credits that can be traded are of a standard 
form, with each credit equal to one metric tonne of carbon diox-
ide equivalent emissions.7 This 
is the basic unit of currency in 
the emissions reduction world.8 
In designing and operating car-
bon markets, the single most 
important issue is consistency 
and quality control in measur-
ing emissions. If a tonne from 
one facility is not equal to a 
tonne from a neighboring facil-
ity, the market cannot operate 
properly. Therefore, without adequate monitoring, verification, 
and reporting procedures, emissions markets will fail to deliver 
actual emissions reductions.9 
euRopean union emiSSionS tRaDing SyStem
The most significant market developed under the Kyoto 
Protocol flexibility mechanisms is the European Union Emis-
sions Trading System (“EU-ETS”).10 The EU-ETS, which 
began operation in 2005, is comprised of twenty-seven European 
member nations and sets a cap on the total emissions that can 
be  generated from power stations, certain large industrial facili-
ties, and oil refineries. Facilities covered by the EU-ETS must 
report their total emissions annually and surrender a number of 
allowances equal to their total GHG emissions. Some allow-
ances are distributed to facilities for free, others are auctioned 
by governments, and others can be purchased on the market 
from traders, governments, or other entities that possess them 
(including allowances generated by credits in CDM or JI proj-
ects). If a facility has extra allowances after it surrenders those 
necessary to match its annual emissions output, it can sell them 
for profit. This provides an economic incentive to consistently 
reduce emissions at a facility. On the other hand, if a facility 
does not have enough allowances to cover its surrender require-
ment, it will have to purchase additional allowances to make up 
the shortfall. This serves as an incentive to reduce GHG emis-
sions, particularly if the cost of the allowances in the market is 
greater than the cost of making modifications that lead to emis-
sions reductions. 
The current phase of the EU-ETS runs through 2012, to 
coincide with the timeframe of the operation of the Kyoto Proto-
col. Regardless of whether there is a global agreement to replace 
the Kyoto Protocol, the EU-ETS will continue to operate, at least 
in a modified form. In January 2008, the European Commission 
released proposed rules for the next phase of the EU-ETS, which 
will run from 2013 to 2020.11 The proposals will change several 
details in the operation of the market and include a provision 
that would allow the EU-ETS to link with trading systems in 
countries that have not ratified the Kyoto Protocol, something 
that is not permitted in the current phase. This is interpreted as 
a clear overture to the United States to link its future emissions 
market(s) to the EU-ETS. 
u.s. FeDeral ghg polIcy
The federal government has yet to pass legislation or 
issue regulations covering GHG emissions. In January 2007 a 
group of major corporations and 
prominent environmental groups 
formed the United States Climate 
Action Partnership (“US CAP”) 
and released a report entitled A 
Call for Action.12 Its goal is to 
put pressure on Congress to adopt 
legislation regulating GHG emis-
sions, including a comprehensive 
cap-and-trade program. While it 
may seem odd for a group of the 
largest corporations in America to advocate for potentially costly 
regulation, they have come to realize that regulatory uncertainty 
and its concomitant risks may exact a greater long-term eco-
nomic cost than comprehensive—but definite—legislation. 
As of this writing, no comprehensive federal climate change 
legislation has been adopted. One major cap-and-trade bill, 
sponsored by Senators Lieberman and Warner,13 is considered 
the leading proposal on Capitol Hill, but there is only a small 
likelihood of final passage in 2008.
The Energy Independence and Security Act,14 signed into 
law in December 2007, contains several provisions that are 
intended to reduce GHG emissions, but it falls short of the com-
prehensive legislation advocated by US CAP and others. The Act 
includes the first increase in Corporate Average Fuel Economy 
(“CAFE”) standards for automobiles since they were enacted in 
1975, requiring average fuel economy of thirty-five miles per 
gallon in 2020.15 It also includes provisions to improve energy 
efficiency in homes and buildings,16 a renewable fuel standard 
(mandating the production of at least thirty-six billion gallons 
of biofuels by 2020),17 and other provisions to meet President 
Bush’s “20 in 10” challenge for reducing gasoline usage by 
twenty percent in ten years. 
A recent House Committee on Energy and Commerce white 
paper looked at the proper role of federal, state, and local gov-
ernments in any comprehensive carbon regulation scheme.18 
Working under the assumption that the federal government 
would eventually enact a cap-and-trade program like the Lieber-
man-Warner bill, the white paper revealed potential situations in 
which state and local leadership could lead to either increased 
emissions, increased overall costs, or both. It makes the argu-
ment that “climate change is a global, not local, problem, perhaps 
No comprehensive federal 
climate change legislation 
has been adopted.
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providing less need for allowing States to be more stringent.”19 
As a result, “a more stringent State program may just shift the 
location of, rather than decrease, national emissions . . . .”20 This 
would occur when regulated entities move their operations from 
states with higher (i.e., more expensive to comply with) stan-
dards to ones that follow the lower, federal standards. 
The white paper does note, however, that state and local 
authorities do have a significant, complementary role to play in 
the effort to reduce GHG emissions. For example, building codes 
that mandate the use of better insulation in new homes would 
cause higher initial prices for consumers, but provide long-term 
savings as a result of lower energy bills. These measures “could 
capture . . . otherwise lost or uncovered emission reductions, and 
thereby decrease the societal cost of achieving greenhouse gas 
reductions.”21 The white paper also recognizes the importance 
of adequate and efficient monitoring, reporting, and verification 
of emissions. “It is probably more efficient to authorize State, 
Tribal, and/or local governments to inspect sources to deter-
mine compliance with national monitoring and record-keeping 
requirements than it would be to leave that exclusively to Fed-
eral inspectors.”22 
Many state leaders, frustrated at slow federal action to 
address climate change, are implementing both comprehen-
sive and piece-meal programs at the state level to help reduce 
GHG emissions. The following section discusses the actions 
that states have taken on their own to reduce GHG emissions, 
focusing heavily on cap-and-trade programs. Next, this Article 
raises and analyzes the constitutional issues that may arise as a 
result of state responses to this pressing global problem, focus-
ing heavily on the constitutional issues raised by attempts to link 
emissions trading systems among states and between states and 
foreign parties. 
u.s. sTaTe-level acTIons
cap-anD-tRaDe pRogRamS 
Although the United States is not a signatory to the Kyoto 
Protocol, there are several efforts underway to establish state- or 
regional-level trading systems. These follow not only the model 
of the EU-ETS, but also other successful domestic cap-and-trade 
programs administered by the EPA, including the Acid Rain 
Program.23 
California is in the process of establishing its own cap-
and-trade program. In September 2006, California adopted the 
Global Warming Solutions Act, also known as A.B. 32.24 This 
law, in part, allows the state to establish a cap-and-trade program 
to help meet the goal of capping the state’s emissions at 1990 
levels by 2020 and eventually reaching eighty percent below 
1990 levels by 2050.25 The program would be administered by 
the California Air Resources Board (“CARB”), which is in the 
process of adopting a scoping plan to identify California’s pri-
mary strategies for reducing GHG emissions under A.B. 32. The 
goal would be to have the cap-and-trade program operating by 
January 1, 2012.26 Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger has openly 
expressed an interest in linking any cap-and-trade program, once 
it is open for business, with the EU-ETS market.27
In addition to California’s intrastate efforts, three interstate 
groups are currently in the process of establishing carbon mar-
kets. One project, known as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initia-
tive (“RGGI”),28 was initially formed in 2003 and is now made 
up of ten states in the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic: Maine, New 
Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecti-
cut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland. In addi-
tion, several eastern Canadian provinces have expressed interest 
in joining RGGI. 
The consortium administering RGGI has published model 
rules for each of the states to adopt, and all ten states are in the 
process of adopting them in statutory or regulatory form. The 
goal is to have the market operating by January 2009. At this 
point, it appears likely that the market will be ready to open at 
that time, although all ten states may not be participating at the 
outset, as a few may have outstanding issues to resolve in the 
early stages of the program. 
The second multi-state group, known as the Western Cli-
mate Initiative (“WCI”), consists of seven Western states and 
two Canadian provinces: Arizona, California, Montana, New 
Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, British Columbia, and 
Manitoba. The WCI was established in February 2007, and as 
a result is not as far along in the process as RGGI. WCI is cur-
rently in the design phase, having completed basic design princi-
ples and established a year-long work-plan.29 Its goal is to have 
the design of the market-based mechanism completed in August 
2008. Based on this timeline, it is unlikely that the WCI will be 
able to establish a functioning market before 2011 or 2012. 
A third group, consisting of nine Midwestern states and 
the Canadian province of Manitoba, signed the Midwestern 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord in November of 
2007, which is designed to establish greenhouse gas reduction 
targets, a regional cap-and-trade protocol, and a regional system 
to track and manage greenhouse gas emissions.30
Renewable poRtFolio StanDaRDS
A renewable portfolio standard (“RPS”) is a state-level 
mandate requiring electric utilities to obtain a certain percentage 
of their power from renewable resources. Twenty-four states and 
the District of Columbia currently have RPSs, while four other 
states have non-binding goals for adopting renewable energy.31 
A typical RPS might call for having twenty percent of 
energy produced from renewable resources by 2020. Currently, 
Minnesota and Oregon have the highest standards calling for 
twenty-five percent renewable energy production by 2025.32 
The renewable resources that qualify for state RPS programs 
generally include wind, solar (concentrated and photovol-
taic), geothermal, and biomass. Nuclear power does not satisfy 
RPS requirements and cannot be used to meet the renewable 
standards. 
auto emiSSionS RegulationS 
The Clean Air Act (“CAA”) prohibits states from issuing 
their own auto emissions regulations. There is one exception that 
applies only to California, as California was the only state regu-
lating auto emissions prior to the enactment of the CAA in 1966. 
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Section 209(b) of the Act allows California to seek a waiver 
from the EPA, which shall be granted unless “the Administrator 
finds that—(A) the determination of the State is arbitrary and 
capricious, (B) such State does not need such State standards 
to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions, or (C) such 
State standards and accompanying enforcement procedures are 
not consistent with section 202(a)” of the CAA.33 Other states 
then have the choice of adopting the federal rule or the Califor-
nia rule. 
Citing the fact that automobile emissions account for 
roughly forty percent of GHG 
emissions in California, the Cali-
fornia Greenhouse Gas Reduc-
tion Bill of 2002, known as A.B. 
1493, requires CARB to adopt 
“regulations that achieve the 
maximum feasible reduction 
and cost-effective reduction of 
greenhouse gases from motor 
vehicles.”34 The regulations 
are not fuel economy standards 
per se, but instead regulate the 
amount of GHG emissions that 
automobiles sold in the state 
may produce. 
In 2004, CARB promul-
gated regulations pursuant to 
A.B. 1493 calling for a reduction 
in emissions by automobiles totaling over fifty million tonnes of 
carbon dioxide by 2030.35 This equates to a twenty-seven per-
cent reduction in automobile emissions by 2030. California for-
mally sought a waiver from the EPA in December 2005.36 Since 
California adopted its regulations, sixteen other states have fol-
lowed its lead and passed laws requiring automobiles to meet the 
California standards. 
After the April 2007 Supreme Court decision in Massachu-
setts v. EPA,37 in which Massachusetts won a significant victory 
that formally establishes EPA’s authority to regulate GHG gases 
as pollutants, Governor Schwarzenegger met with EPA Admin-
istrator Stephen Johnson to encourage EPA to grant California’s 
waiver application. However, in December 2007, Administrator 
Johnson notified California that the waiver application would be 
denied, on the grounds that California’s situation does not meet 
the “compelling and extraordinary conditions” test.38 Identify-
ing global climate change as a worldwide problem and citing 
the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007,39 which 
increased CAFE standards, the EPA determined that California’s 
more strict GHG emissions reduction rule may not be enforced. 
This was the first time, after more than fifty successful applica-
tions, that a waiver request under Section 209(b) was denied by 
the EPA.40 
California and several other states have since sued the EPA, 
and the case is currently pending in federal court.41 For  advocates 
of state action to slow the impacts of climate change, the waiver 
denial was both a significant blow to their efforts and a rallying 
cry. Regardless of one’s views on the merits of the EPA deci-
sion, the decision underscores the importance of clarifying the 
role of the states, as this waiver decision is likely to be a major 
court battle lasting several years and costing millions of dollars. 
gReenhouSe gaS peRFoRmance StanDaRDS
In January 2007, California became the first state to adopt 
a greenhouse gas performance standard (“GGPS”).42 This is a 
facility-based emissions standard, affecting electric utilities, 
which requires that all new long-term baseload generation com-
mitments in California produce 
no more emissions than a com-
bined gas cycle turbine plant.43 
It prohibits load-serving entities 
(investor-owned utilities, energy 
service providers, and commu-
nity choice aggregators) from 
entering into long-term finan-
cial commitments (five years 
or more) for baseload genera-
tion with higher than proscribed 
emissions, regardless of the type 
of fuel used in the plant.44 
This means that no new 
coal-fired plants can be built 
in California, nor can existing 
plants make significant capital 
improvements that do not con-
form to the GGPS. In addition, it prohibits California utilities 
from contracting to import power from out of state that does not 
comply with the emissions requirements of the GGPS.45 
consTITuTIonal Issues
The United States’ system of federalism allows the federal 
and state governments to share power in certain areas, while 
each maintains exclusive areas where the other may not regu-
late. The power of the federal government is constrained by the 
Constitution and does not include general police powers, which 
are reserved to the states.46 State governments, however, may 
not regulate certain aspects of interstate and foreign commerce, 
foreign affairs, and other areas of reserved federal power.
When states take actions to regulate greenhouse gases, it 
raises questions about the extent of state authority to regulate 
the economy and the environment. Linking emissions trading 
programs or enacting auto emissions regulations brings states to 
the far end of their regulatory authority, given the transborder 
nature of emission trading and carbon dioxide emissions gen-
erally. This section explores the constitutional issues that can 
potentially arise from state actions to reduce GHG emissions.
commeRce clauSe
The Commerce Clause, Article I, § 8, cl. 3, gives the federal 
government the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations, and among the several States[.]”47 The Supreme Court 
has long considered the Commerce Clause to be “an implicit 
When states take actions 
to regulate greenhouse 
gases, it raises questions 
about the extent of  
state authority to regulate 
the economy and  
the environment.
10wInTer 2008
restraint on state authority, even in the absence of a conflicting 
federal statute.”48 This concept is known as the Dormant Com-
merce Clause—wherein the Constitution acts as a prohibition 
on certain types of state actions that affect interstate commerce, 
invalidating the state law by negative implication.49 
Although the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine has 
gained widespread acceptance, at least two current Supreme 
Court justices (Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas) reject it alto-
gether. Regardless of these two justices, it is highly unlikely that 
a majority of the Court would reject the Dormant Commerce 
Clause doctrine. Were the doctrine to be rejected by the Court, 
state actions would never be invalidated for conflicting with 
unexercised congressional power under the Commerce Clause, 
but would be subject to invalidation only for express or implied 
preemption by federal law. 
The basic test for whether a state law violates the Commerce 
Clause is to look first at whether the law discriminates on its face 
against out-of-state entities or transactions.50 If there is facial 
discrimination, which essentially means a protectionist measure 
that is written in a manner that singles out foreign entities or 
transactions for disadvantageous treatment when compared to 
their in-state counterparts, then the state law will be invalidat-
ed.51 If there is no facial discrimination, the state law can still 
run afoul of the Commerce Clause if it places unwarranted bur-
dens on interstate commerce in a particular application or range 
of applications.52 “Where the statute regulates even-handedly to 
effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on 
interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless 
the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in 
relation to the putative local benefits.”53 
A linked cap-and-trade program may raise questions of dis-
crimination. One of the biggest issues with establishing regional 
cap-and-trade programs is “leakage,” which occurs when a reg-
ulated entity imports cheaper, higher-polluting power from an 
area outside the program to evade cap obligations. For example, 
if an electrical utility in a state covered by RGGI did not possess 
enough allowances for the current year, and it was more eco-
nomical to purchase coal-fired electricity from the neighboring 
state than to buy allowances on the open market, the emissions 
produced by the neighboring utility company would “leak” into 
the regulated space of the cap-and-trade system when the elec-
tricity was purchased by the RGGI-covered company. 
This leakage issue creates a serious problem for regula-
tors. If the trading system allows or remains silent on importing 
power from states that leave GHG emissions unregulated, the 
credibility of the program as a whole will become suspect. At 
the same time, if the regional system were to attempt to ban the 
purchase of any power from non-member states, there would be 
at least a colorable argument of facial discrimination. In order 
to avoid these problems, the designers of regional cap-and-trade 
programs like RGGI will have to find innovative solutions that 
can protect the integrity of the emissions reduction mechanisms 
while at the same time avoiding potential constitutional pitfalls. 
Linking a state or regional cap-and-trade program with a 
foreign trading system like the EU-ETS would raise unique con-
stitutional issues not present in a wholly domestic linkage situa-
tion. Emission trading linkages with foreign parties would create 
a whole host of problems, from verification and standardization 
of credits at an international level to accounting and securities 
disclosure laws and regulations. Credits created by European 
entities would require some sort of regulation under federal 
securities and/or commodities law. The federal government 
would have a good argument that states should not be involved 
in activities over which they do not have full control. Because a 
state cannot independently regulate securities and commodities 
markets, it may be impossible for a state or group of states to 
provide adequate oversight of a market linked to international 
participants. 
In addition, the Dormant Commerce Clause can potentially 
affect attempts to institute greenhouse gas performance stan-
dards. This would not be a discrimination issue, as the perfor-
mance standards are facially neutral. Rather, courts would have 
to look at whether the performance standards unduly burden 
interstate commerce. If California’s rules prohibit long term con-
tracts for the in-state sale of energy from out-of-state coal-fired 
plants, out-of-state producers are likely to cry foul and sue over 
the lost business from California’s utilities. At that point, the 
courts would have to weigh the relative benefits of California’s 
standards against the burden they place on interstate commerce. 
compactS clauSe
The Compacts Clause, Article I, § 10, cl. 3, reads in part: 
“No state shall, without the consent of Congress, . . . enter into 
any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign 
power[.]”54 
In reviewing claims under the Compacts Clause, courts 
look generally to whether states are attempting to enhance their 
power at the expense of the federal government. 
Where an agreement is not ‘directed to the formation 
of any combination tending to the increase of political 
power in the States, which may encroach upon or inter-
fere with the just supremacy of the United States,’ it 
does not fall within the scope of the Clause and will not 
be invalidated for lack of congressional consent.55
The first question that courts look at is whether a contractual 
arrangement, such as a cap-and-trade system, reaches the point 
of being a “compact” under the Compacts Clause. If it is a com-
pact, then it generally must be approved by Congress or it will 
be invalid.56 Once approved by Congress, it reaches the level 
of federal law. Thus, for an unapproved state-to-state or state-
to-foreign-party relationship to be valid, it must not reach the 
formality of being a “compact” for these purposes.
To answer the first question, whether an arrangement is an 
agreement or compact, the courts look to the general indicia of 
a compact. The Supreme Court summarized the relevant factors 
in Northeast Bancorp v. Federal Reserve,57 a decision involving 
an agreement by holding companies to purchase banks: 
The . . . statutes . . . both require reciprocity and impose 
a regional limitation . . . . But several of the classic indi-
cia of a compact are missing. No joint organization or 
body has been established to regulate regional banking 
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or for any other purpose. Neither statute is conditioned 
on action by the other State, and each State is free to 
modify or repeal its law unilaterally. Most importantly, 
neither statute requires a reciprocation of the regional 
limitation.58
From the passage above, one can draw some general criteria 
for determining whether a contractual relationship is an agree-
ment or compact. There should be some sort of joint organiza-
tion or body to govern the agreement, if necessary. It should be 
binding; that is, no state can freely remove itself from the agree-
ment. And it must require a reciprocity of the regional limitation, 
meaning that one party cannot agree to a nationwide program 
while another believes the agreement only covers a handful of 
states. 
Regarding a regional cap-and-trade program, courts are 
unlikely to find that RGGI or a similar program is a compact, 
unless the agreement contains language that conditions actions 
(in one state) on actions by other states and is not freely revo-
cable by participant states. It appears, based on Northeast 
 Bancorp, that a voluntary union, which allows for a state to back 
out should it not want to participate, would not be considered a 
compact for the purposes of the Clause.
However, it is difficult to see how a linked international 
cap-and-trade framework could be crafted so as not to consti-
tute a compact or even a treaty, which would be impermissible 
under Article I, § 10, cl. 1, regardless of the presence or absence 
of congressional approval. In order to have a properly function-
ing linkage between markets, there would need to be guaran-
tees regarding enforceability and permanence. Without legally 
enforceable guarantees about the quality of the credits being 
traded, the markets are unlikely to succeed. There would be a 
serious problem, for example, if an offset project in California 
created credits that were purchased by a steel manufacturer in 
France, and California de-linked itself from the markets. The 
problem of how the French manufacturer would account for the 
credits in the absence of a monitoring or verification mechanism 
to account for what is happening in California is a significant 
one. The only way to ensure the integrity of the credits being 
traded in the marketplace is to create a framework that is robust 
enough to protect all of the parties involved. This would presum-
ably include the inability to voluntarily leave the program and 
would be most easily accomplished with some sort of central 
emissions registry that aggregates and processes data from all 
participants. These components are almost certain to create a 
compact under the Compacts Clause, which would then require 
congressional approval in order to be valid. 
SupRemacy clauSe
The Supremacy Clause, Article VI, cl. 2, defines the Con-
stitution and laws made “in Pursuance thereof” as “the supreme 
Law of the Land[.]”59 This provision allows federal law to pre-
empt state law in certain circumstances. 
“Even without an express provision for preemption, we 
have found that state law must yield to a congressional Act in 
at least two circumstances,” the Supreme Court noted in U.S. 
v. Locke.60 “When Congress intends federal law to ‘occupy the 
field,’ state law in that area is preempted. And even if Congress 
has not occupied the field, state law is naturally preempted to the 
extent of any conflict with a federal statute.”61
A presumption of non-preemption arises in disputes involv-
ing the traditional police powers of the states; despite the pre-
sumption, even the police powers will yield when Congress 
clearly intends to supersede state law.62 In addition, when there 
is a history of significant federal presence in the area of regula-
tion, there is no presumption of state law validity.63 
With a cap-and-trade system, the question is whether any 
federal law creates a conflict or if the federal government other-
wise occupies the field. At this point, Congress has not passed 
any legislation that would present a direct conflict with a multi-
state cap-and-trade system. Indeed, the federal government has 
been remarkably absent from the field of greenhouse gas regula-
tion in general. 
In the wake of Massachusetts v. EPA,64 the federal govern-
ment’s inaction becomes even more stark. The Court noted that 
“EPA has not identified any Congressional action that conflicts 
in any way with the regulation of greenhouse gases from new 
motor vehicles.”65 Although issued in the context of federal 
regulations rather than state statutes, the point is the same: the 
federal government has not taken efforts to regulate GHG emis-
sions. Massachusetts v. EPA held that EPA has the authority 
to regulate GHG emissions from automobiles because they fit 
within the statutory definition of “air pollutant” under § 202(a)
(1).66 The case was remanded to the EPA for the agency to either 
make a finding of endangerment and regulate auto emissions or 
provide a reasoned judgment as to why GHGs do not contribute 
to global warming and can thus escape regulation.67 
Even if the EPA decides to regulate GHG emissions from 
autos, that would not necessarily provide a conflict for a cap-
and-trade program. Most proposals for cap-and-trade programs 
only regulate tailpipe emissions indirectly. If they capture the 
transportation sector, it is done upstream through regulating 
the fuel industry, rather than limiting actual vehicle emissions. 
As a result, it is unlikely that any forthcoming rule stemming 
from Massachusetts v. EPA would preempt state cap-and-trade 
 initiatives. 
The best case for federal preemption would arise if the 
federal government instituted a similar cap-and-trade system 
or other form of comprehensive carbon emissions regulation. 
Any program that created a nationwide price for carbon would 
likely be interpreted as directly conflicting with state programs; 
in the alternative, courts would probably hold that federal efforts 
occupy the field of GHG regulation. But lacking such a program, 
as is currently the case, it is difficult to see any way in which 
a state-organized cap-and-trade program could be preempted 
under the Supremacy Clause. 
Some congressional leaders are advocating for express pre-
emption in any future comprehensive cap-and-trade bill. The 
Dingell-Boucher white paper,68 which discusses the role of 
federal, state, and local governments in efforts to reduce GHG 
emissions, makes the case for express preemption. “[O]nce a 
national, economy-wide cap-and-trade program is adopted, State 
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or regional cap-and-trade programs may interfere with the effi-
cient functioning of the Federal cap-and-trade program[.]”69 As a 
result, “Chairman Dingell has made it very clear that he believes 
that motor vehicle greenhouse gas standards should be set by 
the Federal Government, not by State governments[.]”70 In addi-
tion, the analysis finds that compliance costs and overall system 
costs (including regulatory overhead) are likely to be higher in 
any duplicative system of federal and state/regional regulation.71 
While the current version of the Lieberman-Warner bill actu-
ally encourages and provides incentives for states to take actions 
above and beyond the federal cap-and-trade program,72 there is 
a possibility that an express preemption clause could be part of 
any final bill.
The Supreme Court recently looked at the scope of express 
preemption of state laws, which may be relevant as applied to 
future GHG regulations.73 In Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor 
Transp. Ass’n, several transport carrier associations sued Maine 
over regulations governing the conduct of carriers that deliver 
packages containing tobacco, as a way to help prevent youth 
from purchasing cigarettes through mail-order retailers. Federal 
motor carrier law expressly preempts any state from “enact[ing] 
or enforc[ing] a law . . . related to a price, route, or service of any 
motor carrier . . . with respect to the transportation of property.”74 
The state law, for example, required carriers to utilize a recipi-
ent-verification service, to ensure that the person who ordered 
the tobacco is also the recipient, and that the recipient is at least 
eighteen years old.75 
In holding that the state law was preempted, the court noted 
that “to interpret the federal law to permit these, and similar, 
state requirements could easily lead to a patchwork of state ser-
vice-determining laws, rules, and regulations. That state regula-
tory patchwork is inconsistent with Congress’s major legislative 
effort to leave such decisions, where federally unregulated, to 
the competitive marketplace.”76 This line of reasoning could be 
relevant, particularly for state efforts to regulate GHG emissions 
from automobiles. 
Although there has not been affirmative congressional 
action to deregulate GHG emissions, as there was with the motor 
carrier industry, the threat of inconsistent state regulations is a 
significant tool for the federal government to yield. The threat 
of a patchwork of state laws was one of the major reasons EPA 
Administrator Johnson decided to reject California’s application 
for a waiver—even though there could never be more than just 
the federal standard and the California standard in that instance. 
The easiest way to prevent the threat of a patchwork of standards 
is to include in any federal legislation an express preemption 
clause that prohibits states from acting in a given area.77 Should 
the federal government adopt comprehensive carbon legislation, 
it is likely to include some level of express preemption of state 
laws to ensure a consistent approach for the entire country. This 
will inevitably lead to legal battles that delay the implementation 
of any comprehensive carbon regulation program. 
inteRFeRence with FoReign aFFaiRS
The power to conduct foreign affairs is vested exclusively 
in the federal government. Aspects of the power are constitu-
tionally divided between the President in Article II (e.g., power 
to make treaties) and the Congress in Article I (e.g., power to 
raise an army, declare war). States do not play a role in foreign 
affairs, as it is important for the federal government to be able to 
speak with one voice on behalf of the national interest for mat-
ters involving foreign affairs. 
Generally, the only cases where courts have struck down 
laws as interfering with foreign affairs power are “state or local 
laws purporting to set up their own authorities as mini-state-
departments, with power to oversee and either approve or dis-
approve foreign regimes or the negotiation efforts of the U.S. 
Executive Branch[.]”78
In Zschernig v. Miller,79 the Supreme Court invalidated 
an Oregon law that prevented a nonresident alien from inher-
iting property unless certain conditions were met—primarily, 
a reciprocal right for Americans in the alien’s country and the 
assurance that any property received in Oregon would not be 
confiscated at home. Noting that states are the typical forum 
for probate matters, the Court still found the law problematic. 
“The several States, of course, have traditionally regulated the 
descent and distribution of estates. But those regulations must 
give way if they impair the effective exercise of the Nation’s for-
eign policy.”80 Zschernig involved a citizen of East Germany, a 
country with which the United States had no treaties regarding 
inheritance. Regardless, “even in absence of a treaty, a State’s 
policy may disturb foreign relations.”81 
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council 82 is the first in 
a line of recent foreign affairs cases that focus on state attempts 
to limit contact with foreign countries. The Crosby court heard 
a challenge to a Massachusetts law that prohibited state entities 
from buying goods or services from companies doing business 
with Burma.83 At the time the law was passed, there was no simi-
lar federal prohibition, although a federal law providing for sanc-
tions on Burma was enacted a few months later. Although the 
Court spoke specifically of the Supremacy Clause, the decision’s 
rationale focused heavily on how the Massachusetts law tied the 
President’s hands and thus reduced his leverage against Burma. 
We need not get into any general consideration of lim-
its of state action affecting foreign affairs to realize 
that the President’s maximum power to persuade rests 
on his capacity to bargain for the benefits of access 
to the entire national economy without exception for 
enclaves fenced off willy-nilly by inconsistent political 
tactics.84 
The Crosby reasoning was followed recently in an Illi-
nois case.85 The district court there looked at an Illinois law 
that regulated contact with and investment in Sudan and deter-
mined that the state law was unconstitutional, based primarily 
on Supremacy Clause grounds. There was, however, extensive 
discussion of the foreign affairs powers in the decision. Under-
standing that the federal government has a unique and exclusive 
role in carrying out the country’s foreign policy, the court noted 
that “the degree of impact a state law has or might have on the 
national government’s conduct of foreign affairs is the relevant 
inquiry.”86 In National Foreign Trade Council v. Giannoulias, 
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requiring pension funds to divest from Sudan, while potentially 
raising difficulties for the fund managers, did not interfere with 
the federal government’s authority to conduct foreign affairs.87 
The Giannoulias ruling also contains dicta that is support-
ive of state efforts to reach non-discriminatory agreements with 
foreign entities: the court indicates that “it does not appear that 
state and local governments are prohibited from entering into 
‘sister state’ agreements or other bilateral agreements with sub-
national foreign governments or foreign trade associations.”88
Finally, in American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi,89 the 
Supreme Court extended the ruling in Crosby to areas where 
there was no explicit federal statute, but merely executive agree-
ments between the President and heads of foreign states. Gara-
mendi involved a California law requiring any insurer in the state 
to disclose information about all policies sold in Europe between 
1920 and 1945. This was seen as a way of ensuring that claims 
belonging to Holocaust victims were paid to any survivors and 
their heirs living in California. 
President Clinton, however, had made executive agree-
ments with Germany, Austria, and France so that all claims 
against German insurance companies relating to the Holocaust 
would be heard by an international commission established for 
that purpose.90 The Court noted that the President has consider-
able authority in the area of foreign relations and can act inde-
pendently of Congress. “While Congress holds express authority 
to regulate public and private dealings with other nations in its 
war and foreign commerce powers, in foreign affairs the Presi-
dent has a degree of independent authority to act.” 91 Thus, con-
gressional silence does not undermine the executive agreements, 
which can, even without an explicit conflict, preempt state laws. 
Garamendi was a 5-4 decision, with Justices Rehnquist and 
O’Connor in the majority. Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, which 
was joined by Justices Stevens, Scalia, and Thomas, focused 
on whether there was an explicit conflict between the executive 
agreement and the state law. Without such a conflict the dissent-
ing Justices would not allow an executive agreement to preempt 
a state law. Justice Ginsburg also noted that “the notion of ‘dor-
mant foreign affairs preemption’ with which Zschernig is asso-
ciated resonates most audibly when a state action ‘reflects a state 
policy critical of foreign governments and involves ‘sitting in 
judgment’ on them.’”92 
Applying the case law above to a scenario in which states 
attempted to link to a foreign trading system, the lack of a coher-
ent federal policy on GHG regulation at this point strongly points 
to the constitutionality of such a linkage. The biggest potential 
problem would occur if there is federal legislation that makes 
mention of international linkages, or if the President makes clear 
statements concerning national priorities for GHG regulation 
that conflict with linking domestic trading systems with their 
international counterparts.
Perhaps just as important, any attempt to link to foreign 
emissions trading systems will be viewed very differently from 
the Crosby and Giannoulias cases. States attempting linkages 
will not be disparaging or otherwise passing negative judgment 
on foreign parties, as occurred in those cases involving state laws 
prohibiting or restricting commerce with rogue nations. Without 
that factor, it is difficult to imagine how courts could find any 
sort of interference with America’s foreign policy prerogatives. 
Thus, cap-and-trade system linkages are likely permissible over-
tures to international partners, particularly if the federal govern-
ment still has not undertaken a comprehensive scheme of carbon 
regulation. 
conclusIon
State governments continue to demonstrate leadership in 
combating climate change —from adopting energy efficiency 
standards to enacting renewable portfolio standards to develop-
ing cap-and-trade programs aimed at reducing carbon dioxide 
emissions, often as part of regional compacts. At the same time, 
the Congress is in the process of developing national climate 
change legislation and agencies in the Executive Branch are 
defining their roles. As the federal and state governments begin 
regulating the same areas of the economy and the environment, 
the potential for conflicting programs arises. 
State programs are potentially vulnerable to a variety of 
constitutional challenges, including through the Commerce, 
Compacts, Supremacy, and Foreign Affairs clauses. As the fed-
eral government solidifies its approach to global climate change 
over the next several years, the likelihood for preemption of 
state programs will become more evident. It is apparent now, 
however, that state programs are in serious jeopardy if the fed-
eral government actively seeks to restrict state authority. If the 
current or future President does not want states to play an active 
role in climate change regulation, he or she will have several 
constitutional tools at their disposal to handicap the states’ abili-
ties to create programs that reduce GHG emissions. 
Endnotes: Climate Change and the States
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caliFoRnia SueS epa aFteR ‘unconScionable’ 
waiveR Denial    by Addie Haughey*
*Addie Haughey is a J.D. candidate, May 2010, at American University, Wash-
ington College of Law.
On January 2, 2008 the state of California filed a com-plaint in the 9th Circuit against the Environmental Pro-tection Agency (“EPA”) for its December 2007 denial 
of a Clean Air Act waiver request made by California nearly two 
years before.1
Under the Clean Air Act, California has the ability to enact 
its own air pollution laws due to unique and extreme impacts of 
pollution in the state.2 In order to implement stricter regulations, 
California must acquire a waiver from EPA and the state has 
done this nearly fifty times over the last three decades.3 Previ-
ous waivers allowed California to create laws requiring catalytic 
converters, unleaded gasoline, and other major advancements 
in air pollution reduction, which are often implemented on the 
national level.4
A waiver seeking to impose stricter tail-pipe emission 
standards was originally requested by California on December 
21, 2005.5 The waiver was based on policy developed by the 
California Air Resources Board (“CARB”) that was intended to 
phase in and ramp up greenhouse gas auto emission standards 
starting with the 2009 model year.6 According to CARB, global 
warming emissions would be cut by thirty percent by model year 
2016, which is the equivalent to taking 6.5 million cars off Cali-
fornia roads by 2020.7 The waiver request cited global  warming 
impacts on California’s expansive coastline and the Sierra Moun-
tain snowpack to justify the need to regulate greenhouse gasses.8
The Clean Air Act also allows other states to adopt Cali-
fornia’s standards if they prefer them over the federal alterna-
tive.9 To date, sixteen states comprising forty-five percent of the 
US auto market have adopted or are in the process of adopting 
California standards, which increases the impact of the proposed 
standards, creating the effect of taking twenty-two million cars 
off America’s roads by 2020.10
After California’s waiver request in 2005, Governor Arnold 
Schwarzenegger made multiple efforts to force EPA to grant a 
decision on the waiver, including filing suit in 2007.11 The EPA 
denied the waiver12 on December 19, 2007 the same day that the 
U.S. Congress passed the Energy Independence and Security Act 
of 2007.13 The final Act was a stripped down version of what 
many environmentalists had hoped would be the largest advance-
ment in energy policy in decades.14 Provisions that would have 
allowed tax incentives for renewable energy were left out, but 
the bill does create the first increase in corporate average fuel 
economy (“CAFE”) standards since the 1970s.15 According to 
the White House, new standards will reach thirty-five miles per 
gallon (“mpg”) by 2020.16
Some question whether the waiver denial coming the same 
day as the passage of the energy bill is a coincidence or an 
engineered political compromise. EPA staffers anonymously 
revealed that Johnson made his decision against their unanimous 
recommendations to grant the waiver.17 One staffer went so far 
as to say “California met every criteria . . . on the merits. The 
same criteria we have used for the last 40 years on all the other 
waivers.”18 Johnson, on the other hand, said that his staff “pre-
sented [him] with a range of options with a lot of pros and cons” 
which he considered before deciding to deny the  waiver.19 
The Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers (“AAM”) ada-
mantly denies a compromise, saying there are absolutely no link-
ages between the group’s decision to support the final version of 
the energy bill and EPA’s denial of the California waiver.20 Crit-
ics point out the sudden reversal of AAM’s position after decades 
of vigorous opposition to the increase of emission standards.21
Regardless of whether the political conspiracy theories are 
correct, a bitter battle is brewing between the Schwarzenegger 
and Bush administrations. California began an immediate vol-
ley of sharp words, attacking the EPA assertion that California’s 
plan would not be as effective as the federal strategy. In his let-
ter to Schwarzenegger, Johnson claimed that California’s plan 
would only reach a 33.5 mpg standard as opposed to the federal 
standard of 35 mpg.
Mary Nichols of CARB, who oversaw air regulations under 
the Clinton administration, said that Johnson’s decision shows 
“that this administration ignores the science and ignores the 
law to reach the politically convenient conclusion.”22 Governor 
Schwarzenegger called EPA’s decision “unconscionable” and 
said the EPA was “ignoring the will of millions of people who 
want their government to take action in the fight against global 
warming.”23 California Attorney General Edmund G. Brown, Jr. 
said Johnson “must have consulted a Ouija board, I don’t know 
what else can explain his bizarre decision.”24 
The Los Angeles Times reported that EPA technical and 
legal staff predicted that if the waiver was denied, EPA would 
likely lose a legal challenge to its decision, but that if the waiver 
was granted and the EPA was sued by representatives of the auto 
industry, that EPA is almost certain to win.25 
In the last year several pro-state decisions have been handed 
down in support of regulation of greenhouse gasses, including 
Massachusetts v. EPA and Green Mountain Chrysler v. Crom-
bie. These cases and others involving environmental organiza-
tions are likely to give support to California in the upcoming 
litigation. Despite any predictions, both sides appear ready for 
a fight.
Endnotes: California Sues EPA continued on page 82
15 susTaInable DevelopmenT law & polIcy
InTroDucTIon
The Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”) is rapidly developing as an important element in international cli-mate policy by providing a cost-effective means of com-
plying with the requirements of the Kyoto Protocol. Defined in 
Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, the CDM provides for Annex 
I Parties to implement project activities that reduce emissions of 
greenhouse gases (“GHGs”) in non-Annex I Parties, in return 
for certified emission reductions (“CERs”).1 The CERs gener-
ated by such project activities can be used by Annex I Parties 
to help meet their emissions targets under the Kyoto Protocol 
and can be traded on the inter-
national emissions trading mar-
ket. Article 12 also stresses that 
CDM projects should assist the 
developing country host Par-
ties (non-Annex I Parties) in 
achieving sustainable devel-
opment and in contributing to 
the ultimate objective of the 
United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change 
(“UNFCCC”).2
There are currently more than 900 registered CDM proj-
ects in forty-nine developing countries, and about another 2,000 
projects in the project registration pipeline. The registered proj-
ects have resulted in 117,394,796 issued CERs.3 The CDM is 
expected to generate more than 2.6 billion CERs, each equiva-
lent to one tonne of carbon dioxide, by the time the first commit-
ment period of the Kyoto Protocol ends in 2012.4
Therefore, the CDM is not only an innovative mechanism 
that builds a bridge over the ‘North/South’ gap in the Kyoto 
Scheme, but it also brings together private economic interests 
and public climate policy by helping to channel private sec-
tor investment toward climate-friendly projects that otherwise 
might not have taken place. A CDM project attracts substantial 
transfers in financial and technological services to developing 
countries while promoting climate protection and diminishing 
the extent of national climate change mitigation in developed 
countries.
Thus, it is crucial that a CDM project delivers real climate 
benefits without causing other environmental damages, and 
therefore upholds environmental integrity. Yet, how to ensure 
the CDM’s environmental integrity is a legal challenge that 
remains. Environmental impacts of the CDM have already led 
buyers of carbon credits to increasingly try to protect them-
iS the clean Development mechaniSm  
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selves from liability for environmental damage caused by GHG 
projects.5
legal challenges
The CDM is unique among the flexibility mechanisms of 
the Kyoto Protocol in that it allows Annex I Parties to increase 
their accumulated caps by obtaining emission credits generated 
by investments in a CDM project in an uncapped, developing 
(non-Annex I) Party. Each CER is an additional carbon tonne 
which will entitle an Annex I, “investor,” Party to an equiva-
lent increase in emissions from its territory, while remaining in 
compliance.6
However, the lack of quan-
titative mitigation commitments 
in CDM host countries and an 
interest in a maximal number 
of CERs resulting from a CDM 
project create incentives for both 
sides, CER-buyers/investors and 
host states, involved in a CDM 
project to inflate the amount of 
CERs claimed.7 Therefore, the 
more successful the CDM is at 
generating CERs, the more an 
Annex I Party can use those CERs to increase its territorial emis-
sions above its cap, and the more important it is that each CER 
corresponds to real, long-term, measurable emission reduction. 
Apparently, with increasing volumes of CERs, the environmen-
tal performance of the entire Kyoto System depends upon the 
environmental performance of the CDM. Environmental per-
formance of the CDM depends on the demonstrated ability of 
the CDM system to support the objective of the UNFCCC: to 
stabilize greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere at safe 
levels.8 This ability of the CDM, coupled with avoiding other 
environmental damages is usually referred to as “environmental 
integrity.”9
The importance of environmental integrity has been made 
obvious by the 2005 Meeting of the Parties (“MOP”) 1 when 
adopting the Marrakech Accords (now titled Kyoto Rule Book). 
In decision 2/CMP.1, “Principles, nature and scope of the mech-
The long-term, significant 
reduction of GHGs is a 
necessary condition for 
sustainable development.
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anisms pursuant to Articles 6, 12 and 17 of the Kyoto Proto-
col,” the Parties emphasize that “environmental integrity is to be 
achieved through sound modalities, rules and guidelines for the 
mechanisms, sound and strong principles and rules governing 
land use, land use change and forestry activities, and a strong 
compliance regime.”10
In this Article, I will try to explore what this passage implies 
for the CDM and attempt to highlight some aspects of the cur-
rent design of the CDM that raise concerns about environmental 
integrity.
DeFInITIon oF  
envIronmenTal InTegrITy
Environmental integrity in general refers to the ability of 
an environmental measure to reach its objective and purpose. It 
therefore relates to the quality of the regime, its instruments, and 
its institutions. In the context of the climate regime, the extent to 
which the means are able to achieve the ultimate objective of the 
UNFCCC, as stated in Article 2, is essential in considering the 
environmental integrity of the entire regime.
With regard to the flexibility mechanisms, environmental 
integrity will depend on their capacity to ensure that the Par-
ties included in Annex I do not exceed their assigned amounts. 
Emissions, reductions, and removals need, therefore, not only 
be quantifiable by using the same standard worldwide, but also 
real, complete, accurate, long-term, environmentally conserva-
tive, comparable, and verifiable.
Particularly in the climate regime, environmental integrity 
is a requirement for the promotion of sustainable development 
by a climate measure. The long-term, significant reduction of 
GHGs is a necessary condition for sustainable development. In 
other words, no development is sustainable if the issue of tack-
ling climate change is left unsolved.
envIronmenTal InTegrITy oF The cDm
In the particular case of the CDM, environmental integrity 
can be defined in a wider and a narrower sense. In its narrower 
(or primary) sense, it is the demonstrated ability to approve proj-
ects and to certify emissions reductions that are real and addi-
tional, for example, reductions that would not have occurred 
in the absence of the project, and to support projects that con-
tribute to long-term reductions in GHG concentrations in the 
atmosphere.11 Environmental integrity in a wider (or secondary) 
sense means that other environmental concerns need to be taken 
into account and negative impact avoided. Special concerns in 
this respect relate to biological diversity protection connected to 
land use, land use change, and forestry projects.12 In particular, 
these concerns exist where CO2 sequestration projects (biomass 
or forest sinks) result in large-scale plantations of mono-cultural 
and/or non-indigenous tree species that could pose a threat to, or 
destroy local ecological systems.
some crITIcal aspecTs
aDDitionality anD leakage
One of the key issues for the environmental integrity of 
CDM projects is the additionality of emission reductions or 
removals.13 Article 12(5)(c) of the Kyoto Protocol provides that 
CERs shall be certified if based on reductions that are additional 
to any that would occur in the absence of the project.14 Addi-
tionality is a necessary requirement for making the CDM func-
tion as a mechanism to compensate for emissions that are not 
being reduced domestically by Annex I Parties.15 If CERs are 
created that represent emission reductions that would have hap-
pened anyway, then these “paper reductions” will undermine the 
integrity of the Kyoto Protocol.
Each project participant must demonstrate the additional-
ity of the project in the project design document (“PDD”). Each 
project must describe the baseline scenario from which this 
additionality is measured. This baseline scenario represents the 
GHG emissions that would have occurred in the absence of the 
project. Problematic in this context is the counter-factuality of 
the baseline scenario: the project developer needs to investigate 
what would have happened if the project had not taken place. 
This scenario can lead to hypothetical assumptions, which help 
to inflate the amount of CERs.
To counter such incentives, the project must be based on 
a baseline and monitoring methodology applied to the project 
activity. The Executive Board (“EB”), which is assisted by the 
Panel on Guidelines for Methodologies for Baselines and Moni-
toring Plans (“Meth Panel”), are to approve the methodologies.16 
However, the issue here is whether the EB and/or the Meth Panel 
are adequately equipped to carry out this task. Concerns have 
arisen with respect to the member’s capacity to carry this task 
and to the financial budget available for this kind of work.17
The PDD must further include the project boundary and any 
adjustments for leakage. This means that a project must calculate 
all GHG emissions under the control of the project participants 
that are significant and reasonably attributable to the project 
activity. These must then be adjusted for net changes of green-
house gas emissions outside of the project boundary, which are 
measurable and contributable to the project activity.18
Additionality coupled with prevention of leakage helps to 
address concerns that investments in the CDM could displace, 
rather than replace, GHG-intensive activities. An example of 
such leakage would occur if a CDM project reduced fossil fuels 
where it meant to, but also resulted in increases elsewhere. The 
challenge, however, is how to define “project boundaries” and 
“emissions under the control of the project participant” in this 
context. “Leakage” might easily be detected if it happens in the 
same industrial sector or the same region, however, increases 
can also occur across country borders. These emissions might 
hardly be found to be under the control of the project developer, 
and thus not calculable in the baseline-scenario.
In order to survive an “environmental integrity check,” a 
CDM project would need to prove that its additionality does not 
lead to increased emissions elsewhere or slow climate change 
mitigation efforts. It is within the climate regime that a solution 
to this situation needs to be found. Therefore, the design of the 
CDM has to prevent projects that lead to a net increase in emis-
sions, whether that is in the same sector, in other sectors, in other 
regions of the same country, or in other countries. 
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The additionality criterion in its present state, despite being 
crucial to the environmental integrity of the CDM, can create 
adverse policy incentives to climate change mitigation. The 
potential of CDM projects to generate much-needed investment 
flows into a host country has led some developing countries to 
back off from implementing more progressive energy or climate 
policies and the respective legislation needed. These policies 
and laws, if integrated into the baseline, would disqualify CDM 
projects that aim at meeting these new standards or thresholds 
because they no longer would be additional.19
In order to promote environmental integrity while encour-
aging progressive climate policies in these countries, a solution 
to, and safeguard against, this disturbing situation must be found 
within the climate regime.
contRibution to SuStainable Development
The contribution of the CDM to sustainable development 
needs to be seen in terms of host country development, as 
expressed as one of the CDM goals mentioned above. Given the 
reference to the objective of the Convention and the role that cli-
mate change mitigation itself plays in sustainable development,20 
any assessment of the CDM’s contribution must also recognize 
the wider role projects and the mechanism itself can play as cat-
alysts for sustainable development of host States.21
CDM’s contribution to sustainable development was sub-
ject to considerable debate during the negotiations of the Kyoto 
Protocol and the Marrakesh Accords and is under improvement 
still.22 In particular, host countries have been concerned about 
their sovereignty and largely unwilling to accept externally deter-
mined sustainable development priorities imposed on them.23 
This led to only marginal references to sustainable development 
in the Marrakesh Accords, which leave the meaning of “sustain-
able development” undefined. Rather, under the climate regime, 
it remains the host country’s sovereign prerogative to determine 
whether a particular CDM project helps it achieve this goal.24 
Thus, relatively little is achieved in terms of affecting the growth 
pattern of developing countries.
A project is, in the absence of any alternative, considered 
to contribute to sustainable development if it is congruent with 
existing national development policies.25 This “subjective” 
approach to sustainable development translates into curtailing 
and challenging the potential of the CDM. Though, there are a 
few concerns. 
First, designing the CDM and meeting CDM project eligi-
bility requirements present significant challenges because host 
countries have different economic conditions, natural resources, 
and development priorities. Thus, they have different percep-
tions about what is required to achieve sustainable development. 
Selecting sustainable development criteria and assessing the sus-
tainable development impact can therefore differ significantly 
from one host country to another.
Despite several ideas about quality standards or indicators 
of sustainable development,26 which provide some guidance on 
what should be taken into account, in the end, it is currently the 
host country’s sovereign decision to ascertain whether a CDM 
project activity promotes its sustainable development targets.27 
Therefore, the Designated National Authorities (“DNAs”) in 
developing countries are tasked with issuing a Letter of Approval 
attesting to the project’s contribution to their countries’ sustain-
able development.28 A CDM project can only be registered if 
such affirmation is provided to the CDM Executive Board. This 
leads to uncertainty and creates a disincentive for investment 
decisions.
Second, while there is, without a doubt, a strong potential 
for synergies between addressing environmental problems and 
national development goals,29 there is also the danger that accept-
ing congruency with existing development policies may not lead 
to a change of benefits to sustainable development since most 
existing national development policies lead to increasing GHG 
emissions.30 Thus, the congruency requirement is not a high 
threshold, if any at all, in terms of sustainable development.31
Which Path to Follow?
From the point of sustainable development, a low energy 
path is, most likely, the optimal way.32 However, most devel-
opment paths are likely to lead to increasing energy demands 
and depend on the availability of energy resources to meet these 
demands. It is unrealistic to assume that developing countries, or 
developed countries for that matter, will in the near future change 
to development strategies based on constant or declining levels 
of energy consumption. Energy is fundamental to advancing the 
economic and social dimensions of sustainable development.33 
However, sustainable development requires that, different from 
the scenario outlined in Figure 1, meeting increasing energy 
demand must not go along with increasing CO2 emissions.
FIgure 1: energy-relaTeD co2 emIssIons
34
In 1987, the World Commission of Environment and Devel-
opment (“WCED”) noted that it is essential that demands be met 
by energy sources that are dependable, safe, and environmen-
tally sound.35 In particular the latter, but arguably all three crite-
ria for such “sustainable energy supply,” require the decoupling 
of energy supply from increasing greenhouse gas emissions.
Achieving sustainable development in developing, and 
developed, countries, thus depends on more efficient energy use, 
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reduction of energy consumption, and, importantly, the decar-
bonisation of their economies. Unless the impact of the CDM 
spurs climate-friendly policies in developing countries, it will 
promote only one of the CDM’s triple goals: the cost effective 
compliance of Annex I countries with their emission reduction 
commitments. However, it will not contribute to the ultimate 
objective of the UNFCCC, as it would not assist non-Annex I 
Parties in contributing to stabilizing GHG concentrations, nor 
contribute to the sustainable development of non-Annex I Par-
ties in any meaningful way. 
The question is whether developing countries should be 
accorded a privileged position when considering their sustain-
able development path. The WCED, in promoting the transition 
to a sustainable energy era, suggested that traditional fossil fuel 
use should be accepted in devel-
oping countries in order to real-
ize their growth potential, while 
developed countries should seek 
to limit their uses of fossil fuel.36 
This recommendation is prob-
lematic. Sustainable develop-
ment does not require increased 
fossil fuel consumption in devel-
oping countries. What it requires 
are equal development oppor-
tunities, however, these depend 
on the availability of energy resources in general, and not only 
fossil fuels. To grant developing countries a preferential “right” 
to use fossil fuels would also burden them with an obligation 
to reduce emissions. Rather, sustainable development requires 
avoiding such a burden from the outset.
Sustainable development in developing countries means 
enabling them to achieve higher levels of economic develop-
ment with much reduced levels of greenhouse gas emissions and 
environmental damage. Copying the negative example of indus-
trialized nations is certainly not sustainable.
Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan pointed out the 
inconvenient truth that, “energy security cannot be achieved 
without recognition of the environmental consequences of 
energy consumption, ‘especially our currently overwhelm-
ing and deeply entrenched reliance on fossil fuels.’”37 He said 
“the need to increase energy supplies in order to fight poverty 
could entail a vicious circle but added that this does not need to 
happen” because energy supplies do not depend on fossil fuels 
only.38
In order to move toward sustainable development, develop-
ing countries also must systematically decrease the carbon inten-
sity of their economic development through renewable energy 
systems, enhanced energy efficiency, and introduction of clean 
technologies, with the financial and technological assistance of 
industrialized countries. Thus, with respect to developing coun-
tries, the purpose of the CDM can be understood as assisting in 
the transformation of their economies. Therefore, the CDM is a 
crucially important global financial vehicle to catalyze national 
transitions toward sustainable development in host countries 
by increasing “green investment” flows into energy supplies, 
transportation, and other industrial sectors.39 In this sense, it 
is evident, as the acting head of the UN Climate Change Sec-
retariat stated, “that the Kyoto Protocol is making a significant 
contribution towards sustainable development of developing 
countries.”40
Reality
The reality of CDM projects has so far been quite different 
from their initial conception.41 As has been noted, almost all pro-
posed and approved projects to date have primarily focused on 
maximizing the generation of CERs instead of focusing on sus-
tainable development.42 Thus, three contentious issues related to 
carbon dioxide capture and storage (“CCS”), HFC-23 projects, 
and forest conservation, arose.43
First, including CCS proj-
ects aimed at capturing CO2 
emissions from industrial 
sources and subsequently stor-
ing the gas underground or in 
the sub-seabed of the oceans in 
the scope of the CDM raises not 
only complicated technological 
questions with regard to ensur-
ing permanence and monitor-
ing, but also legal questions as 
to whether the injection of CO2 
in geological formations should count as a non-emission, emis-
sion reduction, or carbon sequestration.44 It also raises more 
fundamental points as to the contribution to sustainable develop-
ment of such projects. Critics allege that this kind of technologi-
cal advance channels substantial research and development into 
end-of-pipe technological fixes without contributing to long-
term benefits to low-carbon intensive technological develop-
ment. Though in fact, it might actually delay the transition from 
fossil fuels to more sustainable energy systems.45 The Member 
States of the Kyoto Protocol confirmed that 
carbon dioxide capture and storage in geological for-
mations should lead to the transfer of environmentally 
safe and sound technology and know-how, Noting that 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change special 
report on carbon dioxide capture and storage provides 
a comprehensive assessment of the scientific, technical, 
environmental, economic and social aspects of carbon 
dioxide capture and storage technologies as mitigation 
options.46
However, it was also recognized that “there remain a num-
ber of unresolved technical, methodological, legal and policy 
issues relating to carbon dioxide capture and storage activities 
under the clean development mechanism” and “that there is a 
need for capacity-building on carbon dioxide capture and stor-
age technologies and their applications.”47 It is therefore timely 
and necessary to place a wider assessment of CCS and sustain-
able development on the research agendas.
Second, another challenge to the promotion of sustainable 
development by the CDM concerns the proposed inclusion of 
The reality of CDM 
projects has so far been 
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HFC-23 projects. HFC-23, a greenhouse gas listed in Annex 
A of the Kyoto Protocol, is a by-product in the production of 
Hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFC-22), an ozone-depleting gas 
regulated under the Montreal Protocol. Incineration of HFC-23 
at existing production sites is already an accepted and practiced 
CDM project, generating low cost CERs ($0.50 per tonne of CO2 
equiv.). Expanding the scope of CDM projects to new incin-
eration sites could create the perverse incentive to increase the 
production of HCFC-22 to generate larger amounts of HFC-23. 
Sustainable development is further undermined by the fact that 
HFC-23 projects provide no technology transfer to develop-
ing countries and the low cost CERs from these projects could 
actually lead to outpacing other high-quality projects. Again, no 
final decision has been taken on this issue and the MOP1 asked 
the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice 
(“SBSTA”) for further elabora-
tions.48 Also, it is recommended 
that the discussions around this 
issue seriously consider the 
impacts on sustainable devel-
opment due to the extension of 
such projects.
Third, one of the major 
omissions of the current design 
of the climate regime is a plan 
for reducing emissions from 
deforestation in developing 
countries and accounting for-
est conservation activities. A proposal by Papua New Guinea 
and Costa Rica submitted to the 11th Conference of Parties 
(“COP”)/MOP1 in 2005 seeks to include forest conservation 
activities under the CDM or, alternatively, suggests elaborating 
an optional Protocol to the Climate Convention. Yet, at COP13/
MOP3 held in Bali, there was still no final decision made regard-
ing the role for avoided deforestation in the CDM. Thus, for-
est conservation, avoided deforestation, and accounting for both 
will be dealt with as part of the post-2012 package. Still, the 
inclusion of forest conservation projects could bring about the 
win-win situation envisaged by sustainable development, where 
economic value is attached to the protection of ecological assets. 
For developing countries, CDM benefits from “avoided defores-
tation” could bring about social and economic improvements via 
the transfer of environmentally sound technologies, in this case 
ones not directly linked to the project, as well as wider environ-
mental benefits, such as biodiversity protection.
Safeguards
Sustainable development must be clearly defined, and seri-
ously and actively pursued through the CDM. Ensuring the integ-
rity of the CDM with regard to the sustainable development paths 
of host countries, demands strong safeguards. However, no such 
safeguards exist for ensuring sustainable development. Despite 
the above-proposed relatively straightforward definition of sus-
tainable development in a climate context, for example, where 
economic growth is decoupled from GHG emission growth, the 
climate regime has yet to embrace this understanding.
To meet the requirements of sustainability, a CDM project 
with adverse trade ramifications will need to demonstrate an 
ability to overcome the still existing obstacles and shortcomings 
of the Kyoto/Marrakech system.
The legal review of CDM projects, whether it takes place 
under the compliance system of the Kyoto Protocol,49 an inter-
national arbitral tribunal,50 or the WTO Dispute System, will 
supposedly establish a definition of sustainable development 
requirements under the CDM. Regardless, it is important that 
climate law and practice construe a coherent understanding of 
sustainable development. While searching for the conceptual-
ization and definition of sustainable development as an external 
tributary into international climate law, the converse normative 
flow might be at least as valid and probable, and perhaps more 
significant in the long run.51
If sustainable development 
is to be seriously pursued, CDM 
projects will need to go beyond 
more immediate impacts and 
provide “long-term benefits” as 
required by Article 12(5) of the 
Kyoto Protocol. However, those 
immediate benefits are equally 
necessary. No long-term bene-
fits can be attributed to the CDM 
if it does not lead to real, mea-
surable, and additional emission 
reductions.52
The benefits generated by CDM projects may lessen reli-
ance on carbon-intensive development. An analysis of sustain-
able development benefits accruing from CDM projects has 
identified the following advantageous impacts: direct financial 
incentives for proving the competitiveness of new technologies 
for energy reduction, renewable energy generation, and increase 
of energy efficiency, such as sustainable energy technologies; 
development of supporting policy initiatives; increased under-
standing and acceptance of the importance and application of 
sustainable energy technologies; dissemination of best-practice 
techniques; strengthening of local institutional, financial and 
technological capacity; increased and sustainable foreign invest-
ment; and increased access to sustainable energy services.53
Arguably, the most sophisticated analytical methodology 
for identifying sustainable CDM projects is the proposed Gold 
Standard, though other approaches exist.54 The Gold Standard 
aims to ensure that CDM projects deliver real emissions reduc-
tions and clear contributions to sustainable development. The 
criteria established are divided into three screens: the project 
type, additionality and baselines, and sustainable development. 
In regards to the latter particularly, the Gold Standard creates 
a sustainability matrix, in addition to an environmental impact 
assessment and stakeholder consultation. The matrix aims at 
assessing a project’s contribution to sustainable development 
based on its environmental, social, and economic impacts.55 The 
key variables are assessed on the basis of on-site measurement, 
existing data, and stakeholder consultation, and can score nega-
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tive or positive. If the overall contribution is positive and non-
negative in all key components, then a project is considered as 
contributing to sustainable development.
While the Gold Standard certainly is laudable, its success 
will depend on its acceptance by project developers, host and 
investor countries, and the multilateral climate regime, particu-
larly the Executive Board. So far, it has acquired a closer and 
more specific understanding of sustainable development. The 
Gold Standard, together with other approaches to identifying 
“sustainable” CDM projects,56 helps to clarify the substance of 
sustainable development not only in the particular context of 
CDM projects, but also beyond this mechanism. The identified 
criteria and components, if they are accepted and used to guide 
further project development, would reflect the understanding of 
the international community, both North and South, of sustain-
able development. This understanding could be decisive if com-
pliance with WTO norms were at stake.
pRoceDuRalS
Additionally, procedural safeguards of direct contribu-
tion of CDM projects to sustainable development in develop-
ing countries, more specific requirements on sustainable impact 
assessment, public consultation and participation, and benefit 
sharing57 have yet to be included in the CDM regime.58
Impact Assessment
As with the response to sustainable development indicators, 
the idea of a mandatory environmental and sustainable impact 
assessment for all CDM projects was seen as an infringement on 
the sovereignty of potential host States. As a result, the final lan-
guage of the agreement is weak, requiring nothing more than an 
analysis of environmental impacts only if the host country makes 
it mandatory for the project to be approved.59 The CDM Modali-
ties and Procedures do not provide for a situation where the host 
country does not have any laws on environmental impact assess-
ment. However, if stakeholders have concerns about the local 
environment or the social impact of a CDM project, then the 
project should be evaluated under the highest international envi-
ronmental and social assessment procedures and standards.60
However, the more stringent the rules on environmental and 
sustainable impact assessment are, the more costly CDM proj-
ects might become. Since a host country benefits from a CDM 
project, the absence of harmonized international rules may cre-
ate an incentive for the host country to refrain from insisting on 
a thorough impact assessment, in order to make its own market 
attractive for CDM projects. “The CDM’s geographical flexibil-
ity,” warn Meijer and Werksman, “should not become a means 
of channelling projects to host countries with the lowest envi-
ronmental standard.”61
Internationally harmonized rules on environmental and 
sustainable impact assessment of a CDM project would counter 
such a perverse incentive. In order for a CDM project to pass a 
sustainability test, they might, indeed, be necessary. Still, such a 
test would evaluate the circumstances of a particular CDM proj-
ect. In this case, it needs to be shown that the environmental and 
sustainable impacts were thoroughly assessed.
Public Participation
Involvement of stakeholders, defined as “the public, includ-
ing individuals, groups or communities affected or likely to be 
affected” by the CDM project,62 gives an opportunity to a wider 
circle to comment on CDM projects at various stages of the proj-
ect cycle. The modalities of the CDM require certain types of 
information to be made public. Public participation could lead 
to benefits in regards to environmental integrity and sustainable 
development. Local communities and NGOs could influence 
project design as their knowledge of local conditions might be 
of particular value, thus making it easier for project developers 
to recognize community needs and gain public support, and to 
avoid delays, financial risks, local unrest, or legal action. 
So far, stakeholder involvement requirements are only of a 
procedural character. Comments from the public must be invited 
and compiled and form an official input as part of the validation 
and registration process of a project. However, the concerns of 
stakeholders are not required to be substantially reflected in the 
project development. Again, these restrictions on direct public 
involvement resulted from the unwillingness of countries with 
different approaches to public participation to agree on harmo-
nized standards.63
However, the requirements of environmental integrity and 
sustainable development may demand a stronger commitment 
to stricter and harmonized standards for and more direct influ-
ence of public involvement.64 The reference to international 
standards for public participation would prevent a “race to the 
bottom” toward countries with low or no regulation on public 
involvement.
in Sum
Despite the fact that it is the stated goal of the CDM to 
achieve the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC and to assist non-
Annex I countries in developing sustainability, the present regu-
latory framework remains somewhat rudimentary in setting up 
and standardizing essential substantial and procedural require-
ments for meeting these goals. Therefore, the rather pragmatic 
and fragmented approach taken so far to ensure the CDM’s envi-
ronmental and sustainable integrity will need to be replaced by a 
stronger, harmonized regulatory framework. 
conclusIon
Whether the CDM will provide a basis for future multi-
lateral climate policy depends on the willingness of nations to 
commit themselves to the deeper emission cuts that, as scientific 
evidence suggests, are necessary.65 Discussions about the CDM 
during the negotiations of COP13/MOP3 in Bali in December 
2007 signified the considerable potential of the CDM to bring 
about consensus on the terms of global climate policy at some 
point in the future.
UNFCCC Executive Secretary, Yvo de Boer, noted at this 
event:
The CDM has been the focus of intense scrutiny, and 
rightly so, by those who wish to ensure the mecha-
nism’s environmental integrity and contribution to 
sustainable development, as well by those who want 
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to ensure cost effectiveness. The conclusion that we 
can draw, looking back from this milestone, is that the 
CDM is delivering what it was meant to deliver—emis-
sion reductions and development. What’s more, it has 
shown that it can evolve, adapt and improve.66
This positive conclusion will also be subject to scrutiny 
and criticism in the future. Despite the achievements, much still 
needs to be done in order to secure sound environmental out-
comes of the CDM.
Whether the CDM is going to play an important role in any 
post-2012 agreement will depend on the CDM’s ability to meet 
its triple goals: to assist non-Annex I Parties in achieving sus-
tainable development, to contribute to the ultimate objective of 
the Convention, and to help Parties included in Annex I achieve 
compliance with their quantified emission limitation and reduc-
tion commitments.67
Still, the increasing interest in the CDM has spread to non-
Kyoto countries as well. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initia-
tive of seven U.S. states, for example, envisages a cap-and-trade 
system to be in place by 2009. The plants covered by the scheme 
will presumably be allowed to use “offset credits,” emissions 
reductions achieved outside the electricity sector. Such credits 
could be “born in the USA” following similar rules as those 
from projects generating emissions reduction under the CDM. 
However, the plan envisages that under certain conditions, they 
may also stem directly from CDM projects. 
The implications for the environmental integrity of the CDM 
should non-Kyoto Parties be allowed to receive CERs are yet to 
be assessed. While the interest in the CDM is steadily increas-
ing, so are the challenges to ensuring its environmental integrity 
and its contribution to sustainable development.
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InTroDucTIon
At the December 2007 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Bali, Indonesia, negotiators overcame tremendous differences to agree on a “Bali Roadmap” 
process intended to determine a successor to the Kyoto Proto-
col to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (“UNFCCC”),1 whose current commitments to reduce 
global greenhouse gas (“GHG”) 
emissions expire in 2012.2 While 
the United States rejected the 
Kyoto Protocol,3 there appear to 
be decent prospects that it will 
join its post-2012 successor.4
Among other ambitious 
goals, the Bali Roadmap pro-
cess, through the “Bali Action 
Plan” agreement, calls for the 
development of both national 
and international measures to 
mitigate climate change, based 
on a “shared vision for long-
term cooperative action.”5 
However, reflecting a deep rift 
between developed and devel-
oping countries, the Bali Action 
Plan prescribes “common but 
differentiated responsibilities”6 
in which developed countries 
commit to quantified and veri-
fiable GHG emission reduc-
tions, but developing countries are only required to contribute 
“appropriate mitigation actions . . . in the context of sustainable 
development.”7 In short, under the Bali Roadmap, only devel-
oped countries must actually reduce GHG emissions.
This core doctrine of “common but differentiated respon-
sibilities” in the Bali Roadmap may have been politically indis-
pensable to reaching agreement in Bali, but it has substantial 
complicating implications for international trade in goods and 
the competitiveness of U.S. industries. The problem, in a phrase, 
is “carbon leakage.”8 If developed economies like the United 
States and EU impose higher costs on carbon dioxide (“CO2”) 
and other GHG emissions (the economic consequence of set-
ting and tightening caps on such emissions) than do developing 
countries, one result will be an incentive to shift GHG-intensive 
inteRnational tRaDe law anD the  
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In the United States, 
unilateral trade 
restrictions appear to be 
emerging as a mechanism 
of choice as Congress 
evaluates its options  
for legislating a solution  
to the carbon  
leakage problem. 
manufacturing from the former to the latter. This could lead to 
the reduction of such production in developed countries and an 
increase in exports of GHG-intensive goods from developing 
to developed countries.9 In the context of China’s massive and 
growing trade surpluses and its emergence as the world’s larg-
est emitter of CO2,
10 lawmakers in the United States and other 
developed countries face a tricky challenge—how to proceed 
with the urgent task of imposing 
meaningful national curbs on 
GHG emissions while ensuring 
that domestic industries are not 
disadvantaged by imports pro-
duced pursuant to less onerous 
emissions requirements.
In the United States, uni-
lateral trade restrictions appear 
to be emerging as a mechanism 
of choice as Congress evalu-
ates its options for legislating a 
solution to the carbon leakage 
problem. However, it is far from 
clear if the trade restrictions 
under consideration comply 
or conflict with current global 
trading rules under the World 
Trade Organization (“WTO”). 
Such restrictions also do not 
appear to mesh well with U.S. 
trade policy, which generally 
favors trade liberalization. Uni-
laterally imposed national trade restrictions would also, at first 
blush, appear inconsistent with the goal established in the Bali 
Action Plan of a globally coordinated approach to the reduction 
of greenhouse gas emissions. This Article examines the most 
visible proposed legislative solution to carbon leakage currently 
under consideration in the United States in light of WTO rules, 
U.S. trade policy, and the multilateral goals espoused in the Bali 
Action Plan. This Article also proposes that current U.S. trade 
remedy laws provide a useful analogy for understanding and 
addressing the concerns of domestic manufacturing industries as 
they grapple with the carbon leakage problem.
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regulaTIng u.s. ImporTs To ensure  
FaIr compeTITIon
Of the various recent legislative proposals that would reduce 
U.S. emissions of GHGs, the most prominent is the America’s 
Climate Security Act of 2007 (“ACSA”), introduced by Senators 
Joe Lieberman (D-CT) and John Warner (R-VA) on October 18, 
2007.11 ACSA would establish a national emissions cap on six 
GHGs, including CO2, which would decline from 2012 through 
2050,12 and would institute mechanisms to allocate emissions 
allowances to a range of covered U.S. GHG-emitting indus-
tries.13 Senators Lieberman and Warner introduced ACSA in the 
Senate two months prior to the release of the Bali Action Plan, 
and the ACSA is not expressly tied to that multilateral process. 
However, both measures are a clear reflection of the strong polit-
ical will in the United States 
and in many other countries to 
move quickly and in a globally 
coordinated fashion to reduce 
GHG emissions and stave off 
the worst expected effects of 
climate change.
Recognizing the adverse 
competitive effects that could 
result to U.S. manufacturing 
industries competing against 
foreign industries not subject 
to such measures—i.e., the car-
bon leakage problem—ACSA 
would require the Administra-
tion to urge other countries to 
adopt comparable measures to 
reduce GHG emissions.14 Oth-
erwise, U.S. industries would 
have systemically higher com-
pliance costs than their for-
eign competitors—and such an 
imbalance would only increase 
over time as U.S. emissions 
caps decline. But also recognizing that a globally coordinated 
approach to reducing GHG emissions may or may not occur, 
ACSA would, as of 2020, require importers of GHG-intensive 
products to declare to U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
(“CBP”) either that: (1) the imported goods are covered by spe-
cial international allowances created under ACSA,15 or (2) the 
exporting country is one deemed under ACSA to have taken 
measures to reduce GHG emissions comparable to those taken 
by the United States.16 The import provisions expressly cover 
GHG-intensive manufactured goods such as iron, steel, alumi-
num, cement, bulk glass, and paper, and would extend to any 
manufacturing production process that generates GHG emis-
sions “comparable” to the expressly covered products.17 Thus, 
ACSA has the obvious potential to impose very substantial 
compliance costs on U.S. importers of a wide range of manufac-
tured goods, and seems certain to alter the competitive balance 
between U.S. and foreign firms supplying ACSA-covered goods 
to the U.S. market. While these added import compliance costs 
(in essence, constituting a trade restriction) would be justified 
from the U.S. perspective as attempting to restore the competi-
tive balance of U.S. industries harmed by imports from coun-
tries with less stringent emissions restrictions, it seems unlikely 
that U.S. trading partners would willingly accept such unilateral 
import restrictions.
ACSA’s import restrictions are not the only type of mecha-
nism under consideration as the U.S. Congress examines how 
to address competitive disadvantages to U.S. industries result-
ing from the carbon leakage problem. The U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives Committee on Energy and Commerce identified 
two other possible mechanisms to address the competitiveness 
concerns for U.S. industry associated with carbon leakage in a 
widely cited January 2008 White 
Paper.18 One is the adoption of 
carbon intensity standards for 
energy-intensive products, which 
would apply to all such products 
sold in the United States regard-
less of their origin.19 Fees would 
presumably be imposed on prod-
ucts that do not meet those carbon 
intensity standards, to compel 
the sale in the United States of 
only those products that do meet 
those standards.20 The American 
Iron and Steel Institute and the 
Steel Manufacturers Association 
are major proponents of carbon 
intensity standards, and have 
criticized the proposed ACSA 
import mechanism for, among 
other things, encouraging foreign 
governments to provide subsidies 
to their exporters to the United 
States of greenhouse gas-inten-
sive goods.21
The third possible option for addressing carbon leakage 
identified in the White Paper would make foreign countries’ 
access to U.S. carbon markets contingent on their imposition of 
GHG emissions restrictions comparable to those adopted in the 
United States.22 Such incentives could take several forms, such 
as more generous terms of access for countries that agree more 
quickly to emissions caps comparable to those imposed in the 
United States.23 However, import restrictions along the lines of 
those proposed by ACSA, while contentious, are generally seen 
at this point as having the best chances of passage in the U.S. 
Congress.
The EU is also contemplating unilateral trade measures that 
could restrict imports as part of its ambitious drive to reduce 
carbon emissions across a wide range of industries by twenty 
percent by 2020.24 While no such import measure is currently 
in effect, EU leaders such as French President Nicolas Sarkozy 
and European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso have 
The EU is also 
contemplating unilateral 
trade measures that could 
restrict imports as part of 
its ambitious drive  
to reduce carbon emissions 
across a wide range  
of industries by twenty 
percent by 2020.
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repeatedly referred to the possibility of imposing a carbon tax 
or allowance requirement (similar to the scheme contemplated 
by ACSA) on imports from countries not in compliance with 
Kyoto Protocol emission reduction requirements (i.e., the United 
States).25 These suggestions have drawn strong criticism from 
U.S. trade officials, who warn that such proposals could facili-
tate WTO-inconsistent trade protectionism under the guise of 
environmental protection.26
Notably, the recent proposed directives of the European 
Commission that form the centerpiece of the ambitious EU cli-
mate change package do not, with certain limited exceptions, 
impose restrictions on imports.27 However, the economic burden 
of the carbon leakage problem is potentially just as acute for EU 
industries as it is for U.S. industries. It therefore seems inevitable 
that the EU will eventually need to contemplate some scheme 
akin to the ACSA import restrictions to address the competi-
tiveness concerns of its carbon-intensive industries as emissions 
restrictions begin to increase production costs. Indeed, Euro-
pean steelmakers recently threatened to delay expansion plans in 
Europe pending EU adoption of appropriate measures to account 
for the competitive impact of carbon-intensive imports.28
TesTIng acsa’s ImporT provIsIons unDer The 
wTo anD u.s. TraDe polIcy
The trade provisions of ACSA clearly raise the question of 
U.S. compliance with obligations under the WTO. The ques-
tion of WTO compliance has been at the forefront of Congress’ 
consideration of ACSA’s import measures.29 The debate poten-
tially implicates many aspects of the WTO Agreements, but 
centers around two core concepts: (1) the “national treatment” 
principle of Article III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (“GATT”), which, in essence, obligates WTO Members 
to ensure that imported goods are subjected to regulatory and 
tax treatment no more burdensome than the treatment to which 
the same goods, produced domestically, are subjected;30 and (2) 
the GATT Article XX defense, which allows WTO Members 
to take discriminatory action against imports where “neces-
sary to protect human, animal or plant life or health”—but only 
where such action does not constitute “arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination” 31 or represent a disguised trade restriction.32 
GATT Article XX, the plain language of which does not seem 
to perfectly capture the concerns surrounding GHG emissions, 
is as close as the WTO Agreements come to permitting trade 
restrictions based on climate change mitigation.33 It remains 
unclear—and the source of considerable concern—whether U.S. 
laws such as ACSA would be vulnerable to attack from WTO 
Members alleging that ACSA discriminates against their exports 
to the United States, but that it does not meet the narrow GATT 
Article XX tests permitting such trade discrimination.34
In the most recent relevant case, involving a Brazilian ban 
on imports of retreaded tires, the WTO Appellate Body found 
that, while Brazil’s import ban constituted a permissible means 
of protecting human health, the fact that Brazil also permitted 
imports of retreaded tires from neighboring MERCOSUR coun-
tries resulted in trade discrimination not rationally connected to 
the human health objective of the import ban.35 Because of this 
absence of a rational connection between the objective of the 
import ban and the manner in which it was applied, the import 
ban did not satisfy the narrow GATT Article XX test. This most 
recent WTO decision—in particular the rational connection test 
applied by the WTO Appellate Body—provides an important 
roadmap for U.S. lawmakers crafting climate change legislation, 
but by no means answers whether ACSA or other such legis-
lation, once implemented, would pass the GATT Article XX 
test if challenged. As noted in the congressional White Paper 
discussed above, “while Congress has control over which trade-
related measure to include in a climate bill, the determination of 
such a provision’s legitimacy under WTO rules is out of U.S. 
hands.”36
The retaliation issue matters, because a loss at the WTO 
could mean the conferral on U.S. trading partners of substan-
tial retaliation rights. Previously stung by WTO losses pro-
viding substantial retaliation rights to the complaining WTO 
Members,37 U.S. law- and policy-makers are justifiably nervous 
about the possible outcome of a WTO challenge to ACSA’s 
import provisions.
ACSA’s import measures also are likely to re-activate the 
longstanding debate about whether the WTO Agreements pro-
hibit or allow trade regulation based on so-called processes and 
production methods (“PPMs”). The basic terms of the debate can 
be summarized in the following question: May WTO Members 
regulate imports based on the way a good is made (i.e., PPMs), 
or must WTO Members base such regulation on the physical 
attributes of the good in the condition as imported? It is easy to 
see why some might characterize ACSA’s import provisions as 
PPMs, as their application arguably hinges on the “emissions 
footprint” of the imported good, rather than its physical charac-
teristics at the time the good crosses the border.
The WTO jurisprudence to date does not provide a defini-
tive answer on the WTO-consistency of PPMs, and WTO experts 
are divided on the question. One recent commentator assembled 
a long list of statements supporting the view that PPMs can 
never (or almost never) be justified under WTO rules, and then 
proceeded to “debunk the myth of illegality.”38 The most com-
monly cited standards in WTO case law for analyzing PPMs are 
in the multiple decisions in the Shrimp-Turtle Case, in which 
India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand challenged a U.S. ban 
on the importation of shrimp caught in a manner that adversely 
affected threatened sea turtles. These complaining WTO Mem-
bers alleged, inter alia, that the ban violated the U.S. obliga-
tion under the WTO to ensure non-discriminatory treatment of 
imports from these countries.39 The U.S. defense turned on the 
application of GATT Article XX, described above.
One aspect of the WTO Appellate Body’s ultimate decision 
in the Shrimp-Turtle Case could be central to any future case 
challenging ACSA’s import provisions as WTO-inconsistent 
PPMs. In upholding a modified version of the U.S. import ban 
as consistent with GATT Article XX, the WTO Appellate Body 
concluded that a WTO Member can show that an import restric-
tion does not constitute “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimina-
tion” for purposes of GATT Article XX if that WTO Member 
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attempts to negotiate an international agreement ensuring equal 
treatment of all affected trading partners. As the WTO Appel-
late Body explained, the key is not whether such an agreement 
is actually reached, but whether the WTO Member asserting 
a GATT Article XX defense has made a “serious, good faith 
effort” to reach such agreement.40
Given the ongoing interplay of U.S. legislative efforts to 
impose a national scheme to limit GHG emissions and the inter-
national UNFCCC process, it is too soon to say if the United 
States would be able to rely on the “international negotiation” 
defense of the Shrimp-Turtle Case. Notably, ACSA section 
6003 would require the United States to engage in international 
negotiations with the objective of coordinating global GHG 
emissions reductions in a manner consistent with the goals of 
ACSA. However, at this point we can only speculate if ACSA 
will even be enacted into law.
The Bush Administration also expressed concern that import 
restrictions like those proposed in ACSA pose trade policy prob-
lems beyond possible inconsistency with U.S. WTO obligations. 
As recently expressed by U.S. Trade Representative Susan C. 
Schwab, unilateral U.S. trade restrictions designed to compel 
reductions in foreign emissions of GHGs are “a blunt and impre-
cise instrument of fear” that could poison commercial relations 
and trigger retaliatory measures by U.S. trading partners.41 Such 
mirror actions could quickly harm U.S. exports, and could take 
years to resolve if challenged at the WTO.42
Rather, the consistent message from U.S. Trade Representa-
tive Schwab has been that, instead of crafting import restrictions 
that will somehow ensure a competitive, level playing field as 
countries commit to GHG reductions, the priority of the United 
States should be to harness trade liberalization to enhance the 
global distribution of goods and services that contribute to cli-
mate change mitigation. At the core of this effort are the ongoing 
WTO negotiations toward an Agreement on Trade in Environ-
mental Goods and Services (“EGSA”).43 The mandate for these 
negotiations, set out in the 2001 WTO Doha Declaration,44 is 
the “reduction or, as appropriate, elimination of tariff and non-
tariff barriers to environmental goods and services.”45 When 
originally conceived, this mandate did not expressly include cli-
mate change. Nor did the mandate provide any guidance on what 
goods and services should be deemed “environmental.” But the 
United States and many other WTO Members now view a multi-
lateral EGSA as an important tool in combating climate change, 
and state that this effort complements the UNFCCC process. As 
recently explained by U.S. Trade Representative Schwab, the 
current framework for such an agreement, as jointly proposed 
by the United States and the EU, would increase global trade in 
climate-friendly technologies (such as wind turbines and pho-
tovoltaic solar panels) by as much as fourteen percent, thereby 
contributing significantly to global reductions in greenhouse gas 
emissions.46
As of this writing, the Administration and Congress appear 
to be headed for a show-down this year on ACSA’s import pro-
visions. As a practical matter, the debate seems likely to carry 
forward into a new Congress and Administration in 2009.
acsa anD u.s. TraDe remeDy law
Notwithstanding the possibility of claims that ACSA’s car-
bon leakage provisions may violate U.S. WTO obligations and 
send signals to U.S. trading partners inconsistent with current 
U.S. trade policy, the carbon leakage provisions may also be 
viewed as consistent in spirit with long-accepted norms under 
U.S. trade remedy laws.
Like many WTO Members, the United States maintains 
antidumping and countervailing duty laws that permit domestic 
industries to petition the government (or allow the government 
on its own initiative) to impose import duties to redress injuri-
ous import practices. Under the U.S. antidumping law, the U.S. 
Department of Commerce (“DOC”) may order CBP to impose 
on imports antidumping duties in an amount equivalent to the 
difference between the actual import values, as adjusted under 
the statute, and their deemed “fair value.”47 Similarly, under the 
U.S. countervailing duty law, DOC may impose duties to offset 
subsidies provided by foreign governments to the extent they 
confer an unfair benefit on imports and certain other conditions 
are satisfied.48 These laws are expressly permitted by WTO 
rules,49 and are widely seen as a necessary escape clause from 
the presumption of trade liberalization that permitted the WTO 
Agreements to be reached in the first place.50
The trade-restrictive provisions of ACSA may be seen as 
expanding the universe of import practices that should be deemed 
“unfair” under U.S. law. As noted, international trade law, as 
reflected in both U.S. domestic law and the WTO system, rec-
ognizes that import pricing below certain levels (whether due to 
“dumping” by foreign exporters or subsidies provided by foreign 
governments) is a form of unfair trade that, when causing harm 
to domestic industries, may be redressed through import duties. 
This notion of unfair trade is based purely on how an imported 
product is priced. ACSA would arguably expand this accepted 
notion of unfair trade to take into account how imported prod-
ucts are made—specifically, the volume and nature of the GHGs 
associated with their manufacture. ACSA would, in essence, 
dictate that the price of U.S. imports reflects the externalized 
environmental costs of GHG emissions. Just as the U.S. anti-
dumping law provides a remedy to domestic manufacturers that 
must compete against unfairly low-priced, or “dumped,” imports, 
ACSA would provide a remedy to domestic manufacturers that 
must compete against imports that were manufactured under less 
stringent GHG emissions standards—in other words, a remedy 
against a newly recognized form of environmental dumping.
However, unlike the U.S. antidumping and countervailing 
duty laws—which cover approximately one percent of the total 
value of U.S. imports—ACSA could potentially apply to a very 
substantial percentage of U.S. imports. As explained above, 
“covered goods” under ACSA include iron, steel, aluminum, 
cement, bulk glass, and paper, as well as many other unspeci-
fied manufactured goods accounting for “comparable” levels of 
greenhouse gas emissions.51 Thus, ACSA (or any comparable 
legislation to equalize the climate change impact of imports with 
domestically produced goods) could represent a major expan-
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sion of the concept of “unfair trade.” Still, the core concept of 
ACSA’s trade provisions are analogous to U.S. trade remedy 
law in that their purpose is to equalize the competitive impact 
of imports with the same types of goods produced domestically 
through recognition of an “unfair” advantage conferred on the 
imports.
conclusIon
The political will to sharply reduce GHG emissions—at 
least in the United States and the EU—seems to be strong and 
intensifying. The major U.S. presidential candidates all sup-
port the implementation of a national cap-and-trade system to 
reduce greenhouse gases, and all support U.S. participation in 
the UNFCCC process. Senator Baucus has spoken of “the moral 
imperative to deal with climate change.”52 Further, the intro-
duction of ACSA by Senators Lieberman and Warner signals a 
bipartisan consensus for ambitious action on climate change.
However, the “carbon leakage” problem that ACSA’s trade 
provisions attempt to address—a critical component of the 
bill from the perspective of U.S. GHG-emitting manufactur-
ing industries—may also constitute a major hurdle to ACSA’s 
enactment into law. For one, there seems to be significant risk 
that ACSA’s trade provisions, if enacted, could trigger WTO 
complaints against the United States and, potentially, retalia-
tory action to the detriment of U.S. exporters. This risk is one 
reason the current Administration is wary of proposals to penal-
ize importers of GHG-intensive goods, and is instead promoting 
other mechanisms, such as a multilateral EGSA, that would rely 
upon trade liberalization, rather than trade restriction, to com-
bat climate change. However, these objections to ACSA’s trade 
provisions cannot be expected to lessen the concerns of U.S. 
GHG-intensive manufacturing industries which, absent such 
provisions, would likely face declining competitiveness vis-à-
vis their foreign rivals not subject to GHG emissions restrictions 
of the same magnitude as imposed in the United States. These 
U.S. industries can be expected to press for equalizing measures, 
akin to the trade remedy laws, to ensure “fair” competition with 
imported goods manufactured under less stringent GHG emis-
sions standards.
The controversy surrounding ACSA’s trade provisions also 
underscores the imbalance between U.S. domestic and multi-
lateral efforts to reduce GHG emissions. GHG emissions and 
climate change are a problem of the “global commons,” and 
therefore require a globally coordinated approach as embodied 
in the UNFCCC process and Bali Roadmap. Yet, as explained 
above, the Bali Action Plan does not expressly commit devel-
oping countries to undertake reduction in GHG emissions. In 
the face of this asymmetry of commitments between devel-
oped and developing countries, it is reasonable to expect the 
United States (and the EU) to explore domestic laws and other 
mechanisms that would unilaterally attempt to compel countries 
with less stringent GHG emissions standards to tighten them. 
That is what ACSA seeks to do—first through a mandate for 
the Executive Branch to negotiate a global agreement to reduce 
GHG emissions in a coordinated fashion, and second, through 
import requirements that would redress any competitive imbal-
ance experienced by foreign manufacturing industries exporting 
to the United States. 
It remains unclear how much of the burden developing 
countries will accept as the Bali Roadmap process produces a 
successor to the Kyoto Protocol (if it does). But it is clear that, 
the less they do, the greater will be the pressure on U.S. and 
EU lawmakers to ensure, through unilateral trade measures like 
ACSA’s import provisions, that their industries are protected 
from imports produced under less costly emissions standards. 
Political realism suggests that trade mechanisms will be tools of 
choice in this effort—whether or not they are found to comply 
with current WTO rules, the Administration’s trade policy pref-
erences, or the “shared vision” principles espoused in the Bali 
Action Plan.
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InTroDucTIon
Governments at all levels are increasingly engaging the challenges posed by global climate change. Conserva-tion easements have provided income tax deductions to 
their grantors for decades in recognition of certain special benefits 
afforded by the conservation of land subject to the easement.1 As 
policy makers search for effec-
tive means to address climate 
change issues, conservation ease-
ments may well be recognized 
as an important tool. However, 
the current law of conservation 
easements does not recognize the 
full potential for carbon capture 
resulting from land conservation, 
in part because the tax code lim-
its the types of land that may ben-
efit from such easements. Current 
laws will need to be revised and 
expanded to better recognize the 
climate change benefits that could be achieved from placing land 
under conservation easements.
conservaTIon easemenTs
A conservation easement is a legal agreement, made 
between a landowner and an eligible organization, that serves 
to restrict the activities that may take place on the landowner’s 
property.2 The restrictions embodied in a conservation ease-
ment apply to all future owners of the burdened land and may 
be enforced by the easement holder or in some cases by the state 
attorney general.3 A conservation easement can cover all or part 
of the property, and can restrict the uses of various parts of the 
property differently.4 Conservation easements are individually 
negotiated and the restrictions that a conservation easement 
imposes on the landowner will thus vary from one conservation 
easement to another.5
Ownership of land has often been likened to a bundle of 
sticks, where each stick represents a particular right associated 
with the land.6 Landowners may elect to sell or donate indi-
vidual “sticks,” such as the right to construct buildings, or the 
right to harvest timber, while preserving other rights associated 
with the land.7 A landowner who grants a conservation easement 
gives up only those rights that are spelled out in the conserva-
tion easement, retaining all others. The conservation easement 
has thus emerged as one of the most popular land conservation 
tools in the United States because it allows its holder, typically 
a land trust, to protect land without the necessity of owning and 
managing the property.
conSeRvation eaSementS anD climate change
by Daniel L. Aaronson & Michael B. Manuel*
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Tax DeDucTIons For DonaTeD  
conservaTIon easemenTs
While taxpayers are generally not permitted to take chari-
table deductions for contributions of less than the taxpayer’s 
full interest in property, the Internal Revenue Service makes an 
exception to this rule in the case of deductions for “qualified 
conservation contributions.”8 
As a general rule, the avail-
able income tax deduction for 
a qualified conservation con-
tribution is equal to the fair 
market value of the subject 
property before the conserva-
tion easement was put in place, 
minus the fair market value of 
the property after it has been 
encumbered by the conserva-
tion easement.9 This formula 
is intended to compensate the 
grantor of a conservation ease-
ment for the lost development potential that results from the con-
servation easement’s imposition of development restrictions.10
Another potential tax benefit of a validly created conser-
vation easement is that the easement may serve to lower the 
assessed value of the property on which it is placed. Put simply, 
property taxes are based on two things: the assessed value of the 
parcel, and the local tax rate.11 In many taxing jurisdictions, the 
assessed value of a parcel is determined based on the property’s 
highest and best use, which often assumes the maximum level of 
development allowable under applicable zoning regulations.12 
Many states allow for—or even expressly mandate—the reas-
sessment of land upon which a conservation easement is created, 
requiring the assessor to take into account the conservation ease-
ment’s development restrictions in determining the property’s 
value.
common law ImpeDImenTs To The 
 enForceabIlITy oF conservaTIon easemenTs 
In today’s practice, conservation easements are exclu-
sively creatures of statute.13 This is because under the common 
law, the perpetual enforceability of conservation easements is 
doubtful.14
The current law of 
conservation easements 
does not recognize the  
full potential for  
carbon capture.
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In order to be enforceable under the common law, the prop-
erty interest created by a conservation easement must be classifi-
able as one of three types of servitudes: (1) an easement, (2) a 
real covenant, or (3) an equitable servitude. For all three classes 
of servitudes, troublesome common law doctrines serve as obsta-
cles to perpetual enforceability.15 Despite its nomenclature, a 
conservation easement is not enforceable under the common law 
as an easement because it does not fall within one of the four 
recognized types of negative easements, which are defined as 
easements granting the right to restrict the types of activities that 
can be performed on a parcel of land.16 Conservation easements 
are not enforceable in perpetuity as equitable servitudes because 
they run afoul of what is known as the “touch and concern” doc-
trine.17 Courts also have gener-
ally held that a real covenant held 
“in gross”—one which benefits a 
specific individual rather than a 
specific parcel of land—cannot 
be binding on successive land-
owners due to its failure to satisfy 
the “touch and concern” test.18
In light of the aforementioned 
impediments to the enforceability 
of conservation easements—and 
recognizing the fact that, from a 
land preservation standpoint, the permanence of a conservation 
easement is its most critical aspect—states began to enact con-
servation easement legislation in the 1980s.19
sTaTuTory conservaTIon easemenTs
In the early 1980s, the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws proposed model state legislation 
intended to strengthen the reliability of conservation easements 
as a land preservation tool by exempting them from the common 
law doctrines that would otherwise impede their enforcement.20 
This model legislation, titled the Uniform Conservation Ease-
ment Act (“UCEA”), has since been adopted in twenty states, 
while most others have enacted functionally equivalent legisla-
tion modeled after the UCEA.21 Conservation easements that 
satisfy the requirements of the local state conservation easement 
statute are often referred to as statutory conservation easements.
Statutory conservation easements are sheltered from the 
impediments to enforceability that would otherwise plague them 
under the common law. The UCEA and the various state conser-
vation easement statutes place conservation easements beyond 
the reach of the “touch and concern” doctrine by providing that 
a conservation easement is valid even though its benefit does not 
touch and concern real property.22 The other primary obstacle 
to enforcement of conservation easements under the common 
law—that a negative easement may serve only a limited num-
ber of recognized purposes—is also expressly eliminated by 
statute.23
Statutory conservation easements must be granted in favor 
of a non-profit land trust or a governmental agency.24 Private 
foundations or other for-profit entities are ineligible grantees of 
conservation easements.25 State conservation easement statutes 
typically also impose a conservation purpose requirement that 
in many instances mirrors that of the Internal Revenue Code 
(“IRC”). A conservation easement that is granted to an eligi-
ble donee and satisfies the requirements of both the applicable 
state conservation easement statute and the IRC will yield an 
income tax deduction for its grantor and will be enforceable in 
perpetuity.
“conservaTIon purposes” anD carbon sInKs
Not every parcel of land is eligible for preservation by 
way of a conservation easement. The IRC and the various state 
conservation easement statutes provide that the property to be 
protected by a conservation easement must possess significant 
conservation or historic pres-
ervation values.26 Determining 
whether a particular parcel of 
land exhibits such conservation 
values is an inexact science. 
The tax code recognizes 
only four legitimate conserva-
tion purposes: (1) preservation 
of land areas for outdoor recre-
ation by, or the education of, the 
general public; (2) protection 
of a significant wildlife habitat 
or plant community; (3) preservation of open space (including 
farmland and forestland) for the scenic enjoyment of the general 
public or pursuant to government policy; and (4) preservation 
of a historically important land area or a certified historic struc-
ture.27 As a general rule, a conservation easement that satisfies 
one of the conservation purposes recognized by the tax code will 
also be deemed to satisfy the conservation purpose requirement 
of the applicable state conservation easement statute. A conser-
vation easement cannot yield tax benefits to its grantor, nor will 
it likely be perpetually enforceable under state law, if it does not 
fit into one of the four recognized conservation purposes.
In the case of undeveloped land that a landowner does not 
intend to open to the general public, a conservation easement will 
most likely be appropriate if the land is home to an “ecologically 
significant” habitat of flora or fauna28 or if there is sufficient 
public road frontage for the easement area to provide a scenic 
view to passersby.29 IRS regulations and recent jurisprudence 
have shown both of these conservation purposes to be unduly 
difficult to satisfy. Land to be protected by a conservation ease-
ment will not be deemed ecologically significant if it does not 
contain endangered or threatened species or adjoin a designated 
conservation area such as a state or national park. Meanwhile, 
the open space conservation purpose is notorious for its ambi-
guity. One thing IRS regulations have made clear, however, is 
that the preservation of “ordinary” tracts of land would not be 
deemed to yield the significant public benefit requisite for pur-
poses of satisfying the conservation purpose test.30
The current law of conservation easements does not rec-
ognize the potential for carbon capture resulting from land 
conservation. Otherwise “ordinary” tracts of land can produce 
Not every parcel of land  
is eligible for preservation 
by way of a  
conservation easement.
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a significant social benefit by acting as carbon sinks, as grow-
ing vegetation absorbs carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.31 
Young forests comprised of still-growing trees are especially 
effective at absorbing carbon dioxide,32 but even the conser-
vation of mature forests can result in emissions reductions by 
preserving existing carbon stocks where development—which 
releases carbon—might otherwise occur. 
conclusIon
The defining characteristic of a conservation easement is the 
yielding of a public or social benefit from preserving land in its 
natural state. But present laws do not recognize carbon capture 
as a legitimate social benefit. If the law could develop so that 
carbon attributes are recognized as valid conservation purposes, 
the conservation easement could become a meaningful compo-
nent of the overall climate change solution.
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InTroDucTIon
Organic carbon sequestration through vegetation growth is the only realistic means of removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. Increasing vegetation and bio-
mass stocks can therefore be a valuable means to limit atmo-
spheric carbon dioxide concentrations until energy efficiency, 
low greenhouse gas emitting energy and agricultural options, 
and other emission reduction initiatives can be implemented at 
a scale required to limit the growth, and ultimately reduce, the 
amount of global greenhouse gas emissions. 
For over ten years commercially-oriented tree plantation 
interests in Australia have recognised the potential for carbon 
sequestration offset credits to augment the income from other 
plantation products. Income from the sale of offset credits could 
expand the geographic area over which tree and mixed species 
plantations could be a viable land use, contributing to the growth 
of the domestic plantation industry.
In addition, revegetation through plantation establishment 
and other means provide further environmental and social ben-
efits in Western Australia (“WA”), such as groundwater salinity 
reduction, surface water production, erosion control, biodiver-
sity protection, and regional economic diversity. Encouraging 
revegetation is therefore a matter of keen interest to the State 
Government for sustainability objectives.
While the scientific notion that increasing biomass will 
remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere is conceptually 
simple, there are significant challenges in converting those car-
bon dioxide removals into commercially tradeable commodities, 
even with the clear recognition of Emission Reduction Units 
under rules established pursuant to the Kyoto Protocol.
Any emission accounting or trading program which seeks 
to include carbon offset credits resulting from organic sequestra-
tion must address several key issues, of which additionality, per-
manence, quantum, and ownership are the most fundamental.
Ownership raises some of the most complex issues associ-
ated with the creation and trading of organic carbon sequestra-
tion rights, especially where other benefits, such as harvestable 
timber, improved ground water quality, erosion control, or bio-
diversity enhancement, are created by the same actions.
This paper addresses the approach taken in WA to overcome 
barriers associated with ownership of carbon sequestration off-
set credits generated by the establishment of forest plantations 
(Kyoto Article 3.3), followed by a brief summary of the position 
in the other Australian States.
SecuRing RightS to caRbon SequeStRation: 
the weSteRn auStRalian expeRience
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carbon sequesTraTIon rIghTs:  
a new rIghT In properTy
Where all rights associated with the establishment of plan-
tations are held by the same party, carbon sequestration rights 
are coincident with rights to other plantation products. Where 
carbon sequestration rights are separated from other rights, how-
ever, several issues need to be addressed. For example, how 
does ownership of carbon sequestration differ from ownership 
of sequestered carbon? What legislative guidance is required to 
support the commercial interests of both parties? How can car-
bon sequestration rights be protected from loss or injury from 
negligence, natural risks, or other commercial imperatives (e.g. 
harvesting of plantation products)?
An example will illustrate these challenges. Farmer A leases 
part of his farm to Corporation B for thirty years for plantation 
establishment. Corporation B holds all rights to the plantation, 
including carbon sequestration rights, and agrees to pay an 
annual land rent to Farmer A. Corporation B sells rights to the 
lease and the timber to Corporation C and rights to the benefits 
and risks arising from carbon sequestration to Corporation D. 
Since the mid-1990s, most contractual arrangements relat-
ing to tree plantations in WA have included provisions identify-
ing the ownership of benefits arising from carbon sequestration 
by the plantations. The complexity and cost of contracts for car-
bon sequestration rights has led all Australian State governments 
to legislatively create a separate carbon sequestration right. This 
approach, apparently unique to Australia, has increased certainty 
and reduced costs to land holders and traders in carbon seques-
tration rights.
wesTern ausTralIa’s  
carbon sequesTraTIon legIslaTIon
The approach taken in WA has been the broadest of the 
Australian jurisdictions. The forms of carbon sequestration that 
can give rise to carbon rights are not limited in any way, and 
do not require a direct link to a silvicultural project or any form 
of forest management. The approach reflects several important 
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considerations. First, a broad enabling legislative framework 
was considered most appropriate to support activities that might 
be accountable and tradeable under international and national 
rules that are still emerging and are likely to be further altered 
over coming decades. Second, market-based instruments estab-
lished by the Kyoto Protocol will be able to distinguish between 
differing types of carbon sequestration products. Finally, reveg-
etation could reverse past damage to Western Australia’s land 
and ecosystems resulting from clearing for agriculture, urban 
use, infrastructure, or by vegetation destruction through range-
land activities such as grazing.
Western Australia has an area of approximately 2,527,620 
square kilometres. Approximately ninety-three percent of this 
area is held as Crown land, and the remaining seven percent is 
held as freehold land.1 There are two types of freehold land in 
Western Australia. The dominant system is Torrens title land, 
which comprises almost all of the freehold land in WA. The 
Torrens system is a system of title by registration of dealings 
in land in the Register held at the land registry office. The sys-
tem is established under the Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA) 
(“TLA”). One of the fundamental principles underlying the Tor-
rens system is the concept of indefeasibility of title. Essentially, 
the registered proprietor’s title is paramount (except in the case 
of fraud) and held only subject to the interests registered in the 
Register and certain specified exceptions.2 The State in effect 
guarantees the title to land, and interests registered in respect 
of the land, by providing for a right to claim against the State 
if a person is deprived of his or her land due to a number of 
circumstances.3 
The other type of freehold land is old system title land, 
which comprises 0.1 percent of the seven percent of freehold 
land in Western Australia. This system of title relates to Crown 
grants of freehold that were made prior to the introduction of 
the Torrens system of title,4 and which have not since been con-
verted to Torrens system land.5 Under this system, title to land 
is established by an unbroken documentary chain of title for at 
least thirty years prior to the agreement to sell.6
The administration of Crown land in WA is governed by the 
Land Administration Act 1997 (WA) (“LAA”). “Crown land” is 
all land that is not freehold land.7  It is land held by the Crown, 
or the State.
However, all dealings in Crown land are registered under 
the single registration system provided for in the TLA.8 Conse-
quently, the holder of an interest registered in respect of Crown 
land has the same indefeasible title as a freehold land owner, 
subject to the exceptions contained in section 68 TLA and cer-
tain other exceptions arising from its nature as Crown land as set 
out in section 81T of TLA.
carbon rIghTs acT 2003 (wa)
The Western Australian Carbon Rights Act 2003 (“CRA”) 
establishes a new, separate interest in land known as a “carbon 
right.” 
A carbon right comes into existence once it is registered on 
the title to the land.9 The person registered as the proprietor, or 
owner, of the carbon right on the title to the land has security of 
title to the carbon right, via the benefits of the indefeasibility and 
other provisions under the TLA. A carbon right can be regis-
tered in respect of any Torrens title freehold land and any Crown 
land.10 The only land in Western Australia in respect of which 
a carbon right cannot be registered, and therefore cannot be cre-
ated, is old system title land. Generally, it can be dealt with in 
the same way as any other interest in land.11
The intention of the CRA is to establish the legal certainty 
and security of a carbon right as an interest in respect of cer-
tain identified land. A carbon right gives the owner “the legal 
and commercial benefits and risks arising from changes to the 
atmosphere that are caused by carbon sequestration and carbon 
release occurring in or on land in respect of which the carbon 
right is registered.”12
The CRA does not operate to determine or set the value of 
the carbon right. Its commercial value, and therefore tradability, 
is left to the market to determine, in the same way that the value 
and tradability of any other interest in land is determined by the 
market. This is evident from the Second Reading Speech for the 
CRA when it was introduced into the Legislative Assembly by 
the Honourable Francis Logan MLA when he said: 
The Carbon Rights Bill will provide security for the 
owner of the carbon right in land by enabling a car-
bon right to be registered on the land title . . . Issues 
such as measuring the carbon that has been sequestered 
and stays there, provisions for disease and fire protec-
tion and whether a particular type of sequestered car-
bon can be traded and so on are left to the market to 
determine.13 
This intention was reiterated later in the Second Reading 
Speech in the following terms: “Registration will clarify the 
ownership of the right . . . but it gives no guarantee as to how 
much carbon is there, whether it will remain there or what value 
it may have.”14
The owner of the carbon right does not need to be the same 
person who is the owner of the land to which it relates. How-
ever, if they are not the same person, the carbon right can only 
be created with the land owner’s consent.15
The definitions of “carbon sequestration” and “carbon 
release” in section 3 of the CRA make it clear that the changes 
relate to anything stored in or on the land. Consequently, it 
relates to changes in carbon storage in any form—in the soil of 
the land, or in the trees or other forms of vegetation on the land.
The owner of the carbon right, however, does not own the 
carbon itself stored in or on the land. That interest remains with 
whoever owns the matter in which it is stored—for example the 
land owner, or the holder of a plantation interest under section 
7(1) of the Tree Plantation Agreements Act 2003 (WA) (“TPA”). 
A plantation interest is a separate interest in land (again regis-
tered on the title to the land under the TLA), in which the owner-
ship of trees on the land is separated from ownership of the land 
itself (contrary to normal common law principles).
As a consequence of the separation of the ownership of 
the carbon right from the carbon itself, the owner of the carbon 
right must have a mechanism by which carbon changes in or 
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on the relevant land can be controlled, in order for the carbon 
right to have some continuing certainty of its commercial value. 
This is done, in a legal sense, by providing for the creation of a 
concomitant, separate interest in land known as a “carbon cov-
enant.” The carbon covenant is also registered on the title to the 
land,16 allowing the land owner, or others with an interest in the 
same or other land, to agree with the owner of the carbon right 
(who must also be the owner of the carbon covenant)17 to do, 
or not to do, certain things on the land. This will have the effect 
of encouraging carbon sequestration on the land, and mitigating 
carbon release from the land, as much as possible. 
For example, the carbon covenant may include provisions 
as to how the land will be used or managed to decrease the risk 
of fire or pests, thereby reducing the risk of carbon release and 
increasing carbon sequestration in the trees or vegetation on 
the land. Similarly, altered grazing patterns of livestock may 
increase the chance of carbon sequestration.
The carbon covenant runs with, and binds, the land so that 
future owners of the land will be bound to comply with them, 
and any future owner of the carbon right (and therefore the car-
bon covenant) will have the benefit of the covenants.18
The carbon covenants are enforceable through legal pro-
ceedings in the same way that any other interest in land is 
enforced at common law. Any failure to comply with the carbon 
covenant is a civil matter between the relevant parties, which 
will be adjudicated by the courts. 
upTaKe oF carbon rIghTs
The development of the CRA was a government initiative 
to promote the development of the forest plantation industry 
to expand regional economic opportunities, provide domestic 
wood products, support woodchip exports, replace logging of 
old growth forest, and gain the broader environmental benefits 
of revegetation, by reducing transaction costs and increasing 
certainty associated with establishing and trading carbon seques-
tration rights. 
Australia’s plantation and timber industries have included 
carbon rights considerations in their contractual arrangements 
for at least fifteen years and Australia’s financial industry devel-
oped emission trading frameworks during the mid-1990s. Yet, 
because Australia’s national government until recently refused 
to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and has not established domestic 
sectoral or other emission limits or taxes, there exists no basis 
for either international or domestic commercial trading of carbon 
sequestration or any other emission reduction units. Therefore, 
there has been virtually no incentive for parties to undertake 
the costs of establishing carbon sequestration right ownership 
through registration under the CRA, and consequently, the 
uptake on registering carbon rights has been relatively slow.
As of October 2007, only twenty-four carbon rights had 
been registered since the CRA’s proclamation on March 24, 
2004.19 Of these, only ten have had accompanying carbon cov-
enants registered. There are only three instances where a carbon 
right, a carbon covenant and a plantation interest under the TPA 
have been registered. Four plantation interests have been regis-
tered without an accompanying carbon right.
The number of dealings registered does not provide an indi-
cation as to the size or number of properties involved, however, 
as one dealing may affect more than one area of land, if the same 
person owns more than one property.
Similarly, it is not possible to draw any conclusion as to the 
relationship between the uptake of carbon rights and the forest 
plantation industry. This is because tree plantation companies 
have in the past secured their interests in the land by a variety 
of means including timber share-farming agreements under sec-
tion 34B of the Conservation and Land Management Act 1984 
(WA)20 or a lease, and these remain available along with the 
more recently enacted plantation interest. One of the reasons for 
the slow uptake of registration of carbon rights is the number of 
requirements that need to be met before they can be registered.
The area of the land over which the carbon right is being 
registered must be clearly identifiable.21 If the carbon right is 
over the whole of the land in a property, then the description is 
simply the same as the current land description for the property. 
If the carbon right is only over part of the land in the property, 
then a suitable diagram needs to be prepared with co-ordinates. 
If the area over which the carbon rights are to be registered has 
not already been surveyed for other purposes (such as the reg-
istration of a plantation interest), a considerable cost burden is 
imposed. In most cases this would be borne by the carbon right 
holder.
The carbon rights are required to be registered separately 
on the title to each property. Any dealings with the carbon right 
will require the consent of any person having an interest in the 
carbon right itself and in many cases, the owner of the underly-
ing land and any person having an interest in that land. This is 
likely to act as a disincentive to the development of a trading 
market in carbon rights per se, as the conveyancing costs and 
other administrative requirements will be too costly, intensive, 
and time consuming. However, it may lead to the development 
of a wholesale market, where brokers accumulate and hold the 
individual carbon rights from land owners and aggregate them 
for on-sale to industrial or other companies seeking credits in a 
carbon trading system.
carbon sequesTraTIon rIghTs In oTher  
ausTralIan sTaTes
The following table sets out a comparison of the forms of 
legal recognition of carbon sequestration rights, and the limits 
on that recognition, that have been enacted in legislation in the 
other Australian States. 
Almost all of the other Australian State jurisdictions have 
limited their recognition of carbon rights to carbon sequestration 
in trees or forest vegetation. New South Wales is most restric-
tive in that it is limited to trees or forest on the land after 1990.22 
However, the approach in Queensland is more liberal as the car-
bon sequestration right is one of several potential forest products 
and can also relate to vegetation more generally.23
All jurisdictions allow for ownership or the benefits of a 
carbon right to be separated from the ownership or benefits of 
the trees or vegetation. In addition, the rights can run with, and 
bind the future owners of, the land over which the rights exist.
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Neither the Northern Territory nor the Australian Capital 
Territory have enacted any legislation, so any relevant common 
law principles apply in these jurisdictions.
conclusIon
The new Australian government elected on November 24, 
2007 has ratified the Kyoto Protocol, potentially leading to the 
capacity to export carbon sequestration rights (using the Joint 
Initiative mechanism) and to a domestic emissions market. Inter-
nationally, a greenhouse gas limitation regime is being negoti-
ated for the period following the first Kyoto Protocol reporting 
period. 
Table: summary oF carbon sequesTraTIon legIslaTIon In ausTralIa, oTher Than wesTern ausTralIa
Jurisdiction Definition of the Right Nature of the Right Limitations on the Right
VICTORIA  “Carbon sequestration right”  Deemed not to be Limited to carbon sequestered by
Forestry Rights Act means a right to commercially exploit  an interest in land trees (§3)
1996 carbon sequestered by trees (§3) (§14(2)) Can be separated from ownership of
 Created under a “carbon rights   trees (§12)
 agreement” (§12)  Applies to freehold land only (§4)
NEW SOUTH WALES  “Carbon sequestration right”   Forestry right Limited to carbon sequestered by
Conveyancing Act means a right conferred on a person by  deemed a profit a trees on land after 1990 (§87A)
1919 agreement or otherwise to the legal,  prendre (§88AB) Can be granted separately from
 commercial, or other benefit (whether  Forestry covenant is forestry right in respect of crop of
 present or future) of carbon sequestration  an interest in land trees on land (§87A)
 by any existing or future tree or forest on  (§88EA(5))
 the land after 1990 (§87A)
 Carbon sequestration right included in a 
 “forestry right” (§87A)  
SOUTH AUSTRALIA  “Carbon right” is the capacity of forest Form of property, in Limited to absorption of carbon in
Forest Property Act vegetation to absorb carbon from the  the nature of a chose “forest vegetation” (trees or other forms
2000 atmosphere (§3A(1)) in action (§3A(1)) of forest vegetation) (§§3 & 3 A)
 Created under “forest property (carbon  Attaches to the forest Can be separated from ownership 
 rights) agreement” (§5(3)) vegetation to which  of forest vegetation (§3A(2))
  it relates (§3A(2)) 
QUEENSLAND  “Natural resource product” includes Does not create an Limited to absorption of carbon by,
Forestry Act 1959 carbon stored in a tree or vegetation  interest in land or storage of carbon in, trees or
 and carbon sequestration by a tree or  (§61J(4)) vegetation (Schedule 3)
 vegetation (Schedule 3) Rights are a profit a Agreement can be limited to these
 Owner of land may enter into an  prendre (§61J(5)) natural resource products relating to
 agreement about a natural resource   carbon sequestration and/or storage of
 product on the land (§61J(1))  carbon (§61J(3) & Schedule 3)
    Note the effect of these provisions is 
that ownership of carbon stored in trees 
or vegetation, and the ownership of the 
carbon sequestration right in respect of 
them, can also be separated 
TASMANIA  “Carbon sequestration right”  Deemed to be a Limited to carbon sequestration by a
Forestry Rights  means a right conferred on a person profit a prendre tree or forest (§3)
Registration Act 1990 (by agreement or otherwise) to the legal,  (§5(1)) Can be separated from ownership of 
 commercial or other benefit (whether   trees (§3)
 present or future) of carbon sequestration 
 by any existing or future tree or forest on 
 the land (§3)
 Carbon sequestration right included in a 
 forestry right (§3)  
As the CRA covers all types of carbon sequestration on 
all but less than 0.1 percent of land in Western Australia and 
focuses on creating certainty of ownership, the Western Aus-
tralian Carbon Rights Act will be able to support initiatives 
under any future national or international emission regime that 
includes organic carbon sequestration as an option to generate 
offset credits.
Endnotes: Securing Rights to Carbon Sequestration
continued on page 85
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InTroDucTIon
Over the past few years, the U.S. carbon offset market has experienced tremendous growth.1 This expansion can be attributed to several factors, including the creation 
of regional greenhouse gas (“GHG”) initiatives, the anticipa-
tion of federal regulation, and growing public concern regarding 
climate change. In the absence of a national system of carbon 
offset standards, a confusing myriad of methodologies governs 
the creation of offsets. The media has repeatedly questioned the 
credibility of carbon offsets, likening them to papal indulgences 
for environmental sins committed.2 Indeed, the emphasis on off-
sets to mitigate climate change has distorted their appropriate 
role in any future national framework to address climate change 
and may distract from the more 
fundamental changes needed to 
address climate change. Like-
wise, the ease at which some 
offsets are acquired to reduce 
emissions serves to over-sim-
plify the comprehensive, national 
response that is necessary to 
address climate change.
On the other hand, high 
quality offset projects can play a 
role in the near term to mitigate 
climate change by reducing net carbon emissions in a cost-ef-
fective manner.3 Additionally, the growth of the carbon market 
reflects, in part, American society’s genuine desire to address 
climate change, and this impetus should be preserved and 
encouraged. Assuming the enactment of a federal cap-and-trade 
system, rigorous requirements for the creation and maintenance 
of carbon offsets will be needed to ensure market certainty and 
emissions reductions. 
an overvIew: carbon oFFseTs
Under a cap-and-trade regime, a limited percentage of a 
regulated industry’s emission reduction requirement may be met 
with the purchase of carbon offsets. Offsets are different from 
on-site reductions because they mitigate regulated source emis-
sions by reducing emissions through an unregulated sector GHG 
reduction project. Some offset projects remove GHGs from the 
atmosphere; other projects are designed to reduce future emis-
sions. Offset projects include terrestrial carbon sequestration, 
such as afforestation or reforestation, improved range manage-
ment, no-till practices on agricultural lands, as well as projects 
that invest in renewable energy, methane capture, and energy 
conservation. 
it’S not eaSy being gReen: 
ReFlectionS on the ameRican caRbon oFFSet maRket
by Laurie A. Ristino*
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aDDITIonalITy
The reduction in emissions achieved with offsets is called 
“additionality.” Additionally is defined as emission reductions 
that occur solely as the result of voluntary or regulatory GHG 
market incentives, not reductions that would have occurred any-
way.4 A deceptively simple concept, additionality in practice 
can be difficult to assess, but it is critical to viable carbon credit 
creation. Achieving additionality requires policy clarity, rigor, 
and transparency. 
regulaTory & volunTary oFFseTs
There are two general categories of offsets: regulatory 
and voluntary. The former are regulated by emerging state and 
regional cap and trade frame-
works like the Regional Green-
house Gas Initiative (“RGGI”) 
or mandated by law such as Ore-
gon’s requirement that all new 
power plants in that state off-
set part of their carbon dioxide 
emissions.5 The latter include 
offsets that are purchased by 
individuals, organizations, 
government, and corporations 
voluntarily seeking to reduce 
their carbon footprint. Voluntary offsets are purchased either 
through the Chicago Climate Exchange (“CCX”), America’s 
only legally binding commodities market for emissions trading 
and offsets, or through over-the-counter (“OTC”) transactions. 
Since both categories of offset projects purport to result in emis-
sions reductions, similar standards for verifying and monitoring 
should apply. 
Each trading system establishes its own standards for off-
set project creation, including verification, monitoring, baseline 
determination, and permanence, resulting in an inconsistent 
array of methodologies. For example, under RGGI, which is 
comprised of 10 Northeast and Mid-Atlantic states, only affores-
tation projects on land that has not been forested for ten years are 
eligible forest offset projects, and the carbon sequestered must 
be protected through a permanent conservation easement.6 In 
contrast, under CCX, afforestation projects undertaken on sites 
High quality offset  
projects can play a role  
in the near term to 
mitigate climate change.
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unforested as of January 1, 1990 are eligible.7 Instead of a con-
servation easement to ensure project permanence, CCX holds in 
reserve twenty percent of all CCX afforestation offsets to insure 
against catastrophic losses. Landowners must indicate in writing 
their intent to maintain forest for at least fifteen years.8 As is 
generally the case in the voluntary market, CCX has a broader 
array of eligible offset project 
types, such as agricultural soil 
carbon sequestration, when com-
pared to RGGI. Regulated mar-
kets tend to be more restrictive to 
ensure a greater confidence level 
in offset credibility. 
In contrast, OTC offsets are 
not governed by any regulatory 
or legally binding regime. The public is generally more famil-
iar with OTC offsets, which include many of the popular retail-
type offsets offered by both for profit and non-profit entities. For 
example, Expedia, Orbitz, and Travelocity offer individuals the 
opportunity to offset their travel emissions by adding the cost 
of offsets to the travel bill. These offsets are provided by differ-
ent partners, e.g., Carbonfund, Terapass, and The Conservation 
Fund, each with different offset prices and policies.9
The quality of retail offsets is uneven, and there is no stan-
dard certification of offsets upon which consumers can rely. To 
address this information gap, Clean Air-Cool Planet commis-
sioned a 2006 report as an effort to evaluate carbon offset pro-
viders to the retail market. The report ranked, on a scale from 
1-10, thirty retail offset providers based upon several criteria 
and found that only eight of the thirty providers had a score of 
five or more.10 In addition, there have been voluntary efforts to 
develop offset standards such as the Voluntary Carbon Standard. 
Recently, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has been reas-
sessing its consumer protection guides related to environmental 
marketing claims (carbon credits and renewable energy certifi-
cates) to help prevent false or misleading claims to the public. 
However, FTC’s review focuses on its consumer protection role, 
not on establishing environmental performance standards.11
oFFseTs: someThIng For everyone?
The U.S. carbon offset market has been marked by an exu-
berant entrepreneurialism informed, in part, by a desire to do 
environmental good on the one hand and, on the other, tap into a 
significant revenue and funding stream. 
Businesses are participating in the offset market for a vari-
ety of reasons, including demonstrating corporate responsibility, 
hedging against future regulation, and gaining market expe-
rience. Companies are both purchasing offsets to reduce their 
carbon footprint and acting as offset project proponents. As is 
the case with individuals purchasing offsets, the media has ques-
tioned the environmental efficacy of these offsets.12 In antici-
pation of GHG emissions regulation, businesses, especially 
power companies, have established offset projects. For example, 
twenty-five power companies established Powertree Carbon 
Company (“Powertree”) to invest in carbon offset projects in the 
Southeast with various partners, including the federal govern-
ment, The Nature Conservancy, and Ducks Unlimited. Power-
tree retains the rights to emission reductions associated with the 
project and distributes the credits to its member companies. In 
addition, there is an emerging industry associated with carbon 
offsets, including credit brokers, aggregators, providers, and 
verifiers.
The agricultural sector 
has embraced offsetting for its 
potential to generate $8 bil-
lion in revenue.13 The Ameri-
can Farm Bureau Federation 
has stated that agriculture and 
forestry should have unlimited 
access to the offset market.14 
In 2007, Iowa Farm Bureau 
launched a wholly owned subsidiary, AgraGate Climate Credits 
Corporation, to expand its existing offset aggregating business. 
AgraGate pools together carbon offset credits produced from 
offset projects on farms, ranches, and forests and then offers the 
credits for sale on the CCX. To date, the company has enrolled 
more than a million acres of land.15 
Non-profits are using carbon offsets projects to fund con-
servation. Ducks Unlimited, for example, is currently offering to 
purchase carbon credits from landowners in the prairie pothole 
region (the Dakotas, Iowa, Minnesota, and Montana) who place 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) grassland easements on 
their property.16 The carbon credit payment is in addition to the 
easement payment. Ducks Unlimited transfers the credits to an 
environmental asset manager, which sells the credits to inves-
tors. The organization’s website does not explain how paying 
for the carbon credits in addition to the payment for the conser-
vation easement, which protects the land from conversion, meets 
the test of additionality. Ducks Unlimited uses the revenues from 
the credits sold to purchase more easements. 
Likewise, the federal government has experimented with the 
carbon offset market as a funding stream. Federal land manage-
ment agencies’ budgets have increasingly been directed toward 
firefighting17 with the budget in other programs areas reduced.18 
Partnerships with non-profit organizations have provided much 
needed funding to restore areas previously burned by cata-
strophic wildfire. In 2007, the Forest Service signed an agree-
ment with the National Forest Foundation (“Foundation”),19 
under which the Forest Service identifies and makes available 
appropriate National Forest System lands for reforestation proj-
ects, and other lands within National Forest Systems for acqui-
sition and afforestation. In return, the Foundation collects and 
provides funds to carry out reforestation, afforestation, and 
acquisition. No carbon credits are created or traded. The Foun-
dation established the Carbon Capital Fund through which indi-
viduals and organizations wishing to offset their emissions may 
donate funds to support these reforestation efforts. 
Some of the funding generated by the Forest Service’s part-
nership with the Foundation was used to reforest acreage burned 
by fires and damaged by tornados on national forests in Idaho 
and Montana. Forest Service Chief Gail Kimbell has stated that 
The agricultural sector 
has embraced offsetting.
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these reforestation efforts are not necessarily intended to replace 
all the carbon released by wildfire but to have those sites begin 
storing carbon at a good rate as soon as possible.20 
For several years now, the Department of Interior has been 
using the funding that carbon offset projects generate to restore 
existing public lands and acquire new lands. In August of 2002, 
the FWS, which administers the 
National Wildlife Refuge System, 
dedicated the Red River National 
Refuge. FWS was able to do so 
with the financial assistance of 
Entergy Corporation and The 
Conservation Fund.21 Entergy is 
a major global energy company 
that, among other things, delivers 
electricity to over two million customers in the Southeast. The 
company had planted more than 180,000 trees to restore native 
bottomland and sequester carbon. 
oFFseTs In perspecTIve
This enthusiastic participation in, and promotion of, the 
burgeoning offset market has, arguably, inflated the appropriate 
role of offsets in any national strategy to address climate change. 
Similarly, the focus on offsets as an environmental panacea has 
distracted from the comprehensive approach that is necessary to 
begin mitigating climate change. The reality is that addressing 
climate change requires fundamental changes to American infra-
structure and assertive public policy to support such changes, of 
which carbon offsets will play a limited role.22 
In a cap-and-trade system, offsets are only a part of the 
equation. Under the RGGI Model Rule, for example, initially 
only 3.3 percent of a source’s compliance obligation may be met 
by offsets.23 This ensures that bona fide emissions reductions are 
achieved by the regulated entity. The use of carbon offsets rep-
resents a policy choice to use regulated industries to fund GHG 
reductions for unregulated activities, in lieu of public incen-
tives and standards to achieve such reductions. Given the chal-
lenges of creating credible offsets as well as other public policy 
concerns, an initial inquiry should be made whether an offset 
approach is best to effectuate reductions in a particular sector of 
emissions sources. 
One instance where using an offset mechanism to address 
emissions may not be optimal, at least in the United States, are 
those projects seeking to prevent future occurrences resulting in 
GHG emissions, such as deforestation. In these cases, the regu-
lated industry is essentially meeting its current emission reduc-
tion requirement by helping prevent additional emissions from 
another source sometime in the future. There are technical hur-
dles associated with avoidance of deforestation projects, includ-
ing determining a baseline from which additionality is then 
measured. This is because project proponents have to essentially 
estimate when such forests might be deforested. 
That is not to say that such projects should not be part 
of a climate change mitigation strategy. In a 2007 report, the 
Global Canopy Programme described the immense contribution 
of GHG emissions from deforestation. According to the report, 
deforestation accounts for eighteen to twenty-five percent of 
global emissions, mainly from developing countries.24 Under-
scoring the complexity of climate change mitigation, there is 
some evidence that all avoided deforestation and reforestation 
projects do not provide equivalent mitigation benefits. In par-
ticular, preservation in the tropics may be more beneficial than 
in snowy climes because for-
ests dampen the reflectivity of 
the snow, known as the albedo 
effect, and trap heat.25 
In the United States, the 
use of public funds, including 
existing easement acquisition 
programs, to protect private 
forested lands meeting specific 
carbon sequestration criteria and management goals may be a 
more rational public policy response to prevent emissions from 
forest degradation. Public incentives provide greater transpar-
ency regarding what is really being paid for: ecosystem services. 
This approach would reflect society’s determination that the 
continued ecosystem services these lands provide, such as clean 
water, wildlife habitat, and carbon sequestration, are vital public 
goods, and society will pay for them. 
There are other categories of non-regulated emissions 
sources that may not result in robust or efficient offsets, and 
therefore, alternative strategies may be considered to address 
those sectors. For example, carbon offsets from sectors that 
already receive government financial assistance so that receiv-
ing payment for offsets results in “double-dipping;” projects 
for which extant public programs already provide a mechanism 
to require GHG reduction practices; offsets from categories of 
projects that are difficult or expensive to verify and/or quantify; 
and offset projects involving resources where there is a legal 
requirement to manage those resources sustainably. 
Along the lines of using existing infrastructure to maximize 
carbon sequestration, a Pew Center for Climate Change report 
addressing agricultural and forest lands carbon sequestration 
concluded that agricultural and forest lands can play a key part 
in climate change mitigation and that much of the infrastructure 
needed to increase carbon sequestration on those lands is already 
in place, mainly in the form of conservation programs autho-
rized by the 2002 farm bill.26 The report proposed that a vari-
ety of tools can be used by the Federal government to increase 
sequestration, including education, incentives, and results-based 
system of payments that encourages local innovation. 27 
Another example of using public programs to incentivize 
emissions reductions is in the federal grants context. Recently, 
the U.S. House of Representatives passed “The College Oppor-
tunity and Affordability Act,” H.R. 4137, which reauthorizes 
loans, grants and assistance programs to make education more 
accessible to students. The bill also ties several of the grants to 
how much universities reduce their carbon footprint and requires 
new campus buildings to meet or exceed certain energy effi-
ciency standards.28 
The quality of retail  
offsets is uneven.
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conclusIon
Addressing climate change requires a robust, national 
response, including making fundamental changes to Ameri-
can infrastructure, incentivizing the use of existing renewable 
and clean technologies, fostering technology development and 
deployment, and reducing consumption in order to create a more 
sustainable America. Climate change can be a tremendous driver 
for innovation, and progressive public policy can facilitate this 
process. 
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Carbon offsets have the potential to play an effective, interim 
role as part of an overall comprehensive federal framework that 
uses multiple strategies to address climate change. However, a 
national regulatory framework that takes a disciplined approach 
to offset creation is needed to ensure high quality offsets result-
ing in real climate mitigation. Such an approach will also help 
provide needed credibility to the offset market and more effec-
tively harness for the good of the environment the significant 
investments being made in the offset market. 29 
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the FutuRe oF the eu emiSSionS tRaDing SyStem
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Slightly more than a year after ratifying the Kyoto Protocol in October 2003, the European Commission established the European Union Emissions Trading System (“EU- 
ETS”), a cap-and-trade system, to help implement its goals 
under the Kyoto Protocol.1 Now, as the reporting period for the 
Kyoto Protocol begins, the European Union (“EU”) is looking 
beyond 2012 and creating plans for the future. 
The EU-ETS has completed its first phase (2005–2007) and 
is currently beginning its second phase (2008–2012). In these first 
two phases, the EU-ETS was limited to installations in certain 
industries, namely energy activities, production and processing 
of ferrous metals, activities involving pulp and paper produc-
tion, and carbon dioxide emissions.2 Additionally, the structure 
of the EU-ETS centered on allocations through National Alloca-
tion Plans (“NAPs”) 3 and the predominantly free distribution 
of allowances.4 Each country submitted a NAP laying out its 
number of allowances and its allocation plan, then at the end of 
the year each country reported its emissions and could sell any 
leftover allowances.5 Thus, these initial EU-ETS phases estab-
lish the system, but are limited in scope.   
As the “cornerstone for the EU’s strategy for fighting cli-
mate change,” the EU-ETS must be continued and strength-
ened.6 To establish a proposal for phase three, the Commission 
used three guiding objectives: to fully exploit the potential of the 
EU-ETS to the EU’s overall greenhouse gas reduction commit-
ments; to refine and improve the EU-ETS based on experience; 
and to contribute to the transformation of Europe into a “low 
greenhouse-gas-emitting economy” and to create incentives for 
low carbon investment decisions by “reinforcing a clear . . . and 
long term carbon price signal.”7 
The Commission issued a draft proposal on January 23, 
2008 that included an overview of the provisions and specific 
language to amend the EU-ETS directive.8 This draft proposal 
acknowledges the EU commitment to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions by at least twenty percent below 1990 levels by 2020.9 
The new proposal tries to create a more harmonized system to 
exploit the benefits of emissions trading and facilitate linking 
the EU-ETS with other emissions trading systems that may 
emerge while avoiding distortions in the market.10 In addition 
to increased harmonization, the proposal includes new industry 
sectors and new gases, which will allow for new investments 
and new abatement opportunities, hopefully leading to increased 
efficiency.11 The expansion of the EU-ETS to include more 
industries and gases other than carbon dioxide is a key provision 
in the fight against climate change.12 It is estimated that there 
will be six percent increase in coverage—about 120 to 130 mil-
lion tonnes of CO2-equivalent when compared to phase two and 
will cover almost half of Europe’s emissions.13 
Another key part of the proposal is the shift from individual 
country NAPs to a Community-wide quantity of allow ances.14 
The initial Community-wide cap will base the number of allow-
ances on the average total number of allowances issued by 
Member States during phase two.15 Additionally, it will create 
greater harmonization across countries by standardizing alloca-
tion rules, which will help prevent countries from having NAPs 
that favor certain industries.16 Further, the draft proposal calls 
for a decrease in allowances yearly from 2013 to 2020 so as to 
reduce overall emissions in a cost-effective way.17 Reducing 
allowances yearly will not only help the EU meet its emissions 
reduction goals, but do so in a way that avoids instability and 
uncertainty.  
The new draft proposal calls for the auctioning of allow-
ances, which is distinguishable from the initial phases of the EU- 
ETS, when most of the allowances were given away for free.18 
The draft calls for the full auctioning of allowances in the power 
sector, but for the free allocation of allowances in other sectors 
of industry initially, with a program to eliminate all free alloca-
tions by 2020.19 It is proposed that the power sector, due to its 
inclusion in the current EU-ETS scheme, have auctioned alloca-
tions, whereas other industries are given some free allowances 
to help adjust to the emissions trading system. Moreover, the 
draft proposal recognizes that some industries could suffer from 
“carbon leakage” due to international competition, thus it allows 
consideration of this factor in assessing whether to auction off or 
freely distribute allowances.20 Further, a portion of the proceeds 
from the auctioned allowances will go to programs designed to 
fight climate change and to adapt to its inevitable effects.21 
As the international community works towards a post-
Kyoto agreement, the EU has put forth a new plan to fight 
climate change with a focus on expanding and refining the EU-
ETS. The proposed changes in the EU-ETS show the steps the 
EU is taking to fight climate change in the upcoming decade. By 
expanding and harmonizing the EU-ETS, the proposal looks to 
the post-Kyoto world and the changes to come.
  
Endnotes:
1 Council Directive 2003/87/EC, preamble, para. 4, art. 1, 2003 O.J. (L 275)  
(EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do? 
uri= CELEX:32003L0087:EN:HTML (last visited Feb. 15, 2008) [hereinafter 
EU-ETS Directive].
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InTroDucTIon
Studies indicate that Australia has one of the worst envi-ronmental records of any developed country.1 Particu-larly striking is its role in the climate change debate: 
despite being the current leading emitter of greenhouse gases in 
the world on a per capita basis, Australia originally joined the 
United States in refusing to sign the Kyoto Protocol.2 These dis-
parate climate change positions have a common denominator: 
coal.3 Australia is the world’s fourth largest coal producer and 
largest coal exporter, sending out approximately sixty percent of 
its annual production, which accounts for almost thirty percent 
of global coal exports.4 Not only is the country’s trade economy 
reliant on coal,5 so too is its electricity production: over seventy-
five percent of Australia’s electricity comes from burning coal.6
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As Dr. Mark Diesendorf, Director of the Sustainability 
Centre at Sydney’s University of Technology, pointed out, “[t]
he greenhouse pollution produced by these [coal fired] power 
stations is equivalent to the annual emissions from about forty 
million cars, four times Australia’s actual car fleet.”8
But today, the business as usual mentality and relative 
environmental indifference is quickly becoming a thing of the 
past. Ubiquitous climate change headlines both popularize the 
issue and arguably educate the public.9 The Intergovernmen-
tal Panel on Climate Change’s (“IPCC”) Fourth Assessment 
Report unequivocally documents the scientific consensus on cli-
mate change’s anthropogenic sources.10 Closer to home, record 
drought in Australia and its toll on the agricultural sector—par-
ticularly cotton exports—has raised awareness and concern over 
global warming.11 Such a massive turn in public perception has 
led to a political reevaluation of Australia’s climate change posi-
tion. On November 24, 2007, Labor Party candidate Kevin Rudd 
was elected Prime Minister in the world’s first climate change 
election.12 Promising to make the issue a priority, Rudd immedi-
ately signed the Kyoto Protocol and played an active role in the 
United Nations’ climate summit in Bali.13 
The growing scientific consensus about climate change and 
Australians’ fears about irreversible ecological impacts have led 
to a search for more proactive domestic regulation via environ-
mental impact assessments (“EIAs”). During the past five years, 
Australian conservation foundations have spearheaded a grass-
roots movement to use the courts as a tool for climate change 
reform. In so doing, these environmental advocates have pushed 
the judiciary to interpret and apply the Environment Protection 
and Biodiversity Conservation Act of 1999 (“EPBC Act”) to cli-
mate change. Through a series of cases,14 courts decided that 
EIAs required under the EPBC Act and relevant state environ-
mental planning statutes15 must consider climate change and 
its intergenerational effects. Reaching this conclusion required 
case-by-case analysis of the EPBC Act’s terms in light of its 
overall purpose. It also required a measure of courage, for, by 
taking a general environmental protection statute and applying 
it progressively to the home-grown causes of global climate 
change, Australian judges have stepped into a breach that legis-
lators and executive branch agencies have typically avoided.16
This Article seeks to explain how Australian jurisprudence 
came to take this position on climate change. In Part I, we briefly 
describe the EPBC Act, its key principles and provisions, and 
how these ideas made their way into national legislation. In 
Part II, we explore the recent climate change decisions of vari-
ous federal and state trial and appellate courts. We specifically 
analyze how key EPBC Act provisions have been interpreted 
to require recognition of global and intergenerational account-
ability for Australia’s coal industry. Finally, in our conclusion 
we discuss how the EPBC Act and Australian courts contribute 
to the broader narrative of climate change litigation currently 
occurring around the world.17 
parT I: 
envIronmenT proTecTIon anD bIoDIversITy  
conservaTIon acT oF 1999
The EPBC Act established a schema of EIA requirements 
and guidelines. Although a federal statute, individual Australian 
states and territories look to its principles and structure when 
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formulating their own environmental regulations. Along with the 
general objectives of protecting the environment and conserving 
biodiversity, the EPBC Act takes a strong stand on sustainable 
development and intergenerational equity.18
pRecuRSoR pRincipleS
After signing many inter-
national environmental trea-
ties and protocols beginning in 
the 1980s, the Commonwealth, 
states, and territories of Austra-
lia adopted the National Strat-
egy for Ecologically Sustainable 
Development (“NSESD”) and 
the Intergovernmental Agree-
ment on the Environment 
(“IGAE”) in 1992. These two 
agreements established ecologically sustainable development as 
an accepted principle of environmental policy across all levels 
of government.19 The NSESD provides a framework for policy- 
and decision-making. Its adoption came largely in response to 
the 1987 release of Our Common Future by the World Com-
mission on Environment and Development (commonly referred 
to as the Brundtland Commission).20 The NSESD thus lays out 
a cooperative approach to ecologically sustainable development 
that emphasizes long-term benefits over short-term gains. Tak-
ing into account Australia’s unique natural environment, the 
values of the Australian people, and the prevailing patterns of 
economic production and consumption, the NSESD defined 
ecologically sustainable development as “using, conserving 
and enhancing the community’s resources so that ecological 
processes, on which life depends, are maintained and quality 
of life for both present and future generations is increased.”21 
The NSESD’s five principles, announced after consultation with 
Australia’s manufacturing, mining, agriculture, and fisheries 
sectors, include:
1.  integrating economic and environmental goals in poli-
cies and activities;
2. ensuring that environmental assets are properly valued;
3. providing for equity within and between generations;
4. dealing cautiously with risk and irreversibility; and
5. recognizing the global dimension.22
Although each level of government adopted these principles, 
they implemented them according to their own needs and 
priorities.23
Most Australian governments signed off on the IGAE one 
month before the UN Conference on the Environment and Devel-
opment in 1992 in Rio, as a direct reflection of Australia’s com-
mitment to the environment. In it, the parties acknowledged that 
environmental concerns and impacts respect neither physical nor 
political boundaries and thus have inter-jurisdictional, interna-
tional, and global impacts.24 Similar to the NSESD, the IGAE 
declares that “ecologically sustainable development . . . provides 
potential for the integration of environmental and economic con-
siderations in decision making and for balancing the interests 
of current and future generations.”25 Government parties also 
agreed that environmental decisions need to take into account the 
precautionary principle, intergenerational equity, conservation 
of biological diversity and ecological integrity, and improved 
valuation, pricing, and incentive 
mechanisms.26  Importantly, 
the IGAE sought to harmo-
nize Commonwealth and State 
approval processes, to promote 
efficiency and limit duplication. 
The IGAE report concluded by 
pointing out the potentially sig-
nificant impact of greenhouse 
gas-enhanced climate change on 
Australia’s natural, social, and 
working environments, as well 
as on the global community.27
the epbc act’S teRmS
When enacted in 1999, the EPBC Act set out eight “Objects 
of Act:”
1.  protecting the environment, especially “matters of 
national environmental significance;”
2.  promoting ecologically sustainable development through 
conservation and sustainable use;
3. conserving biodiversity;
4. protecting and conserving heritage;
5.  promoting cooperation among governments, community, 
landholders, and indigenous peoples;
6.  implementing cooperatively Australia’s international 
environmental responsibilities;
7. recognizing the role of indigenous people; and
8. promoting the use of indigenous peoples’ knowledge.28
To achieve these objects, the EPBC Act very practically 
committed to “strengthen[ing] intergovernmental co-operation, 
and minimi[zing] duplication through bilateral agreements,”29 
“adopt[ing] an efficient and timely Commonwealth environmen-
tal assessment and approval process that will ensure activities 
that are likely to have significant impacts on the environment are 
properly assessed,”30 and “promot[ing] a partnership approach 
to environmental protection” with states and territories, land-
holders, and indigenous people.31
Given the EPBC Act’s grounding in the NSESD and IGEA, 
the Act includes a separate section explicitly stating the five 
principles of ecologically sustainable development:
1.  decision-making processes should effectively integrate 
both long-term and short-term economic, environmental, 
social, and equitable considerations;
2.  if there are threats of serious or irreversible environmen-
tal damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not 
be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent 
environmental degradation;
3.  the principle of intergenerational equity—that the pres-
ent generation should ensure that the health, diversity 
and productivity of the environment is maintained or 
enhanced for the benefit of future generations;
Ubiquitous climate change 
headlines both popularize 
the issue and arguably 
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4.  the conservation of biological diversity and ecological 
integrity should be a fundamental consideration in deci-
sion-making; and
5.  improved valuation, pricing, and incentive mechanisms 
should be promoted.32
EPBC Act assessment and approval is required for actions 
that are likely to have a significant impact on: (1) a matter of 
national environmental significance; (2) the environment of 
Commonwealth land (even if taken outside Commonwealth 
land); and (3) the environ-
ment anywhere in the world 
(if the action is undertaken 
by the Commonwealth).33 
The EPBC Act characterizes 
“action” broadly to include a 
project, development, under-
taking, activity, or series of 
activities.34 When a person 
or Commonwealth agency 
proposes to take an action it 
believes may be “controlled” 
under the EPBC Act, it must refer the proposal to the Common-
wealth Minister for the Environment and Water Resources.35 To 
make this determination, the Minister “must consider all adverse 
impacts (if any) the action “(i) has or will have; or (ii) is likely to 
have.”36 To apply this language, policy guidelines instruct that:
1.  a “significant impact” is an impact which is important, 
notable, or of consequence, having regard to its context 
or intensity;
2.  whether or not an action is likely to have a significant 
impact depends on the sensitivity, value, and quality of 
the environment which is impacted, and on the inten-
sity, duration, magnitude, and geographic extent of the 
impacts; and
3.  the significant impact does not need to have a greater 
than fifty percent chance of happening. Rather, all that 
is required is that it has a real and not a simply remote 
chance or possibility. If there is scientific uncertainty 
about the impacts of an action but the potential impacts 
are serious or irreversible, the precautionary principle is 
applicable.37
parT II: 
clImaTe change anD InTergeneraTIonal rIghTs 
case law
Australian courts have taken the lead in connecting global 
climate change to domestic environmental planning and eco-
nomic development. Using the EPBC Act and its core principle 
of intergenerational equity, courts have asserted the govern-
ment’s responsibility to assess even the indirect impacts of coal 
industry expansion, in light of its greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emis-
sions and their contribution to global climate change.
Reaching the inDiRect eFFectS oF Development
To understand the recent flurry in climate change litigation, 
one has to first understand the Nathan Dam (Minister for the 
Environment & Heritage v. Queensland Conservation Coun-
cil) precedent,38 for it established the test used to determine the 
scope of a controlled action under section 75 of the EPBC Act. 
In this case, a developer applied to the Commonwealth Envi-
ronmental Minister for EPBC Act approval of a dam construc-
tion project in Central Queensland. The dam’s principal purpose 
was to supply water to irrigate cotton farms. If constructed, the 
dam would have significantly affected river flow traveling into 
the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area (“GBRWHA”). 
Because the dam would directly 
impact certain threatened species, 
the Minister found the construction 
of the dam to be a controlled action 
only in that regard. The dam’s 
indirect impacts on migratory spe-
cies, for example, and on the GBR-
WHA, through agricultural runoff, 
were deemed not controlled actions 
under this direct effects test.
In response, the Queensland 
Conservation Council (“QCC”) 
challenged the direct effects test, asking the Minister to do envi-
ronmental impact assessments for the indirect impacts the dam 
would have on the downstream Great Barrier Reef and Dawson 
floodplain.39 The federal trial court held that the Minister had 
erred by refusing to consider the impacts of associated agricul-
tural development and the reviewing court affirmed, conclud-
ing that the Minister had wrongfully construed the “all adverse 
impacts” language.40 The Court of Appeals determined that these 
statutory words include “each consequence which can reason-
ably be imputed as within the contemplation of the proponent of 
the action, whether those consequences are within the control of 
the proponent or not.”41 Furthermore, “impact” means the influ-
ence or effect of an action, which may readily include the indi-
rect consequence of an action—even possibly the results of acts 
done by persons other than the principal actor.42 The court did 
put limits on these indirect effects, however: they must be “suf-
ficiently close to the action to allow it to be said, without strain-
ing the language, that they are, or would be, the consequences of 
the action on the protected matter.”43 Thus, as long as potential 
impacts do not lie in the “realm of speculation,” they are con-
trolled actions.44 
Regulating coal mining anD itS inDiRect eFFectS 
on climate change
The decision in Australian Conservation Foundation & Ors 
v. Minister for Planning stands as one of the world’s first climate 
change lawsuits resolved in favor of environmentalists.45 In this 
case, the Hazelwood Mine and Power Station and its owner, 
International Power Hazelwood (“IPH”), sought to develop an 
additional coal field to ensure a supply until at least 2031.46 
Although IPH created an environmental effects statement,47 it 
only addressed the release of GHG during coal extraction and 
not from its subsequent burning in IPH’s power station.48 On 
July 12, 2004, the Australian Conservation Foundation (“ACF”) 
petitioned to have the future release of GHGs from the power 
The EPBC Act 
established a schema of 
EIA requirements and 
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station considered. The panel rejected the petition and the ACF 
referred the matter to the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tri-
bunal (“VCAT”). 
The VCAT concluded that GHGs released from power sta-
tion operation constitute a relevant planning concern when deter-
mining whether a coal mine field should expand. Although it 
looked to several sections of the Victoria’s Environment Protec-
tion Act when construing the relevancy of panel submissions,49 
notably section 21(1)’s relatively simple requirement that the 
submission be “about an amendment,” it is the Tribunal’s adop-
tion of the indirect test from Nathan Dam’s EPBC Act inter-
pretation that stands out. To find a sufficient nexus between the 
amendment and the effect, the VCAT reasoned that
the approval of [the] Amendment will make it more 
probable that the Hazelwood Power Station will con-
tinue to operate beyond 2009; which, in turn, may 
make it more likely that the atmosphere will receive 
greater greenhouse gas emissions than would otherwise 
be the case; which may be an environmental effect of 
significance.50 
Thus, the GHG submission is “about” the planning amendment 
because an indirect effect of expanding coal mine operations is 
an eventual increase in GHG emissions.51   
Although complicated procedurally, this VCAT decision is 
vitally important climate change jurisprudence in Australia. By 
deciding that applications for permits or amendments to plan-
ning schemes must consider all relevant environmental impacts, 
both direct and indirect, it paved the way for greenhouse gas 
emissions produced through future burning of the coal to consti-
tute relevant considerations in the present. 
Two years later, another coal mine expansion challenge 
shifted the judicial discussion to the burden of proving when 
a project’s local GHG emissions have a significant impact. In 
Wildlife Preservation Society of Queensland Proserpine/Whit-
sunday Branch Inc. v. Minister for Environment & Heritage, 
the preservation society argued that two proposed coal mine 
projects fell under the EPBC Act’s “controlled action” provi-
sion because burning coal from these mines would produce mas-
sive amounts of GHGs, which in turn would lead to increased 
global warming.52 But in this case, the Minister’s environmental 
impact assessment had already considered the possibility that 
GHGs might cause climate change and that it, in turn, could 
adversely affect protected areas. When reviewing this data to 
determine whether the project amounted to a controlled action, 
requiring the next level of scrutiny in an environmental impact 
statement, the Minister saw such future impacts as too specula-
tive. He found no strong evidence suggesting the project would 
increase overall GHG emissions: if the coal did not come from 
these mines, he reasoned, other mines would feed the power 
plants.
The Court agreed with the Minister’s reasoning, finding that 
GHGs generated in the extraction, transportation, and burning 
of coal were unlikely to have a “significant impact” on a mat-
ter of national environmental significance.53 The Court rejected 
Whitsunday’s interpretation that “likely,” under section 75 of 
the EPBC Act, meant “possible.”54 It consequently concluded 
that the Minister had lived up to the Australian Conservation 
Foundation’s baseline of taking GHGs into account in the envi-
ronmental assessment phase; having done so procedurally, it 
could now conclude substantively that the burning of coal was 
not likely to have a significant impact on a protected area or spe-
cies. In this manner, Whitsunday Branch established a new focus 
on the “likely” requirement and on the amount and kind of infor-
mation needed to prove it. 
With the courts having established both a GHG account-
ing baseline and a tighter nexus between these emissions and 
their specific impact on the Australian environment, a third case 
decided in neighboring New South Wales (“NSW”) staked out 
new territory by bringing ESD principles to the fore. In Gray v. 
The Minister for Planning,55 Centennial Hunter Party Limited 
applied for approval to construct and operate a large, open cut, 
coal mine at Anvil Hill under the New South Wales Environ-
ment Planning and Assessment Act of 1979 (“EPA Act”). The 
mine would have an estimated production capacity of 105 mil-
lion tons of coal per year and an estimated twenty-one-year life 
span. Gray, a law student, challenged the Director-General of 
the Department of Planning’s acceptance of the company’s pro-
posed environmental assessment because it ignored the indirect 
effects of GHG emissions released from burning Anvil Hill coal 
at power stations.
The Gray Court began with the principle that EIAs extend 
to the “whole, cumulated and continuing effect” of an activity so 
long as it is relevant and reasonable.56 The Court reasoned that 
because a sufficiently proximate link exists between the min-
ing of thermal coal in NSW and global warming, an assessment 
would enable the decision-maker to make an informed decision 
regarding potential environmental consequences.
Climate change/global warming is widely recognized 
as a significant environmental impact to which there 
are many contributors worldwide but the extent of the 
change is not yet certain and is a matter of dispute. The 
fact there are many contributors globally does not mean 
the contribution from a single large source such as the 
Anvil Hill Project . . . should be ignored in the environ-
mental assessment process. . . . That the impact from 
burning the coal will be experienced globally as well 
as in NSW, but in a way that is currently not able to be 
accurately measured, does not suggest that the link to 
causation of an environmental impact is insufficient.57  
In reaching its decision, the Court relied explicitly on ESD 
principles, particularly intergenerational equity and the pre-
cautionary principle.58 It reasoned that environmental impact 
assessments are key considerations because they include the 
public interest and they enable the “present generation to meet 
its obligation of intergenerational equity by ensuring the health, 
diversity and productivity of the environment is maintained and 
enhanced for the benefit of future generations.” 59 The Court 
observed how cumulative impact determinations help a decision 
maker to more accurately predict future environmental effects, 
while viewing impacts in a piecemeal fashion undermines the 
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planning process. Notably, the Court read the ESD principles 
set out in the Act’s objectives section to apply to all of its parts, 
including Part 3A’s environmental assessment requirements.60 
Based on these principles, the Court held that a decision maker 
is legally required to consider intergenerational equity during 
the environmental assessment pro-
cess61 and specifically rejected the 
argument that a GHG assessment 
without coal burning emissions 
appropriately took into account 
ESD principles.62
The Anvil Hill project is under 
a new round of judicial scrutiny, 
following amendment to its EIA 
to account for the impact of its 
coal burning. The Minister for the 
Environment and Water Resources 
decided in early 2007 that the Anvil 
Hill Project is not a controlled 
action under the EPBC Act, because 
the action is not likely to have a sig-
nificant impact on any of the mat-
ters protected under the Act.63 After 
examining the assessment reports submitted by the Anvil Hill 
Project Watch Association (“AHPWA”) and taking into account 
the precautionary principle and public comments, the Minister 
found that “a possible link between the additional greenhouse 
gases arising from the proposed action and a measurable or 
identifiable increase in global atmospheric temperature or other 
greenhouse gas impacts is not likely to be identifiable.”64 “The 
climate system is complex,” it reasoned, and connecting specific 
sources of GHG to potential impacts on protected matters is 
“uncertain and conjectural.”65
On appeal, the AHPWA challenged the Minister’s inter-
pretation of section 75(2)’s “likely” language, arguing that he 
erroneously required a “measurable or identifiable increase in 
the global atmospheric temperature or other greenhouse gas 
impacts”66 and thus misconstrued the causal relationship nec-
essary for legal responsibility.67 The correct test, according to 
the AHPWA, is whether the proposed action is likely to have 
an impact on a matter protected under Part 3 that is “impor-
tant, notable, or of consequence having regard to its context 
or intensity.”68 A single judge of the Federal Court rejected 
AHPWA’s contextual argument, finding that the relatively small 
contribution of Anvil Hill’s proposed emissions to total global 
emissions fell short of a significant impact.69 AHPWA appealed 
to the full Federal Court on October 11, 2007.70 
The most recent coal mine expansion case, Xstrata Coal 
Queensland Pty Ltd. v. Queensland Conservation Council, 
recites familiar facts but adds a new twist in its remedy request: 
the QCC argued for a conditional permit as long as the company 
could “avoid, reduce or offset the emissions of greenhouse gases 
that are likely to result from the mining, transport and use of the 
coal from the mine.”71 The proposed mine would produce up 
to 2.5 million tons of black coal a year for fifteen years, which 
would be used in domestic and/or export markets for electric-
ity production. The QCC relied heavily on evidence that GHG 
emissions from human activities (particularly energy produc-
tion) cause climate change, which in turn levies significant 
economic, social, and environmental costs on Australia and the 
world. But cross examination 
of their experts brought out 
that the mine’s annual con-
tribution to GHG emissions 
was minimal and that sub-
stantial scientific challenges 
to the IPCC report and the 
Stern Review exist.72
While the Court consid-
ered ESD principles, it was 
not satisfied that QCC had 
established a demonstrable 
causal link between the pro-
posed mine’s GHG emissions 
and any discernable harm.73 
The only sure impact the 
Court saw was the adverse 
economic consequences of 
restrictive growth; absent universally applied policies for GHG 
reduction, it concluded that requiring this mine to limit or reduce 
its GHG emissions would be arbitrary and unfair.74 Thus, the 
Court recommended that the Minister for Mines and Energy 
grant Xstrata’s additional surface area application as well as 
approve the environmental authority application under the Envi-
ronmental Protection Act. The QCC appealed and the Queen-
sland Court of Appeal remitted the matter to the Land Court for 
rehearing, based on procedural grounds.75 Now the Land Court 
must re-evaluate the climate change science to determine if coal 
companies will not only have to assess their contribution to cli-
mate change, but initiate programs in order to avoid, reduce, or 
offset GHG emissions.
conclusIon: nexT sTeps In clImaTe change 
lITIgaTIon Down unDer
On one level, the victories experienced by climate change 
advocates seeking to use EIAs to make explicit the link between 
coal mining, coal burning, greenhouse gas emission, and global 
warming are real ones. The language in the EPBC Act and 
related state environmental statutes has been interpreted broadly, 
in light of overarching principles of ecologically sustainable 
development. Importantly, this application to climate change 
has resulted in EIAs having to account for the indirect effects of 
burning coal. Yet on another level, it would be relatively easy to 
see these requirements as pyrrhic victories, for no coal expan-
sion project has been stopped in its tracks. Each was slowed 
down, admittedly, by the litigation and resulting requirements 
of more careful analysis and documentation of GHG emissions. 
But even the robust statutory language enshrining the precau-
tionary principle and intergenerational equity did not keep an 
Australian coal mine from expanding.76
Australian courts 
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Nonetheless, these recent Australian climate change deci-
sions have pointed a certain way. As the Australian govern-
ment undergoes major changes in the wake of Rudd’s election, 
the international community fashions an agreement to succeed 
the Kyoto Protocol, and the IPCC continues to refine its data, 
the questions of causation, burdens of proof, and evidentiary 
requirements that made Australian courts pause before hold-
ing individual coal mines accountable for their contribution to 
 climate change will soon likely find answers. Thus via case-by-
case judicial interpretation of statutory intent, which provoked 
and refined this analysis of ecologically sustainable develop-
ment in practice, Australian climate change litigation has played 
an important role in showing how individual countries might 
grapple with issues like climate change that cross temporal and 
spatial boundaries. 
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Endnotes: China’s Renewable Energy Law
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China’s rapid economic growth over the last two decades has brought numerous environmental problems. Today, China contains seven of the ten most polluted cities in 
the world and is now the second-largest source of carbon diox-
ide emissions, behind the United 
States.1 China’s new renewable 
energy law recognizes the loom-
ing energy and environmental 
crisis on the horizon but may not 
be enough to solve the  problem.
Current trends show China’s 
energy use growing faster than 
its GDP.2 Over two-thirds of its 
energy is produced from coal.3 
Current projections for China’s 
energy consumption in the near 
future could be as much as fifty percent higher than expected.4 
Given China’s dependency on coal for energy, its greenhouse 
gas emissions could grow equally as fast unless there is a signifi-
cant shift to cleaner energy sources.
The Standing Committee of the National People’s Con-
gress of China passed a comprehensive renewable energy law on 
February 28, 2005. The law sets an aggressive target for renew-
able energy—fifteen percent of China’s energy will come from 
renewable sources by 2020, up from approximately seven per-
cent today.5 Overall, the law calls for the creation of 137 giga-
watts of new renewable power generation in the next thirteen 
years.6 The law offers financial incentives, like a national fund 
to foster renewable energy development, discounted lending, 
and tax preferences for renewable energy projects.7 Due to the 
new law, China showed a sixty percent increase in wind power 
generation between 2004 and 2005; biogas and solar show simi-
lar growth.8
Unfortunately, this growth of renewable energy may not 
be enough to have a substantial impact on China’s increasing 
dependency on fossil fuels. This is due in part to the fact that 
renewable energy projects have much higher up-front costs 
than fossil fuel projects, making financing of the projects much 
more difficult. Additionally, due to antiquated laws governing 
coal energy production, the environmental controls for renew-
able energy projects are much stricter than those for coal plants, 
making approval for energy projects much more costly and 
difficult.9
The Chinese law also mandates that power grid operators 
purchase energy produced from renewable sources at a price set 
by state authorities.10 For example, the national rate set for wind 
energy is 6.5 cents per kilowatt hour, a forty percent increase 
over the average 4.5 cent rate for coal-generated power.11 Unfor-
tunately due to the higher cost for wind energy production, even 
at 6.5 cents per kilowatt hour, wind farm development in China 
is still slow.12 At this rate, only 
one-third of one percent of 
wind projects approved in 2004 
were completed and none were 
approved in 2005 or 2006.13 
Mongolia pays between 8 and 
9.5 cents per kilowatt hour for 
wind energy and is projected 
to see rapid growth in renew-
able energy development.14 To 
increase the speed of develop-
ment, some of China’s provin-
cial governments are now allowing payments of around 8.1 cents 
per kilowatt hour. All wind projects selling at that rate have been 
completed.15 These provincial rate increases have helped con-
siderably, doubling installed wind capacity in China in 2006.16
 At its current rate of consumption, China is likely to face 
serious energy shortages and growing environmental problems 
as it draws upon readily available coal resources and oil imports 
to remedy the problem.17 China’s renewable energy law is not 
facilitating development of renewable sources fast enough to 
meet demand, and new and creative solutions are needed to meet 
this challenge.
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InTroDucTIon 
Last September’s historic agreement under the Montreal Protocol to accelerate the phase-out of hydrochlorofluo-rocarbons (“HCFCs”) marked the first time both devel-
oped and developing countries explicitly agreed to accept binding 
and enforceable commitments to address climate change.1 This 
is particularly significant because the decision was taken by 
consensus by the 191 Parties to the Protocol—all but five coun-
tries recognized by the United 
Nations.2 Accelerating the 
HCFC phase-out could reduce 
emissions by sixteen billion 
tons of carbon dioxide-equiva-
lent (“CO2e”) through 2040.
3 In 
terms of radiative forcing, this 
will delay climate change by up 
to 1.5 years.4 This is because, in 
addition to depleting the ozone 
layer, HCFCs also are potent 
greenhouse gases (“GHGs”)—
with some thousands of times more powerful than carbon diox-
ide (“CO2”) at warming the planet. Thus, from September 2007 
both Montreal and Kyoto can be considered climate protection 
treaties.
The HCFC agreement and its climate benefits were possible 
largely because of the Montreal Protocol’s unique history of 
continuous adjustment to keep pace with scientific understand-
ing and technological capability.5 The Parties to the Protocol 
generally regard the treaty as fair, due to its objective techni-
cal assessment bodies and its effective financial mechanism, 
the Multilateral Fund. These features and others have made the 
Protocol the world’s most successful multilateral environmental 
agreement, phasing out ninety-five percent of global production 
of ozone-depleting substances in just twenty years and placing 
the ozone layer on a path to recovery.6
The Montreal Protocol offers additional opportunities to 
reduce GHG emissions further, including by creating greater 
incentives for the recovery and destruction of ozone-depleting 
substances currently in chemical inventory or contained in 
refrigerators, air conditioners, and other products and equipment 
still in service or not yet disposed.7 As with the HCFC agree-
ment, these opportunities can achieve immediate and substan-
tial reductions in GHG emissions, as well as further speed the 
recovery of the ozone layer. More significantly, they can be pur-
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sued immediately and independently of the international climate 
treaty negotiations. 
The monTreal proTocol:  
“sTarT anD sTrengThen”
In 1987, the Parties to the Montreal Protocol required a 
freeze in halon production and a fifty percent reduction in the 
production of chlorofluorocarbons (“CFCs”), and have continu-
ally strengthened the treaty since then as it became clear that 
ozone protection required that 
other ozone-depleting substances 
must be controlled and as new 
environmentally-superior substi-
tutes and alternatives were devel-
oped. This is one of the great 
strengths of the Protocol, and it 
did not arise by accident. To the 
contrary, the treaty is designed 
to be flexible, allowing the Par-
ties to strengthen and fine-tune 
its provisions to stay abreast of 
current scientific understanding and technological capability.8 
As Mostafa Tolba, the fomer UNEP Executive Director and 
“father” of the Montreal Protocol, has said of the treaty’s evolu-
tion: “Start and strengthen.” 9
Adding or removing substances from the treaty’s control 
measures generally requires an “amendment ,” which then must 
be ratified by each Party’s government.10 Amendments can be 
time-consuming, often taking years, or even decades, before 
every Party completes ratification. For example, the most recent 
“Beijing Amendment” agreed on in 1999 did not enter into force 
until January 2001 and today is ratified only by 135 of the 191 
The Montreal Protocol 
offers additional 
opportunities to reduce 
GHG emissions.
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Parties to the Montreal Protocol. The treaty has been amended 
four times.11
But the Parties can change or, more specifically, accelerate 
the Protocol’s phase-out schedules by “adjustment ,” a procedure 
used six times. Adjustments do not require ratification and take 
effect within six months of agreement, except for parties that 
affirmatively opt out. In the United States, for example, Con-
gress included “adjustments adopted by the Parties thereto and 
amendments that have entered 
into force” in its definition of the 
Montreal Protocol when it incor-
porated its provisions into the 
1990 Amendments to the Clean 
Air Act.12
The adjustment procedure 
was instrumental in the evolution 
of the Protocol. The original text 
of the 1987 Protocol included 
only CFCs and halon ozone- depleting substances and required 
developed countries to phase out fifty percent of CFC production 
by 2000 and to freeze halon production. This was woefully inad-
equate in terms of protecting the ozone layer, but nevertheless a 
political and diplomatic triumph given concerns at the time that 
the science was not yet certain, the substitutes did not yet exist, 
and the projected costs looked prohibitive. 
Shortly after the Protocol entered into force, the science 
of stratospheric ozone depletion and the Antarctic Ozone Hole 
were confirmed with empirical evidence—showing that the 
situation was potentially more grave than originally perceived. 
The modest control measures imposed in 1987 created a market 
for substitutes and alternatives, which were quickly developed 
and deployed. And many businesses complied at no cost or, in 
some cases, at a profit. As a result, the fifty percent phase-out of 
CFCs by 2000 was subsequently adjusted in 1990 to require a 
seventy-five percent phase-out by 1998 (and one-hundred per-
cent by 2000), and then adjusted again in 1992 to require a one-
hundred percent phase-out by 1996—all within the treaty’s first 
five years. Through amendment and adjustment, the Montreal 
Protocol now regulates ninety-six different chemicals used in 
more than 240 sectors and thousands of applications. 
rapID Increase In hcFc use ThreaTens 
 clImaTe as well as ozone
At their nineteenth meeting on September 22, 2007, the 
Parties agreed to adjust the Montreal Protocol to accelerate the 
phase-out of HCFCs. Fittingly, the meeting celebrated the twen-
tieth anniversary of the Montreal Protocol.
HCFCs are ozone-depleting substances regulated under 
the Montreal Protocol as “transitional” substitutes for the more 
damaging CFCs. Like CFCs, they were used in a variety of 
applications, including refrigerators and air conditioners, as 
foam blowing agents, and as chemical solvents. By 2006, it was 
clear that the use of HCFCs in developing countries was grow-
ing rapidly and threatening the recovery of the ozone layer and 
potentially undermining efforts to mitigate climate change.
Estimates reported by the Montreal Protocol’s Technology 
and Economic Assessment Panel (“TEAP”) showed that HCFC 
use could exceed 700,000 tonnes by 2015—roughly five times 
more than the TEAP’s 1998 projection of just 163,000 tonnes.13 
The Protocol’s Scientific Assessment Panel reported in 2006 
that the recovery of the ozone layer to pre-1980 levels would 
likely be delayed by fifteen years over Antarctica, to 2065, and 
by five years at mid-latitudes, to 2049, with the delay at mid-
latitudes partly due to the high 
estimates of future produc-
tion of HCFCs.14 In addition, 
the Environmental Investiga-
tion Agency reported in 2006 
that HCFC emissions by 2015 
could cancel out the reductions 
achieved by the Kyoto Proto-
col during its first commitment 
period of 2008–2012.15
The increased HCFC use was driven partly by economic 
growth in developing countries and by a “perverse incentive” 
under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism 
(“CDM”).16 The most commonly used HCFC is HCFC-22, 
which produces by-product emissions of HFC-23 when it is 
manufactured. Under the CDM, eligible HCFC-22 producers in 
developing countries could generate Certified Emissions Reduc-
tions (“CERs”) by capturing and destroying HFC-23 by-product 
emissions.17 HFC-23 is a super-GHG with a global warming 
potential (“GWP”) of 11,700.18 HFC-23 CERs could earn up 
to ten times the cost of capturing and destroying HFC-23 emis-
sions and are exceeding the sales revenue of HCFC-22,19 effec-
tively subsidizing the cost of producing HCFC-22 and driving 
its expanded use, including in applications where it has not been 
widely used or had already been replaced.20 
The original HCFC control measures were not negotiated 
with these higher than expected levels in mind. Originally, 
the Montreal Protocol required developing countries to freeze 
HCFC consumption by 2016 at 2015 levels and phase-out one 
hundred percent of HCFC production by 2040. It required devel-
oped countries to phase out 99.5 percent of HCFCs by 2020, 
with 0.5 percent allowed for servicing existing equipment until 
2030.21 By early 2007, there was concern that without urgent 
action, developing countries would have difficulty in complying 
with the 2016 freeze and the 2040 phase-out.22 
monTreal proTocol’s success maDe IT  
The worlD’s besT clImaTe TreaTy
As it approached its twentieth anniversary, the Montreal 
Protocol already was widely considered the world’s most suc-
cessful multilateral environmental agreement. But what many 
did not know is that its success in phasing out ozone-depleting 
substances also made it the world’s best climate treaty—so far.
The publication of a groundbreaking paper in the Proceed-
ings of the National Academy of Sciences (“PNAS”) calculated 
the climate benefits of the Montreal Protocol, and the results 
helped spur the international community to action.23 Because 
The adjustment procedure 
was instrumental in the 
evolution of the Protocol.
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CFCs are such potent GHGs, the Montreal Protocol is reducing 
emissions by 135 GtCO2e between 1990 and 2010 and delaying 
climate forcing by seven to twelve years.24 When pre-Montreal 
Protocol efforts to protect the ozone layer are included, such as 
voluntary reductions in CFCs and domestic regulations in the 
1970s, the delay in climate forcing is thirty-five to forty-one 
years.25
The PNAS article drew greater attention to both the ozone 
and the climate impacts of the increased HCFC use. It became 
the foundation for key Parties and non-governmental organiza-
tions to make the case for strengthening the Montreal Protocol 
by accelerating the HCFC phase-out to maximize its climate 
benefits—as well as to ensure the continued success of the treaty 
in protecting the ozone layer. In particular, the article received 
considerable attention at meetings of the Stockholm Group, an 
informal gathering of ozone and climate experts that played a 
critical role in reviewing the technical and economic data sup-
porting an accelerated HCFC phase-out and building consensus 
among developed and developing country governments. 
proposals To acceleraTe hcFc phase-ouT 
cITeD clImaTe beneFITs
In March 2007, an “unusual coalition” of nine Parties sub-
mitted six separate proposals (some jointly) to accelerate the 
phase-out of HCFCs.26 Proposals came from both developed 
and developing countries, and nearly all cited the potential cli-
mate benefits of an accelerated HCFC phase-out, as well as the 
ozone benefits. Small island and coastal developing countries, 
including Argentina, Brazil, Mauritius, and the Federated States 
of Micronesia, were among the Parties stressing the need to 
take immediate action to mitigate the causes of climate change 
as part of their justification for an accelerated HCFC phase-out. 
The United States also referenced climate considerations in its 
proposal, which put forward one of the most aggressive acceler-
ated phase-out schedules. 
The Parties met at the 27th Open-Ended Working Group in 
June 2007, to discuss the proposals and recognized a “clear need 
to accelerate the timetable for the phase-out of ozone-depleting 
substances, in particular HCFCs.”27 On June 7, the G8 Summit 
Declaration added further support, committing to “accelerating 
the phase-out of HCFCs in a way that supports energy efficiency 
and climate change objectives.”28
As the twentieth anniversary Meeting of the Parties 
approached, key Parties and influential scientists and policy-
makers began to weigh in on the HCFC issue. Dr. Mario Molina, 
who in 1995 shared the Nobel Prize with Dr. Sherwood Row-
land for their work in the 1970s on the impacts CFCs had on the 
ozone layer, wrote an influential opinion piece for the Financial 
Times of London, stating, 
Now it is time for the ozone treaty to make its role in 
reducing climate emissions more explicit. This should 
start next month with an agreement among the par-
ties to accelerate the phase-out of hydrofluorocarbons 
in a way that promotes energy efficiency and climate 
change objectives. . . . In the light of the short time 
before we reach the planet’s ‘tipping point,’ they can-
not afford to fail.29
As the negotiations progressed, the key questions, particu-
larly for developing countries, were the availability of substitutes 
and whether assistance through the treaty’s financial mechanism, 
the Multilateral Fund, would be available. 
With regard to substitutes, the evidence clearly showed that 
they were commercially available for virtually all HCFC appli-
cations. The UNEP 2007 Synthesis Report concluded that tech-
nically and economically feasible substitutes were available for 
almost all HCFC applications.30 
Financing the accelerated phase-out was more complicated. 
Under the 1990 Amendments to the Montreal Protocol, devel-
oped country Parties must provide financial assistance, through 
the Multilateral Fund, to developing country Parties to cover the 
agreed incremental costs of making the transition out of ozone-
depleting substances and into more environmentally friendly 
substitutes and alternatives. Thus far, the Fund has disbursed 
approximately $2.3 billion in financial assistance. The high lev-
els of HCFC use, particularly in China, meant that the amount 
of financial assistance would need to increase substantially to 
cover incremental costs for HCFCs at a time when many donor 
Parties were expecting financing for the Montreal Protocol to be 
winding down. Indeed, many thought the ozone layer problem 
had already been solved and the time had come to discontinue 
the Montreal Protocol itself. 
hcFc agreemenT provIDes For  
clImaTe-FrIenDly subsTITuTes anD FInancIng
After a week of intense negotiations in Montreal, the Par-
ties reached an agreement to accelerate the HCFC phase-out.31 
For developing countries, the new control measures shift the 
base year from 2015 to an average of 2009 and 2010 and the 
freeze date from 2016 to 2013. Developing countries must then 
phase-out ten percent of production by 2015, thirty-five percent 
by 2020, 67.5 percent by 2025, and 97.5 percent by 2030, with 
2.5 percent allowed for servicing existing equipment until 2040. 
Developed countries, many of which have already completed a 
transition out of HCFCs, must now phase-out seventy-five per-
cent of production by 2010, instead of sixty-five percent, with 
a 99.5 percent phase-out by 2020, and 0.5 percent allowed for 
servicing existing equipment until 2030.
Accelerating the HCFC phase-out will reduce emissions an 
estimated sixteen GtCO2e or more through 2040, with the actual 
climate benefits depending on the success replacing HCFCs with 
zero and low GWP substitutes, and/or preventing future emis-
sions of these substitutes by providing for a robust system to 
recover and recycle or destroy used chemicals at equipment end-
of-life.32 
In an effort to maximize these potential climate benefits, the 
adjustment decision calls on the Parties to “promote the selec-
tion of alternatives to HCFCs that minimize environmental 
impacts, in particular impacts on climate” and to give priority to 
“substitutes and alternatives that minimize other impacts on the 
environment, including on the climate, taking into account glob-
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al-warming potential, energy use, and other relevant factors.”33
By explicitly referencing the climate impacts of HCFC sub-
stitutes and alternatives, the adjustment marks the first time that 
both developed and developing countries have agreed to accept 
binding commitments to mitigate climate change. 
The adjustment decision also includes provisions to ensure 
that developing countries receive financial assistance through the 
Multilateral Fund to make the transition out of HCFCs, although 
the details of implementation will continue to be negotiated at 
the Fund’s Executive Committee 
meetings. 
The agreement was hailed 
worldwide. Achim Steiner, the 
Executive Director of the United 
Nations Environment Programme, 
called it “the most important 
breakthrough in an environmen-
tal negotiation process for at 
least five or six years because it 
sets a very specific target with an 
ambitious timetable.”34 Romina 
Picolotti, Argentina’s Minister 
of Environment and an early and 
vocal proponent of the accelerated HCFC phase-out, described it 
as “important for the ozone layer, and even more important for 
the climate. It shows us what we can do when we have the spirit 
to cooperate.”35 
nexT up aT The monTreal proTocol:  
creaTIng greaTer IncenTIves  
For The recovery anD DesTrucTIon oF banKs
There are several other measures that the Parties can take 
that will mitigate climate change, including the “practical mea-
sures” developed as part of the Ozone Secretariat’s Workshop on 
the IPCC/TEAP Special Report held in July 2006.36 The TEAP 
calculates that an accelerated HCFC phase-out plus the “practi-
cal measures” identified at the Workshop can result in cumula-
tive emissions reductions of about 1.25 million ozone depleting 
potential (“ODP”) tonnes and thirty GtCO2e.
37 
In particular, banks of CFCs and other ozone-depleting sub-
stances (“ODSs”) represent a significant threat to the ozone layer 
and the climate. Banks are defined as ODSs contained in exist-
ing equipment (e.g. air conditioners and refrigerators), products 
(e.g. foam insulation), and stockpiles (e.g. the military stock-
piles various chemicals for specialized uses). These exist in both 
developed and developing Parties. Approximately 7.4 GtCO2e 
of CFCs, currently contained in banks of existing equipment and 
products, is expected to be released into the atmosphere between 
2002 and 2015.38 There will be additional significant emissions 
beyond 2015 as more CFC and HCFC-based equipment reaches 
end-of-life.39 
Emissions of CFCs and other ODSs from banks could be 
avoided by creating greater incentives for their recovery and 
destruction. This should include allowing destruction credits to 
carry forward for more than one year, to be traded between Par-
ties, and to transfer among chemical groups, where the destruc-
tion of an amount of one chemical, for example, CFCs, would 
allow the production or consumption of an equal amount, on an 
ODP-weighted basis, of an ODS from another chemical group, 
for example, HCFCs.40 It could include programs to encourage 
greater recovery and recycling or destruction, such as Refrig-
erant Reclaim Australia.41 In addition, the Chicago Climate 
Exchange issued the first carbon offset methodology in late 2007 
that would allow the destruction of ODS banks to generate offset 
credits.42 
One additional benefit of 
a robust recovery and recycle/
destruction program is that it 
undercuts the traditional para-
digm where consumption of 
ODS or ODS substitutes is 
treated as equal to emissions. 
With guaranteed recovery and 
destruction, it would be pos-
sible to allow the continued 
use of certain chemicals whose 
direct impacts on the ozone and 
the climate may be high, but 
whose indirect benefits, such as 
improved energy efficiency, make them desirable to available 
alternatives.43
There is growing support for new measures creating greater 
incentives for the recovery and destruction of banks. At the Sep-
tember 2007 Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol, 
the Administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 
Stephen Johnson, challenged, “all delegations to consider ways 
of destroying the banks of ozone-depleting substances cur-
rently installed in equipment. These large sources of CFCs and 
other ozone-depleting substances represent a ripe opportunity 
to both further protect the ozone layer and to reduce emissions 
that contribute to global climate change.”44 At the December 
2007 Climate Conference in Bali, the United States, Argentina, 
Micronesia, and Mauritius answered this challenge at a side 
event organized by the Institute for Governance & Sustainable 
Development, where they stated their interest in strengthening 
the Montreal Protocol to address the threat from banks.
oTher measures
Other strategies for strengthening the Montreal Protocol 
were described in the original SDLP article,45 including exempt-
ing HCFC-123 from phase-out and allowing its continued use 
until superior substitutes are developed, based on its negligible 
ozone impacts and the energy efficiency advantage of HCFC-123 
chillers over the primary alternative, HFC-134a, where HCFC-
123 results in lower GHG emissions associated with power gen-
eration to run the chillers, as well as lower operating costs over 
the thirty-year life of the equipment.
The Montreal Protocol also should strengthen its compli-
ance efforts by building on work already underway in the Secre-
tariat, UNEP OzonAction’s compliance assistance program, and 
elsewhere, to promote an ambitious capacity building program. 
This can be accomplished by linking with the Green Customs 
In March 2007, an 
“unusual coalition” of 
nine Parties submitted 
proposals to accelerate the 
phase-out of HCFCs.
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Initiative of UNEP, and the International Network for Environ-
mental Compliance & Enforcement. A much more aggressive 
effort is warranted by the combined ozone and climate benefits 
from strict compliance.
With regard to the use of ODSs for feedstocks, process 
agents, and quarantine and preshipment (“QPS”) applications, 
requiring mandatory periodic review of current uses and their 
direct and indirect impacts on the ozone and climate, utilizing a 
Life Cycle Analysis, would lay the groundwork for future action 
banning the use of ODSs where alternatives that are less harmful 
to the environment are available. Half of the HCFC-22 produced 
today is used as feedstocks and process agents exempt from the 
Montreal Protocol accelerated phaseout; and thus half of the 
global emissions of HFC-23, a super GHG, is a consequence 
of allowing exempted HCFC uses. Unfortunately, the Montreal 
Protocol and its TEAP have not yet investigated the technical 
feasibility of reducing and eliminating these uses—including the 
options of not-in-kind technology for the products that currently 
depend on HCFCs in production.  
Finally, the Montreal Protocol also should require use of the 
concept of Life Cycle Climate Performance (“LCCP”), which is 
considered a practical elaboration of Life-Cycle Analysis. LCCP 
was proposed by the TEAP to calculate the “cradle-to-grave” cli-
mate impacts of the use of ODSs in equipment. Direct emissions 
result from the leaks of chemicals into the atmosphere. Indirect 
emissions result from the energy consumption due to manufac-
turing, operation, and disposal at the end of product life and 
also account for the carbon content of the fuel utilized in each 
process and product life. The Mobile Air Conditioning Climate 
Protection Partnership has posted its LCCP model on the U.S. 
EPA website showing the combined climate life cycle impact 
of refrigerant greenhouse gases directly emitted and the indirect 
greenhouse gas emissions of fuel used to produce, power, trans-
port, and dispose the equipment.46 
conclusIon
The Montreal Protocol and its success in protecting both 
the ozone layer and the climate show that global environmen-
tal problems can be solved through international cooperation. 
As the world works toward a post-2012 climate treaty, the 
 twenty-year history of the Montreal Protocol offers invaluable 
lessons for climate negotiators and demonstrates the potential 
of international environmental law in the pursuit of sustainable 
development.47
Climate mitigation under the Montreal Protocol is one of 
several key strategies for achieving immediate climate mitiga-
tion, along with strategies for energy efficiency, reductions in 
black carbon, or soot, expansion of renewables, and enhance-
ment and protection of forests and other sinks. These and other 
immediate mitigation strategies are needed to buy critical time 
to develop a sufficiently strong post-2012 climate regime. 
It is impossible to say just how much the planet will warm 
before triggering abrupt climate changes, but critical thresh-
olds could be as near as ten years away, and it is imperative 
to strengthen the Montreal Protocol to avoid every ton of CO2e 
emissions that it can. In addition to finishing the job of protect-
ing the ozone layer, this is one of the best insurance policies the 
world can buy to give us time to succeed with our long-term 
climate controls. And it is an insurance policy that we can be 
confident will be delivered by the world’s best environmental 
treaty.
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InTroDucTIon
The next generation of carbon regulation is under discus-sion. The United Nations Climate Change Conference in Bali, Indonesia concluded with the collective sense 
that the United States is now an 
active participant in the future of 
an international carbon regime. 
Undoubtedly, skepticism about 
U.S. domestic regulation of 
greenhouse gases (“GHGs”) as 
well as the timetable for U.S. 
participation will remain. State, 
regional, and local initiatives to 
control GHGs, principally from 
the electric power sector, how-
ever, are well developed and 
on the road to implementation 
with draft administrative rules 
available for public review and 
comment. For instance, in the Northeastern United States, the 
most familiar of these initiatives is the Regional Greenhouse 
Gas Initiative (“RGGI”), and the recently implemented Western 
Regional Climate Action Initiative (“WRCAI”) has gained size-
able momentum in the West. It is unlikely these initiatives will 
be tabled to wait for a uniform federal response. 
On the programmatic side, New York City Mayor Michael 
Bloomberg’s administration has created PlaNYC 2030, an ini-
tiative to bring clarity and definition to principles of urban sus-
tainability. As well-intentioned as these efforts are, the first two 
remain confined, as RGGI is in its first generation with limited 
scope and geographical coverage, and the PlaNYC is still a 
programmatic goal statement with some initial implementation 
projects. The New York City-based Regional Plan Association 
has launched an integrated energy-land use-transportation and 
GHG mitigation program, Long Island 2035, in Nassau and Suf-
folk Counties, which adjoin the five county-boroughs of New 
York City.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“U.S. EPA”) 
Regional Office in New York City (“U.S. EPA Region II”) has 
formed a diverse partnership with Brookhaven National Labo-
ratory, academic institutions, regional transportation, and land 
use planning organizations to develop a suite of analytic sys-
tem models which can provide a quantitative vision of technol-
ogy and management strategy options for reducing the region’s 
analytical toolS Shaping the next geneRation 
oF caRbon Regulation anD tRaDing: 
the new yoRk metRopolitan aRea caSe StuDieS 
by Edward J. Linky, Vatsal J. Bhatt & John C. Lee*
 carbon footprint while maintaining the energy demands of the 
community and the servicing of environmental infrastructure. 
In this Article we provide results of a case study using mod-
els completed for New York City and one under development 
for Long Island, which utilizes 
an integrated urban energy-
water systems analysis tool. 
The case study demonstrates 
integration of the MARKAL 
model with land use, transpor-
tation, and human health mod-
els. Combined with appropriate 
stakeholder participation, such 
case studies promise to influ-
ence the current environmental 
regulatory regime, including 
multi-media aspects of carbon 
control, whether at the regional 
or national level. 
Top-Down anD boTTom-up InITIaTIves  
In u.s. carbon regulaTIon anD marKeTs
The next generation of carbon regulation in the United 
States is under consideration with three competing pieces of leg-
islation in the United States Senate: S.280, S.485, and S.1766.1 
This next generation legislation will be much more sophisticated 
and hence, more complicated than previous energy and air regu-
latory schemes such as the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments and 
the Energy Policy Act Amendments of 2006. The goal of this 
proposed legislation is to account for GHG generation from the 
usual industrial, commercial, and residential sources, in addition 
to land use patterns. The successor to the Kyoto Protocol of the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change now 
under discussion is very likely to address key performance ele-
ments such as “additionality and leakage.” Both of these ele-
* Edward J. Linky, Esq. is Senior Energy Advisor, U.S. EPA Region II and can 
be reached at Linky.Edward@epamail.epa.gov. Vatsal J. Bhatt and John C. Lee 
work at the Brookhaven National Laboratory and can be reached for comment 
at vbhatt@bnl.gov and jcl@bnl.gov. This Article is written as part of the authors’ 
program responsibilities at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and 
Brookhaven National Laboratory. The activities presented describe ongoing work 
in U.S. EPA Region II in collaboration with the Brookhaven National Laboratory 
in support of the Air Quality Management and Climate Partnership Programs. 
The Article is the responsibility of the authors.
The next generation of 
carbon registration and 
exchange is going to be  
far more rigorous than  
its predecessor.
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ments have been issues surrounding carbon market exchanges 
in the United States and the European Union. Further, a future 
Asian Climate Exchange located in India or China poses addi-
tional challenges to those who claim carbon reductions and then 
post them for sale and exchange. Thus the next generation of 
carbon registration and exchange is going to be far more rigor-
ous than its predecessor. 
Despite the sense of inevitability surrounding U.S. carbon 
legislation and presumed conformance to the Kyoto successor, 
the timing of such measures remains very uncertain. For this 
reason, this paper focuses on bottom-up initiatives, particu-
larly those in the Northeastern United States. In this region and 
specifically in the New York Metro area, there are a variety of 
mega-stakeholders that are uniting behind several sustainability 
plans and programs. These initiatives are not dependent on any 
of the top-down legislative proposals described above, and they 
may very well act independently of them for a period of time. 
As is suggested below, one particular analytical tool—the New 
York Metro MARKAL Integrated System model—can produce 
a quantitative vision for any of 
the efforts described below either 
individually or collectively. The 
output of this tool can help shape 
more precise regulatory schemes 
and financing mechanisms for 
greenhouse reduction technolo-
gies and strategies, and, as we 
show, help produce higher qual-
ity carbon credits which will be 
well received in the domestic and 
international markets. 
Enactment of any of the top-down approaches will ulti-
mately need to be reconciled with regulatory and planning initia-
tives already launched in the Northeastern and Western States. 
Currently, these initiatives are limited to electric power produc-
tion facilities, but if federal legislation is not enacted then these 
initiatives will likely expand in the near future, probably around 
2012.2 RGGI is further along the regulatory track with the adop-
tion of a memorandum of understanding (“MOU”) and a Model 
Rule on power plants3 working its way into several states’ 
administrative rule procedures. The Western States Initiative 
was recently launched in 2007.4
The next wave of regulatory and planning initiatives is found 
at the local level of government. It is at this level that the body 
of this Article concentrates. Networks of researchers, municipal 
and regional government officials, and regional offices of federal 
agencies and one National Laboratory have coordinated their 
efforts in the New York Metropolitan area. This evolving net-
work illustrates how local interests and needs can move ahead of 
top-down federal and even international regulatory schemes. The 
applications of the New York Metro MARKAL tool range from 
the next generation of electric power production and wastewater 
treatment facilities down to community redevelopment through 
zero thermal footprint zoning ordinances. The goal of ongoing 
studies using this tool is not to direct or influence the regulatory 
process per se but to suggest that with proper analysis virtually 
any of the GHG reductions requirements through international 
treaty or federal/state legislation can be met with existing and 
emerging technologies. This analytical framework provides leg-
islators and policy makers with a quantitative vision of a sustain-
able future. To be sure, this sustainable future will require an 
extraordinary amount of self-discipline, which the United States 
has not needed since World War II and the international com-
munity has never faced: holding carbon caps in place for at least 
a century with the possibility of returning the climate in time to 
the patterns of the last century.5
new yorK meTropolITan area’s  
boTTom-up InITIaTIves
There are three on-going programs in the New York Metro 
region, which directly focus on climate change and sustainabil-
ity. These are: New York Metro Urban Modeling Consortium, 
PlaNYC, and the Regional Plan Association’s Fourth Regional 
Plan, and the Northeast “Mega region.” Since each of these 
efforts is either utilizing or con-
sidering the MARKAL tool, a 
brief description of each plan is 
warranted, as it will help crys-
tallize some of the proposed 
future uses of the tool. As will 
be illustrated below, PlaNYC 
still needs a unifying tool that 
can, for example, evaluate 
the costs and benefits of using 
shade trees either in combina-
tion or as a substitute for other 
forms of building energy efficiency. Through its work with the 
Urban Modeling Consortium, the NYC MARKAL is uniquely 
positioned to provide guidance. 
the new yoRk metRo uRban moDeling conSoRtium
This Consortium is composed of the U.S. EPA Region II, 
Brookhaven National Laboratory, The Earth Institute at Colum-
bia University, Units of the City University of New York, and 
the NASA Goddard Institute of Space Studies (“GISS”). Each 
of the members had been engaged in loosely affiliated research 
in various aspects of climate change in New York City, how-
ever, the principal focus of these efforts is the urban heat island 
(“UHI”) and its impact on the electrical power network along 
with air quality implications for human health. 
U.S. EPA Region II facilitated a MOU to be ultimately 
signed by Consortium members, containing a set of principles 
for climate models and their applications. These principles were 
adopted from the American Council for an Energy Efficient 
Economy and essentially pledge the signatories to total transpar-
ency and critical examination in modeling and applications. It is 
thought that this declaration of principles is the first of its kind, 
at least in the United States. The central model in the Consor-
tium is the New York Metro MARKAL. Other models involve 
climate and health models as well as weather related models 
from Columbia University and NASA-GISS, respectively. 
The next wave of 
regulatory and planning 
initiatives is found at the 
local level of government.
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To date, the Consortium has advised several Community 
Planning Boards—the ultimate decision-makers on zoning 
ordinances—on low climate impact zoning ordinances based on 
the thermal impact of new development or redevelopment proj-
ects on their areas. The recent sale of two middle class hous-
ing developments Stuyvesant Town and Peter Cooper Village to 
private developers has raised concerns about the future sustain-
ability of these forms of public housing in an urban, heat-island-
intensified environment.6 
planyc
Mayor Bloomberg’s Administration has created an ambi-
tious and groundbreaking public forum on the future of the five 
boroughs of New York City through PlaNYC.7 The effort has 
three basic areas for public input and technical research: popula-
tion growth, infrastructure needs, and maintenance and greening 
of the city in order to cope with rising temperatures and sea level 
rise. The planning horizon is 2030. Within PlaNYC there is a 
comprehensive discussion of energy costs and carbon emissions 
from an ineffective market, inefficient buildings, and growing 
needs. The needs are exemplified by both the quantity and qual-
ity of electric power needed to service the demands of a dynamic 
academic and private sector research community along with 
enhanced entertainment and information services demanded 
in the commercial and residential sectors. Key elements of the 
energy section of PlaNYC include reforming the planning pro-
cess for new generation, recognizing that attention must be paid 
to the transmission and distribution of electricity, and creating 
an energy efficiency authority. The working group for PlanNYC 
has completed a GHG inventory for the city and identified that 
the building sector is the biggest contributor. The Regional Plan 
Association8 has stated that there are approximately 940,000 
buildings in the five boroughs (counties) of New York City but 
that currently only 400 are “green” in some form.
The green category includes Energy Star Rated Buildings 
along with LEED certified, plus all other forms of green desig-
nation. Clearly, if the city is to reduce its GHG emissions from 
the building sector, a massive effort must be mounted to stimu-
late energy efficiency. Technology and accounting mechanisms 
exist through the Energy Star Buildings Program to reduce elec-
tric power consumption in most building types by forty percent. 
The principal objective of the Energy Efficiency Authority will 
be to dramatically increase the efficiency of the building sector 
and lower electric power consumption. 
A second element of PlanNYC is “Million Trees NYC,” a 
city-wide initiative to restock and reforest parks and street trees 
to plant one million trees within the 2030 horizon of PlanNYC. 
Trees can be effective in cooling certain types of buildings but 
are not considered as a cooling strategy per se in PlaNYC. Trees, 
and by implication vegetative roofs, can also have storm water 
control benefits. Finally, it is believed that to make use of the 
extended benefits of urban canopy, key regulatory issues not 
even yet identified must be faced. For example, only fifty per-
cent of the urban canopy is thought to be under public control. 
High costs associated with maintaining the urban canopy as an 
effective technique for reducing climate impacts may lead to an 
understanding that the canopy should be designated as a regu-
lated utility and governed by enhanced control schemes. How-
ever, one never gets to that threshold issue unless a quantitative 
analysis conducted by the NYC MARKAL is completed.
the Regional plan aSSociation anD  
the noRtheaSt mega Region
In a joint venture, the Regional Plan Association (“RPA”)
and the Lincoln Land Institute (“LLI”), convened a meeting in 
Healdsburg, California to examine the concept of mega regions 
in the United States.9 The Regional Plan Association has taken 
this report a step further and produced America 2050, in which 
ten emerging mega regions in the United States are identified.10 
Beyond identifying the regions the initiative is trying to identify 
the relationships that define mega regions and test new financ-
ing and governance methods as well as finding equitable mecha-
nisms to distribute benefits to bypassed regions.
One of the ten mega regions in the American 2050 report is 
the Atlantic Coast Northeast region. The RPA usually produces 
in a decadal frame its vision for its traditional region—the thirty-
one counties of New York City, central and northern New Jersey, 
western Connecticut and downstate and central New York State, 
which includes Nassau and Suffolk County, collectively known 
as Long Island. The RPA is using Long Island as a test bed for 
smart growth and low-carbon approaches to land use and envi-
sions using the Long Island extension of the NYC MARKAL as 
its principal analytical tool.11
Long Island’s basic infrastructure, including its commuter 
railroad, electric generating stations, and wastewater treatment 
plants, are all threatened by a rise in sea level.12 Whether the 
existing network can be maintained cost effectively or will have 
to be modified to serve new population centers protected from 
the sea in a more efficient land use pattern, is the type of long-
range low-carbon direction that will be explored in this planning 
paradigm. How the state’s public utility regulatory structure 
may need to be reshaped to accommodate a future of low-car-
bon requirements and an impending sea level rise can at least 
be preliminarily quantified by the NYC MARKAL-Long Island 
extension.
FutuRe DiRectionS FoR the RegulatoRy pRoceSS
As we noted, in the on-going RGGI rule adoption process, 
the regulation of power generation facilities in the signatory 
states will change by 2012. Regulatory elements of PlaNYC in 
the energy sector will stimulate markets for energy efficiency in 
buildings and these efficiency improvements may generate trad-
able carbon credits in the New York State electric grid. Plan-
ning processes under development on Long Island and at the 
Community Planning Board in New York City can potentially 
reshape zoning ordinances relating to low-carbon and low-ther-
mal impact on land use patterns.
The New York City MARKAL and its Long Island exten-
sion are tools fully capable of responding to all of the challenges 
noted above. This bottom-up approach can serve as an example 
of how low-carbon planning approaches can be implemented 
when guided by a tool such as an urban-based MARKAL.
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urban energy, waTer, anD  
solID wasTe sysTems analysIs
An integrated urban energy-water systems analysis tool, 
Urban MARKAL, recently developed by the Brookhaven 
National Laboratory, has the capability to influence existing air, 
water, solid waste, and zoning regulations. The urban energy 
model, MARKAL, along with the building energy simulation 
model and a meso-scale climate model, was developed under a 
grant from the U.S. EPA Region II. Water and wastewater anal-
ysis capabilities were integrated with urban energy in MARKAL 
with the grant from the U.S. Department of Energy’s (“DOE”) 
grant to support the Energy-Water Nexus program. The Urban 
MARKAL model incorporates a technology database rich with 
existing and future technologies that is tied to the performance 
of urban infrastructure systems. The Urban MARKAL model 
incorporates active and passive approaches to central and dis-
tributed energy resources, electric grids and energy consump-
tion, water supply and wastewater treatment grids, and passive 
approaches to reducing thermal load on the sites of public hous-
ing and commercial building projects. 
marKal moDelIng FrameworK For  
InTegraTeD sTraTegIc plannIng
Energy, water, wastewater, and solid waste disposal systems 
are highly interdependent. For optimal sustainable operation of 
cities, long-term strategic planning and management is required 
for the detailed sub-system and the integrated macro-system. 
MARKAL provides a comprehensive and integrated systems 
planning and management methodology. 
The MARKAL model is a technology-driven linear opti-
mization model of the urban energy system that runs in five 
year intervals over a fifty year projection period.13 MARKAL 
provides a framework to evaluate all resource and technology 
options within the context of the entire energy/materials sys-
tem, and it captures the market interaction among fuels to meet 
demands (e.g., competition between gas and coal for electricity 
generation). The model explicitly tracks the vintage structure of 
all capital stock in the economy that produces, transports, trans-
forms, or uses, energy and the associated materials.
In MARKAL, the entire energy system is represented as 
a network based on the reference energy system (“RES”) con-
cept. The RES depicts all possible flows of energy from resource 
extraction, through energy transformation, distribution, and 
transportation, to end-use devices that satisfy the demands of 
useful energy services (e.g., ton in cooling, lumen-second in 
lighting). Figure 1 illustrates a simplified RES in graphical form. 
The U.S. MARKAL model has detailed technical representations 
of four end-use sectors: residential, commercial, industrial, and 
transportation, as well as fossil fuel and renewable resources, 
petroleum refining, power generation, hydrogen production, and 
other intermediate conversion sectors. 
Technology choice in the MARKAL framework is based on 
the present value of the marginal costs of competing technolo-
gies in the same market sector. On the demand side, the marginal 
cost of demand devices is a function of levelized capital cost: 
Operation and Maintenance (“O&M”) cost, efficiency, and the 
imputed price of the fuel used by these devices. For a specific 
energy-service demand and period, the sum of the energy- service 
FIgure 1. marKal reFerence energy sysTem wITh waTer, wasTe waTer, anD solID wasTe sysTems
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output of competing technologies has to meet the projected 
demand in that period. The relative size of the energy-service 
output, or market share, of these technologies depends not only 
on their individual characteristics—technical, economic, and 
environmental—but also on the 
availability and cost of the fuels 
they use. The actual market size 
of a demand sector in the future 
depends on the growth rate of the 
demand services and the stock 
turnover rate of vintage capacities. 
MARKAL dynamically tracks 
these changes and defines future 
market potential. Another fac-
tor considered in MARKAL that 
affects the market penetration of a 
specific demand device is the sustainability of the expansion in 
the implied manufacturing capacity to produce these devices.
On the supply side, the technology choices made in 
MARKAL are based on the imputed price of the energy products 
(e.g., coal, natural gas, biomass) and the marginal cost of pro-
ducing energy from conversion technologies (e.g., power plants, 
burners, distributed generation plants) to meet electricity demand 
(endogenously determined in MARKAL). The cost of resource 
input for production, exogenously projected in MARKAL, such 
as imported oil prices and cost of uranium ore, together with 
the characteristics of supply technologies (including electric-
ity generation) determine the market share of a particular fuel 
type and the technology that uses it. The supply-demand balance 
achieved for all fuels under the least energy-system cost repre-
sents a partial equilibrium in the energy market. In particular, 
the intertemporal new investments in nuclear technologies under 
this equilibrium determine the market deployment of these tech-
nologies. Additionally, policies can be modeled that explicitly 
or implicitly provide economic incentives for less competi-
tive technologies to accelerate their learning curves or market 
penetration.
new yorK cITy InTegraTeD marKal For 
urban elecTrIc peaK loaD sTuDIes
Brownouts and blackouts in America’s Northeast and West, 
as well as in Europe in the recent years, have been attributed to 
overloaded grids and substations coupled with the UHI effect.14 
Ensuing adverse economic impacts led to lawsuits against the 
utilities.15 Concerned with the economic impacts along with 
the effects on human health, energy, and the environment, plan-
ners have felt the need for better energy planning and mitigation 
strategies in major metropolitan areas.16
The New York City integrated MARKAL project, sup-
ported by U.S. EPA Region II, is a collaboration of Brookhaven 
National Laboratory (“BNL”) and State University of New York 
at Stony Brook. The project uses a portfolio of models inter-
actively to evaluate mitigation strategies covering demand-side 
management (e.g. energy star technologies) and UHI mitigation 
measures, such as city greening techniques. A detailed New York 
City multi-regional MARKAL model was developed to simulate 
current and projected energy and electricity demands, electricity 
transmission and distribution requirements, and peak load pat-
terns in the city and selected hot spots. EnergyPlus, a building 
energy simulation model developed by the U.S. DOE, is used to 
quantify specific building end-
use energy flows and electric-
ity load patterns.17 
During the same time, 
the New York State Energy 
Research and Development 
Authority (”NYSERDA”) and 
Department of Environmental 
Conservation initiated a proj-
ect to examine “green” UHI 
mitigation strategies like urban 
forestry and green/reflective 
roofs. The project, comprising Hunter College, City Univer-
sity of New York, and the NASA-Goddard Institute of Space 
Studies, uses a meso-scale climate model, MM5, supported by 
geographical information system-based land use and land cover 
models. Researchers on both projects had long-standing cooper-
ation on related projects such as the Metroeast Regional Climate 
Study for New York City. This study was part of the U.S. Global 
Change Research Program and had basic scoping elements of 
energy saving and UHI. 
Cooperation between these two projects was sought to quan-
tify UHI effects in EnergyPlus resulting from “green” mitigation 
strategies. The reduction of end-use energy demands in build-
ings due to these changes is measurable in EnergyPlus, which 
is then fed to MARKAL to measure peak load and emission 
reductions. Figure 2 schematically represents the “portfolio of 
models” approach and interactions of EnergyPlus and UHI study 
with MARKAL framework 
The energy utility for New York City, the Consolidated Edi-
son Company, identified overloaded sub-stations and high heat 
emitting locations considered as hot spots to study the impacts 
of mitigation strategies and reduced electric demand during 
the summer peak period. The New York City MARKAL proj-
ect considered the Lower Manhattan hot spot as a case study to 
measure the benefits of the mitigation strategies. This task of 
integrating all modeling approaches, however challenging, pro-
vides an insightful methodology to enable New York City and 
other urban areas to develop and test policies for energy effi-
ciency and UHI mitigation and to determine the expected eco-
nomic and pollution prevention (“P2”) metrics for mitigation 
policies.18 This experimental exercise provides a “validation of 
concept,” and it is anticipated that as the exercise moves toward 
a “proof of concept” methodology that will be prudent enough to 
be used at a utility scale.
The model calculates the least-cost system configuration 
that satisfies externally defined demands for final energy services 
(e.g., air conditioning), while taking into account environmental 
objectives such as reductions in CO2, NOX, and SOX emissions. 
The MARKAL outputs include quantified P2 metrics 
for each time period over the time horizon of interest such as 
Energy, water, 
wastewater, and solid 
waste disposal systems are 
highly interdependent.
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 projected reductions in waste emissions from stack gases from 
implementation of energy efficient technologies, the U.S. EPA 
Energy Star Building Program or renewable energy technology 
portfolios. Potential future extensions of the model to incor-
porate material flows into the standard model to produce an 
energy-materials version of MARKAL would support a broader 
systems approach to addressing waste minimization and pollu-
tion prevention than discussed in this report and could contribute 
in the future to broader adoption of ISO-14000 environmental 
management systems.19
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MARKAL has been applied with the joint efforts of U.S. 
EPA and BNL, for instance, towards examining the effects of 
implementing Energy Star Building Program technologies in 
Hong Kong and Taiwan to measure reductions in energy use and 
subsequent CO2 emissions.
21 U.S. EPA is currently funding a 
project to develop a Northeastern regional version MARKAL 
model (“NEMARKAL”) for the six New England states. The 
states of New York and New Jersey may participate in the 
exercise once the concept is validated. The U.S. EPA Office of 
Research and Development (“ORD”) is the principal funding 
agency along with in-kind contributions from state participants. 
Unlike the MADRI and RGGI, the NEMARKAL is a compre-
hensive stationary and mobile source technology evaluation tool 
that addresses issues from GHG reductions in the electric gen-
eration and transportation sectors, reductions of Clean Air Act 
criteria pollutants, and reducing energy intensity in commercial 
and industrial buildings. This model is intended as the pilot and 
flagship of a group of nine regional models for the continen-
tal United States. NEMARKAL primarily focuses on State Air 
Quality Programs as they are developed by the Northeastern 
States Coordinated Air Use Management (“NESCAUM”)—an 
organization composed of State Government Air Quality Direc-
tors. Taking this framework into consideration, future regional 
MARKAL models should be developed on the structure of 
nation’s electric grid, considering Regional Transmission Orga-
nizations (“RTOs”) as boundaries for other regional models.
new yoRk caSe StuDy outcomeS
The integrated MARKAL/EnergyPlus/UHI framework for 
modeling the energy supply/demand electric loads of buildings, 
along with the effects of UHIs in major urban areas, provides a 
systematic approach toward identifying and implementing oppor-
tunities and policies for the reduction of energy system loads 
and related P2 metrics. This framework pulls together the rec-
ognized and widely-applied MARKAL reference energy system 
model, the U.S Department of Energy’s EnergyPlus model for 
buildings, and recent UHI mitigation modeling. Taken together, 
these facilitate the study of electric peak loads as well as energy 
system supply side capacity requirements and P2 metrics.
beneFitS oF uRban maRkal moDel
The benefits of using integrated urban MARKAL method-
ology include the following:
Energy, Water, and Solid Waste Systems
	 •	 Provide	reliable	energy,	water,	and	wastewater	systems
	 •	 Reduction	in	energy	use	per	capita	(Btu/capita)
	 •	 Increased	use	of	renewable	resources
	 •	 Decreased	reliance	on	imported	fossil	fuels
	 •	 Increased	use	of	efficient	appliances	and	green	technology
	 •	 Increased	use	of	bio-fuels	and	solid	waste	recycling
	 •	 	Increased	 production	 of	 electricity	 from	water	 treatment	
plants
	 •	 Decrease	in	energy	for	buildings,	water	supply,	and	treat-
ments and transportation
Sustainability 
	 •	 Reduction	in	water	use	per	capita
	 •	 Increase	in	recycling	of	solid	waste
	 •	 Efficient	 and	 reliable	 building	 technologies	 and	
transportation
	 •	 Reduction	of	GHG	emissions,	criteria	pollutants,	and	other	
multi-media pollution
Urban Community
	 •	 Assure	reliability	of	systems
	 •	 Provide	a	clean	environment
	 •	 Keep	energy	costs	as	low	as	possible
Preliminary results obtained from this portfolio approach 
indicate that Energy Star and UHI mitigation strategies, 
employed in tandem, can potentially lead to savings in energy, 
P2 metrics, and system cost:
	 •	 Lower	 aggregate	 demands	 and	 consequentially,	 reduced	
supply-side requirements indicated by MARKAL. 
	 •	 Reduced	 peak	 load	 requirement	 of	 the	 Lower	 Manhat-
tan Sub-station, which moderately impacts the New York 
City’s energy system peak as shown in Figures 4 and 5. 
	 •	 Curtailed	 emissions	 of	 carbon	 dioxide	 and	 other	 criteria	
pollutants within the city are expressed in Figure 6. 
FIgure 4: marKal sImulaTIons For lower manhaTTan case-sTuDy
Annual Electricity Consumption for Lower Manhattan Sub-station Peaking Load for Lower Manhattan Sub-station
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These activities and current programs in the U.S. EPA 
regions create infrastructure to study energy saving and emis-
sions reduction strategies. The framework of the New York City 
MARKAL project features cooperation between different state 
and federal agencies, academic institutions, and the industry, 
highlights “validation of concept.” Further “proof of concept” 
for necessary development mechanisms is required to create 
implementation projects as a next step. A new generation of pro-
grams and public and private sector partnerships, state energy 
agencies (e.g., NYSERDA), regional transmission grid opera-
tors and green building community can be augmented to provide 
effective implementation projects. Such a concept and portfolio 
approach can be replicated on a national level to achieve desired 
reductions in energy consumption to relieve grid congestions, 
UHI effects, and emissions.
marKal InTegraTIon wITh oTher  
urban sub-sysTems
MARKAL models dynamic interactions among energy and 
water availability, supply, distribution, and consumption tech-
nologies. This novel approach uses highly interconnected formu-
lations to represent and integrate the inherent multidimensional 
feedbacks with other systems important to the multi-disciplinary 
urban systems analysis. Examples of factors include the ener-
gy-water nexus, solid waste, transportation, land-use change, 
climate change, and public health, as shown conceptually in 
overview in Figure 7. The MARKAL methodology quantifies 
these relationships while accounting for evolutionary and revo-
lutionary technologies and parametric characteristics pertaining 
to energy and water supply, distribution, and consumption. 
This approach explicitly models fundamentally crosscutting 
issues and their interactions, which then determine technology 
performance and ultimately Research, Development, Demon-
stration, and Deployment (“RDD&D”) expenditure decisions. 
Additionally, it can model endogenous technological learning 
and learning-by-doing formulations at the forefront of research 
and technology improvements over the years. Based on pro-
grammatic or research objectives, the project develops benefits 
metrics (measurable targets) for proposed technologies and sci-
entific solutions, and the project then tests the technologies for 
water-efficient energy supply and energy-efficient water supply 
through scenario-based examination. These metrics help priori-
tize technologies for deployment on the basis of short and long-
term technical, economic, environmental, and social benefits. 
The approach uses various sensitivity analyses to explore key 
technical and economic risks and barriers to the future deploy-
FIgure 5: ImpacTs oF lower manhaTTan reDucTIons on new yorK cITy energy sysTem
Annual Electricity Savings for New York City System Peaking Load Reduction for New York City System
FIgure 6: sysTem wIDe p2 beneFITs
Net CO2 Reductions for New York City Net Reductions in Criteria Pollutants for New York City
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ment of the competing technologies. For example, the urban 
MARKAL methodology is able to analyze the expected benefits 
of solar energy and biologically-derived fuels. In addition, the 
MARKAL model can work with existing modeling platforms 
such as water body models for Chesapeake Bay, New York Har-
bor Estuary, and Long Island Sound to produce estimate-targets 
of GHG reductions from both individual media and from an eco-
system as a whole.
Successfully modeling cross-media ecosystems entails solv-
ing a number of scientific and computational challenges such as 
ensuring that consistent assumptions are used at the boundary of 
the media, and managing the large number of models and data 
sets that are typically required. The National Oceanic and Atmo-
spheric Administration and the U.S. EPA Atmospheric Sciences 
Modeling Division jointly developed a Multimedia Integrated 
Modeling System (“MIMS”) that provides solutions for some of 
those challenges.22 MIMS is a non-substantive model architec-
ture which allows media specific models to share and cross relate 
data and results, which will be used to integrate MARKAL with 
other proven integrating models such as the U.S. EPA Com-
munity Multiscale Air Quality Model (“CMAQ”) because the 
alignment of stakeholders on Long Island and New York City 
has already been accomplished through PlaNYC and Long 
Island 2035. 
In spite of its detailed nature, the model formulation is 
transparent; its behavior is clearly connected to the assumptions 
and causal structure of the model, and it has a simple-to-work-
with model interface. It is very helpful, therefore, in creating a 
common understanding with stakeholder participation to address 
complex challenges of energy, water, solid waste, climate 
change, and land-use, as well as improving fundamental under-
standing of these interconnected sub-systems in a comprehen-
sive approach. The model is able, but not limited to: (1) quantify 
water needs for the future and the amount of “new” water pro-
duced or water efficiency achieved by enabling technologies; (2) 
predict gaps in the regional water availability and energy  sector 
FIgure 7: major FeeDbacK processes among energy, waTer, anD assocIaTeD sysTems To be IncorporaTeD  
wITh The marKal analysIs
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demand and the energy saved or produced as a result of the 
applied technologies; (3) identify energy and water efficiency 
and conservation opportunities; (4) promote new science and 
technology for advanced water treatment and reclamation; (5) 
quantify environmental sustainability and energy security bene-
fits of proposed technologies; and, (6) describe potential markets 
and benefits of energy-related science and technology programs, 
along with their energy and water-related impacts.
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conclusIon
Promoting the need to accelerate adaptation and mitigation 
to the impacts of climate change in the New York Metro Region 
is where the suite of models centered on MARKAL analysis pro-
vides a unique framework with ongoing environmental planning 
programs. The results of these ongoing case studies can provide 
the analytical basis and background for future carbon control 
in a compressed timeframe. Combined with appropriate stake-
holder participation, such case studies hold the promise of influ-
encing the current environmental regulatory regime, including 
multi-media aspects of carbon control, whether at the regional 
or national level.
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InTroDucTIon
The United States Commission on Ocean Policy, a Pres-identially-appointed panel of sixteen advisers, with genesis in the Ocean’s Act of 2000,1 has noted that 
“[although] coastal watershed counties comprise less than 25 
percent of the land area in the United States, they are home to 
more than 52 percent of the total U.S. population.”2 With such a 
large percentage of the American population living in or near the 
coastal zone, it is unsurprising that the value of the coastal and 
ocean economy is also high. In 2000, the contribution to United 
States GDP from services 
and manufacturing from 
and in the marine and 
coastal economy exceeded 
U.S. $1.1 trillion.3 When 
the term coastal is taken 
to its broadest reading to 
include all coastal water-
shed counties, the value to 
the United States from the 
coastal and ocean economy 
rises to over U.S. $5.5 tril-
lion (2000).4
The coastal and ocean 
environment is under great stress from development and resource 
exploitation. On the “wet-side” of the coastal baseline,5 over-
utilization of fishery resources, degraded water quality from 
anthropogenic impacts, and invasive species are the primary, but 
not sole, stressors.6 On the “dry-side,” the coastal environment 
has largely been impacted from coastal development associated 
with population growth. With the increasing development of the 
terrestrial and littoral coastal environment, natural hazards such 
as hurricanes, tsunamis, and seashore erosion have become seri-
ous and growing problems.
Of all the factors impacting the coastal and oceanic environ-
ment, perhaps one of the most grave is climate change. It is well-
accepted that average global temperatures have risen over the 
past century. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(“IPCC”) has “[reported] that the average near-surface tempera-
ture of the Earth increased by about 1ºF between 1861 and 1990, 
but is expected to increase by another 2.5–10.4ºF by the end of 
the [21st Century.]”7
Global climate change will likely have significant impact 
upon the U.S. coastal zone and be felt in a number of ways. 
Perhaps most visible, as a result of an anticipated sea level rise 
of between four and forty-three inches, the coast line of the 
DomeStic ocean anD coaStal ReSouRce law 
anD policy anD climate change
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United States may be significantly altered.8 As a direct result 
of climate change-induced sea level rise, “saltwater contamina-
tion of fresh-water sources, coastal erosion, damage to natural 
barriers such as coral and mangroves, and loss of agricultural 
sites and infrastructure” is likely to result.9 In addition, with 
climate change-induced disruption of chemical, biological, and 
oceanographic processes in the marine environment as a result 
of climate change, significant effects upon marine fish stocks 
are probable. Although not strictly in the coastal zone, climate 
change will also likely have great impact upon domestic water 
resource (and associated fresh water 
fishery) management.
roaDmap
This Article will focus upon the 
major federal agencies that have juris-
diction in the United States coastal 
zone, as well as reviewing their under-
lying legal mandates. Next, this Article 
will examine two laws that are of gen-
eral importance. It will then examine 
those areas of the law that will likely 
have particular relevance in terms of 
and as a result of climate change. This 
Article will conclude by briefly assessing how coastal and ocean 
law and policy is especially relevant in the domestic response to 
the consequences of climate change in the United States. 
FeDeral agencIes wITh a  
resource managemenT InTeresT In The  
coasTal envIronmenT
Five federal agencies of the United States have a resource 
management interest in the coastal zone of the United States spe-
cifically relevant to climate change: the Army Corps of Engineers 
(“ACE”), the Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”), the Minerals 
Management Service (“MMS”), the Environmental Protection 
Agency (“EPA”), and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (“NOAA”). Of these agencies, the ACE and 
FWS largely regulate on the terrestrial side of the coastal base-
line, with MMS regulating generally in the near-shore marine 
environment, and NOAA and EPA in both. 
Of all the factors 
impacting the coastal 
and oceanic environment, 
perhaps one of the most 
grave is climate change. 
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mineRalS management SeRvice
The MMS has jurisdiction over the energy resources of 
the Outer Continental Shelf (“OCS”) of the United States. The 
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”), as amended by 
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments,10 provides 
the pertinent legal authority for offshore oil and gas leases to 
companies for marine mineral extraction.11 Relatively recently, 
the Energy Policy Act of 2005 also gave jurisdiction over OCS 
alternative energy projects to MMS.12 
Pursuant to OCSLA, the OCS is largely those areas of the 
marine environment that extend beyond three nautical miles 
(“NM”) from the coastal baseline. In the case of the Gulf Coasts 
of Florida and Texas, state jurisdiction extends to three marine 
leagues, approximately nine nautical miles. Under OCSLA, the 
federal government is entitled to all revenue from lease sales 
beyond six NM, with the states receiving twenty-seven percent 
of such revenues in the three to six NM zone, with a similar pro-
tocol, based upon the different jurisdictional boundaries, used 
for the gulf coasts of Florida and Texas. Pursuant to OCSLA, 
leasing decisions are required to consider environmental consid-
erations and impacts to fisheries and endangered species. 
FiSh anD wilDliFe SeRvice
The FWS manages domestic, largely freshwater, fishery 
resources, birds, associated habitat, and wetlands. The statutory 
authority underlying the operation of the FWS is largely found 
in the Migratory Bird Treaty Act,13 protecting birds subject to 
one of a number of international treaties, the Endangered Spe-
cies Act,14 conserving threatened or endangered species and 
associated critical habitat, and the Fish and Wildlife Coordi-
nation Act,15 which provides a consultation role for the FWS 
in domestic “water-resource development projects.” The FWS 
also co-manages marine mammals with the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration, with each taking the lead on a 
number of different species. Other important and relevant laws 
protecting the coastal environment, involving the FWS, include 
the Coastal Wetlands Planning, Protection and Restoration 
Act,16 which created “national coastal wetlands conservation 
grants,” allowing for funds to be awarded to states for wetlands 
conservation projects and also provided for a specific role in 
wetlands restoration efforts in coastal Louisiana. The FWS also 
plays a lead role in the Coastal Barrier Resources Act,17 which 
created a system of undeveloped barrier islands along the East, 
Gulf, and Great Lakes coastlines of the United States. This act 
is especially interesting as it does not preclude development, but 
forbids any sort of federal assistance, especially federally subsi-
dized hurricane insurance. 
Perhaps the most important law providing underlying stat-
utory authority to FWS is the Fish and Wildlife Coordination 
Act (“FWCA”).18 Under the FWCA, “whenever the waters of 
any stream or other body of water are proposed or authorized 
to be impounded, diverted, the channel deepened, or the stream 
or other body of water otherwise controlled or modified for any 
purpose whatever,” by a federal agency or by a private entity as 
a result of a federal license, the FWS must be consulted “with 
a view to the conservation of wildlife resources by preventing 
loss of and damage to such resources as well as providing for 
the development and improvement thereof in connection with 
such water resource-development.”19 Significantly, the FWCA 
also requires that the FWS provide recommendations to federal 
agencies for any proposed “water resource development proj-
ects” that they are involved in. These agencies are required to 
give “full consideration” to FWS’s recommendations. 
enviRonmental pRotection agency
As noted by a commentator, “[o]ne of the most basic 
divisions in federal water quality regulation is the distinction 
between point source and nonpoint source pollution. This divi-
sion derives [by negative implication] from the [Clean Water 
Act].”20 Although the Clean Water Act (“CWA”)21 does have 
impact in the marine environment, its focus is on domestic ter-
restrial water quality, with its centrum in point source pollution 
regulation and with the EPA in a lead role. NOAA, through 
the Coastal Zone Management Act (“CZMA”),22 has federal 
responsibility over non-point source regulation, with program-
matic authority essentially delegated to the States.
Pursuant to the CWA, a point source of pollution is defined 
as “any discernible, confined, and discrete conveyance, includ-
ing but not limited to, any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, 
well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated ani-
mal feeding operation, landfill leachate collection system, vessel 
or other floating craft from which pollutants are or may be dis-
charged. This term does not include return flows from irrigated 
agriculture or agricultural storm water run-off.”23 The character-
ization of whether or not a pollution source will be considered 
point or non-point is generally done at where it would first be 
introduced into United States waters.24
The overarching goal of the CWA is “to restore and maintain 
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s 
waters.”25 Pursuant therefore to this goal, the “discharge of any 
pollutant [into the navigable waters of the United States] by 
any person [is] unlawful.”26 Under the CWA, the EPA is given 
responsibility for permits in terms of coastal activities under two 
programs.27 The first is for Section 404 Secretary of the Army 
permits, necessary for the release of dredged materials into spe-
cific coastal sites in accordance with guidelines jointly created 
by the ACE and EPA. The Administrator of the EPA is specifi-
cally given the authority
to prohibit the specification . . . of any defined area as 
a disposal site, and is authorized to deny or restrict the 
use of any defined area for specification . . . as a dis-
posal site, whenever he determines, after notice and 
opportunity for public hearings, that the discharge . . . 
will have an unacceptable adverse effect on municipal 
water supplies, shellfish beds and fishery areas (includ-
ing spawning and breeding areas), wildlife, or recre-
ational areas.28 
The second program is for National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (“NPDES”) permits, necessary for the dis-
charge of point sources of pollution into navigable waters of the 
United States. 
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Although initially vested in the Administrator of the EPA, 
Section 402 of the CWA provided authority for EPA to delegate 
to the States the ability to manage their own NPDES programs 
and issue permits for discharge, under guidelines set by EPA.29 
As one commentator has noted, the NPDES permit system 
essentially provides for 
an exception to [the] zero pollution approach [as pro-
vided for in the CWA]. Under the NPDES permit pro-
gram, ‘the Administrator may, after opportunity for 
public hearing issue a permit for the discharge of any 
pollutant, or combination of pollutants,’ [into naviga-
ble waters] upon condition that the discharger meets all 
applicable effluent standards under the law.30 
Upon delegation to the states, similar authority exists. 
Under the CWA, navigable waters are defined as “the waters of 
the United Sates, including the ter-
ritorial seas,”31 the latter as marked 
from the low water tidal line. 
The breadth of the “waters 
of the United States” under the 
CWA has long been controversial. 
Ultimately known as the “Migra-
tory Bird Rule,” the ACE in 1986 
declared it had jurisdiction over 
intrastate waters and wetlands adja-
cent to navigable waters that were 
used, or might be used, as habitat 
by migrating birds. Over the years, numerous courts have exam-
ined this contentious issue. In 2006, the Supreme Court of the 
United States, in Rapanos v. Army Corps of Engineers,32 limited 
the definition of “waters of the United States” under the CWA 
to only flowing or standing waters of relative permanence. This 
restriction has relevance to other laws that relate to the CWA.
aRmy coRpS oF engineeRS
Of all federal resource agencies, the ACE has perhaps one 
of the largest roles in terms of coastal development and its mis-
sion is closely related to that of the EPA.33 Organized into eight 
national divisions and forty-eight subordinate districts, the ACE 
has jurisdiction over coastal navigation, coastal dredging, and 
the discharge of refuse into the navigable waters of the United 
States pursuant to the Rivers & Harbors Act of 189934 and its 
successor, the Clean Water Act of 1972.35 Special emphasis 
must be placed upon Section 404 of the Clean Water Act.36 This 
section allows for Secretary of the Army permits providing for 
the release of dredged materials into specific coastal sites, with 
such sites chosen in light of guidelines jointly created by EPA 
and the ACE. The ACE is also specifically given a lead role in 
protecting and preserving Louisiana’s wetlands in the Coastal 
Wetlands Planning, Protection and Restoration Act.37
national oceanic anD atmoSpheRic aDminiStRation
In part, the mission of NOAA is to “conserve and manage 
coastal and marine resources to meet [the United States’] eco-
nomic, social, and environmental needs.”38 In terms of managing 
coastal development, chief among the tools utilized by NOAA is 
the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972.39 Recognizing that 
“[t]he key to more effective protection and use of the land and 
water resources of the coastal zone is [the encouragement of] the 
states to exercise their full authority over the lands and waters 
in the coastal zone . . . [,]” 40 the Coastal Zone Management Act 
created a voluntary federal-state partnership for coastal manage-
ment. Aside from the relatively limited federal financial support 
available to states who participate in the program, the crux of the 
partnership is the concept of “federal consistency.” 
Federal consistency is a powerful tool that state partners 
possess to manage development in the coastal zone. There are, 
in effect, two types of consistency under the CZMA. The first 
relates to direct federal agency activity,41 with the second being 
connected with the issuance of a required license or permit by a 
federal agency.42 In terms of direct federal agency activity, pur-
suant to 16 U.S.C. §1456(c)
(1)(a), federal consistency 
requires that “[e]ach federal 
agency activity within or 
outside the coastal zone that 
effects any land or water use 
or natural resource of the 
coastal zone . . . be carried 
out in a manner . . . consis-
tent to the maximum extent 
practicable with . . . enforce-
able policies of [federally] 
approved State management programs.” A second type of con-
sistency applies to federally permitted or licensed activity that 
“effects any land or water use or natural resource of the coastal 
zone” by virtue of 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(a).43 Under this sec-
ond type of consistency, a developer must submit certification 
to a relevant state coastal management agency that a project is 
consistent with enforceable policies of a federally approved state 
coastal management program. If a State coastal management 
agency objects to a project requiring a federal license or permit 
(arguing that the project is inconsistent with its state enforceable 
policies), then no relevant federal agency may issue a permit, 
unless the Secretary of Commerce overrides the objection on 
one of two policy grounds: “. . . the activity is consistent with 
the objectives of this [CZMA] or is otherwise necessary in the 
interest of national security.” 44
Importantly, the CZMA also provides states with the author-
ity to regulate non-point sources of pollution, noting that: 
each State [with a federally approved CZM manage-
ment program] shall prepare and submit to the Sec-
retary [of Commerce] and Administrator [of EPA] a 
Coastal Nonpoint Pollution Control Program. . . . The 
purpose of the Program shall be to develop and imple-
ment management measures for nonpoint source pol-
lution to restore and protect coastal waters, working 
[with State and local partners].45 
Pursuant to the CZMA each state non-point source pollu-
tion program is required to identify and provide for land uses 
which impact coastal waters, critical coastal areas, governance 
The coastal and ocean 
environment is under great 
stress from development 
and resource exploitation.
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measures to address problematic land uses and critical coastal 
regions, opportunities for public input, measures for administra-
tive coordination between state agencies, and the possible modi-
fication of coastal boundaries to address the above concerns.
In terms of managing marine fishery resources, NOAA’s 
chief tool is the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act (“MSFCMA”), which created eight regional 
fishery management councils (“RFMCs”), each responsible for a 
region of United States waters (generally 3-200 NM). For most 
domestic marine fishery resources, the councils prepare Fishery 
Management Plans (“FMPs”) in accordance with ten national 
policy standards.46 Pursuant to the MSFCMA, FMPs are also to 
identify essential fish habitat in “waters of the United States,” as 
defined by the CWA. Essential Fish Habitats (“EFH”) are “those 
waters and substrate necessary to fish for spawning, breeding, 
feeding or growth to maturity.”47 Federal law requires that “[e]
ach federal agency . . . consult with the Secretary [of Commerce] 
with respect to any action authorized, funded, or undertaken, or 
proposed to be authorized, funded or undertaken, by such agency 
that may adversely affect any [“EFH”] identified . . . .”48 
Due to the amount of coastal development, other activities 
may also have adverse effects upon EFH. Consequently, all 
FMPs must identify activities other than fishing that 
may adversely effect EFH. Broad categories of such 
activities include, but are not limited to: dredging, 
filling, excavation, mining, impoundment, discharge, 
water diversions, thermal additions, actions that con-
tribute to non-point source pollution and sedimenta-
tion, introduction of potentially hazardous species, and 
the conversion of aquatic habitat that may eliminate, 
diminish, or disrupt the functions of EFH.49 
Furthermore FMPs must also identify habitat areas of par-
ticular concern (“HAPCs”), based upon a number of specific 
criteria: (1) ecological significance, (2) sensitivity to anthropo-
genic impact, and (3) sensitivity to impacts from development.50 
RFMCs are given permissive authority to comment on any 
federal agency action with adverse effects upon EFH, but are 
required to do so in regards to anadramous fish habitat under a 
council’s authority. Last, “[f]ederal agencies must consult with 
NMFS regarding any of their actions authorized, funded, or 
undertaken, or proposed to be authorized, funded, or undertaken 
that may adversely affect EFH.” 51 In response, NMFS will 
provide recommendations for conservation. This issue is espe-
cially triggered by coastal energy projects, both under traditional 
power sources (nuclear and fossil-fuel) and renewable sources 
(hydrokinetic and wind).52
otheR geneRal lawS
There are two other laws of particular relevance to domestic 
ocean and coastal law and policy and climate change. The first is 
the Federal Power Act (“FPA”).53 The FPA creates a regulatory 
protocol for the establishment of hydrokinetic power generating 
stations on domestic navigable waters, defined, for purposes of 
the Act, as those waters to which Congress’ jurisdiction extends 
under the Commerce Power. Pursuant to this Act, the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) may issue licenses 
for the construction and operation of hydrokinetic power gen-
eration facilities. In deciding whether or not to issue licenses, 
FERC is statutorily required to consider several factors, among 
them, the project’s potential power-generating capacity as well 
as its possible impact upon fishery resources, specifically includ-
ing fishery habitat. In direct reference to fishery resources, each 
license is required to include considerations relating to fish-
ery conservation. FPA Section 18 is especially important as it 
requires that any license granted by FERC contain conditions 
relating to “fishways as may be prescribed by the Secretary 
of the Interior [through FWS] or the Secretary of Commerce 
[through NOAA], as appropriate.”54 The second law is the 
National Aquatic Invasive Species Act (“NAISA”).55 NAISA 
created a ballast water management program intended to com-
bat the introduction and dispersal of invasive species into United 
States waters through the creation of voluntary guidelines by the 
Secretary of Transportation. The act also sponsors research into 
combating invasive species.
laws oF parTIcular relevance To  
clImaTe change
Although all of the above-examined laws are of significance 
in terms of climate change, it is this author’s opinion that several 
general legal areas are of the most potential relevance. These 
will be examined below, with a short explanation of their pos-
sible eventual implications.
The first relates to the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and the 
enhanced role that it provides for the Minerals Management Ser-
vice. With the advent of climate change, it is likely that coal-
powered and other high carbon-emitting power plants will be 
supplemented and/or eventually replaced by alternative energies 
such as wind, wave, tidal, ocean current, and solar. As it is well 
known that wind resources located in the littoral and coastal 
United States are strong and relatively consistent, that ocean 
tides are well known and constant, and that broad areas of the 
coastal zone are subject to strong and continuous wave energy, it 
is likely that this is an area of strong growth.
The second relates to the Coastal Barrier Resources Act, 
which although it does not forbid development, prohibits fed-
eral assistance on certain barrier islands on the East and Gulf 
coasts. As climate change-induced sea level rise becomes ever-
more evident, it is conceivable that this law could become more 
popular to limit federal expenditures for at-risk barrier islands, 
and possibly even expanded to include the West Coast.
The third relates to the Clean Water Act, which regulates 
point sources of pollution. If climate change has substantial 
effect upon the physical layout of the coastal zone, as some fore-
cast, it is likely that areas of current intense development may 
be impacted by rising sea levels. It is thus likely that pollution 
sources that currently do not have interactions with “waters of 
the United States” may eventually do so by encroaching water 
lines. 
The fourth relates to the Coastal Zone Management Act and 
is of particular importance. Unlike many of the above-examined 
laws, the CZMA allows States to plan for and actively manage 
coastal development, while also regulating non-point sources of 
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pollution. Under the CZMA, states can adopt coastal manage-
ment plans, addressing local geographic and physical variations, 
and can plan themselves for climate change, while forcing fed-
eral consistency with federally-approved programs.
The fifth relates to the group of laws that address fisheries 
and marine resources. Under the Fish and Wildlife Coordination 
Act and the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Man-
agement Act, the FWS and NOAA have a key role in managing 
freshwater and marine fish, respectively. With climate change, 
fishery resources are likely to be significantly impacted due to 
changes in chemical, biological, and oceanographic processes, 
with a possible large federal response so as to protect food 
sources as well as biodiversity. In addition, climate change is 
also likely to have impact upon flow rates of American coastal 
and continental rivers. Such an impact will also likely have con-
comitant implications in terms of the Federal Power Act and the 
conservation/utilization balance between fisheries and power 
generation. Finally, climate change will also likely have impact 
upon the range of marine (and freshwater) species, creating prob-
lems in terms of defining the meaning of an invasive species.
conclusIon
The coastal and ocean environment is home to extensive 
development and substantial resource utilization. A number of 
laws have been created to attempt to manage this development 
and resource use, under the cognizance of a number of federal 
agencies. With ever increasing development in the coastal zone 
and ocean industry, it can be seen that coastal and ocean law and 
policy is particularly relevant to climate change due to the incred-
ible diversity of resources and uses that are likely to be impacted 
by rising sea levels and a changing marine environment. With 
such a large proportion of the American population residing in 
or near the coastal zone and an ocean and coastal industry worth 
trillions of dollars, it is clear that this issue is primed to become 
one of the most pressing of the coming century.
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With the release of the last report from the Intergov-ernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”), it is clear that climate change is already a reality, and 
future warming caused by the burning of fossil fuels is prob-
ably unavoidable.1 As gradually warming temperatures lead to 
stronger storms, longer droughts, and more frequent flooding, 
communities all over the world must adapt to this new reality. 
The blame for climate change, however, is not spread equally 
throughout the world, and the impacts of a warmer climate will 
not be spread equally either. The developed nations, which are 
most responsible for the carbon 
emissions warming the climate, 
have a moral obligation to help less 
developed nations adapt.2 
The next few decades will 
bring significant changes to 
global weather patterns and devia-
tions from historical norms. Both 
drought-affected areas and flood-
ing will increase as precipitation 
patterns change, glaciers melt, and 
sea levels rise.3 Crop productivity 
will drop in seasonably dry and 
tropical areas, increasing the risk of 
hunger.4 Poor coastal communities will begin to flood annually 
as the sea level rises, threatening small island states and delta 
communities in Asia and Africa where adaptive capacity is espe-
cially low due to extreme poverty.5 Adapting to a changing cli-
mate is vital to the survival of communities all over the world. 
While the developed world benefited from cheap energy 
provided by burning fossil fuels, the developing world will 
be the first to suffer. Climate models suggest that agriculture 
in the United States will benefit from longer growing seasons 
and warmer temperatures, but crops in Africa and elsewhere 
are already near the upper end of their temperature tolerance.6 
Millions of people least able to cope with environmental change 
will suffer as the developed world escapes the initial effects of 
climate change.7
In addition to the urgent obligation to drastically reduce car-
bon emissions, developed countries have a moral obligation to 
help the rest of the world adapt to the climate change created by 
development.8 The consequences of development are being felt 
largely in those communities that benefited least from this devel-
opment. Developed countries must both mitigate future harm by 
reducing emissions and provide major assistance to reduce the 
harm caused by previous emissions.9 
The IPCC defines adaptation as an “adjustment in natural or 
human systems in response to actual or expected climatic  stimuli 
or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial 
the polluteR ShoulD pay: aDapting to a changing climate
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opportunities.”10 Successful adaptation goes hand in hand with 
sustainable development. More developed communities—mea-
sured by income, education, capacity of institutions, and access 
to technology and information—are more capable of adapting 
to changes in the climate.11 To successfully adapt to a chang-
ing climate, communities require knowledge of likely impacts 
and efficacy of possible responses, capacity to successfully 
plan and design responses, the financial resources to implement 
adaptation measures and cope with impacts, institutions to orga-
nize responses, and technologies that meet the needs of specific 
communities.12 To prevent 
additional warming, devel-
oping countries must avoid 
following in the footsteps of 
developed countries. Instead, 
development must skip many 
technological generations 
to jump straight to efficient 
renewable technologies. 
Adaptation efforts must 
be balanced between mea-
sures that respond to emer-
gencies and measures that 
increase the adaptive capacity 
of a community.13 Specific adaptations in response to immediate 
threats, such as disaster assistance, emergency stockpiles, and 
early warning systems, are vital in emergency situations. Larger 
benefits, however, are possible from measures that increase 
adaptive capacity, such as strengthening competent government 
institutions, public health services, and research into alternative 
crops.14 
Successful adaptation will require a significant investment 
by developed nations, but that investment need not require dif-
ficult choices. Successful measures that pay for adaptations 
achieve the dual goals of mitigating climate change by reducing 
emissions and increasing the adaptive capacity of the world. In 
the United States, efforts to reduce carbon emissions will likely 
yield an energy tax, whether by a direct tax or a cap-and-trade 
system, and may include a reduction in subsidies provided to 
non-renewable energy companies. While most of the new rev-
enue provided by new taxes and reductions in subsidies should 
go towards offsetting other taxes and research into renewable 
technologies, a portion of that revenue must go to developing 
nations to support efforts to adapt to a changing climate. 
The next few decades  
will bring significant 
changes to global weather 
patterns and deviations 
from historical norms. 
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InTroDucTIon
The international debate over reducing worldwide carbon emissions increasingly focuses on effectively reducing carbon emissions by formulating novel policy tools after 
the Kyoto Protocol expires in 2012. One recommendation posits 
that if a tax is levied on carbon emissions it would promote envi-
ronmentally-minded business decisions, encourage incremental 
investment in new clean technology, attract the necessary level 
of capital formation in impacted sectors, and achieve national 
and global environmental goals. Yet, to effectively reduce car-
bon emissions, businesses and individuals will have to adopt 
significant lifestyle and behavioral changes and endorse choices 
with dramatic economic consequences. Rather than dwelling on 
the immediate impacts on business and household budgets, all 
users of energy must eventually confront and assume respon-
sibility for reducing the economic and environmental conse-
quences of carbon emissions. Once governed under the law of 
“commons,” carbon will now become governed by the laws of 
science, physics, and economics in global markets. To this end, 
the most effective plan will ensure that all sources of carbon are 
meaningfully addressed. 
If economic markets were forced to integrate the cost of 
environmental externalities caused by carbon emissions into 
the costs of doing business, the ensuing price signals and eco-
nomic incentives would force a dramatic shift toward develop-
ing cleaner energy sources and more sustainable energy habits. 
Economic consequences will likely be imposed on the industries 
that created carbon emissions if there is any hope of effectively 
reversing the legacy of environmental damage. This Article 
argues that implementing a tax on carbon dioxide (“CO2”) 
imposes economic accountability and would impact the use of 
precious resources in a more direct, transparent, and sustainable 
manner than any proposed cap-and-trade program. The critical 
issue is managing the perceived political consequences of exer-
cising such policy choices.
A carbon tax would directly influence both industry and 
individual behavior with transparency, fairness, speed, and bal-
ance. Industry would have an economic incentive to reduce 
their carbon emissions to avoid the tax, which would likely 
be a cost passed on to consumers, and thus, the price signals 
created would modify consumer behavior. Accurate price sig-
nals for carbon (with diminished volatility) will also direct the 
marketplace so that clean renewable sources of power, energy 
efficiency, demand-side management, and combined heat and 
power technologies enjoy a level playing field with the CO2-
producing conventional fossil fuel generation resources. A cap-
and-trade system will reward traders, commodities merchants, 
caRbon tax: ReaDy FoR pRime time?
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and financial institutions. An astute use of the federal tax system 
can build companies, development of equipment and technol-
ogy, and ensure that physical investments are made in sustain-
able business models. 
But the question remains whether the carbon tax is ready 
for widespread application in light of the clear impediments 
to, and uncertainty about, a cap-and-trade system. Currently, 
carbon trading cannot establish with reasonable accuracy how 
much carbon is being bought and sold over a period of time. 
The product is not physical, it is not readily usable, and the pur-
chaser faces limited utility after the purchase is consummated. It 
is also subject to a level of reliance on fiduciary conduct that has 
been compromised in past decades and is not fully embedded 
in all global financial and legal systems. Industry self-reporting 
will remain an essential component to any new CO2 emissions-
control system, but the most effective policies will institute a 
further measure of verification and transparency. No technology 
can confirm and validate such continuous emissions monitoring 
for new CO2 products in support of a cap-and-trade system.
carbon Tax basIcs
A “carbon tax” is a tax on the carbon content of fuels; effec-
tively, it is a tax on the CO2 emissions produced from burning 
fossil fuels.1 The current prices of gasoline, electricity, oil, coal, 
and other fuels do not include the full economic costs of the 
health, resource, and environmental externalities associated with 
the broad usage of these energy sources in the United States and 
around the world. The failure to force industry and consumers to 
shoulder these externalities suppresses the economic incentive 
to develop and implement carbon-reducing measures like energy 
efficiency, renewable energy, advanced metering, storage, addi-
tional transmission, or clean technology. On the other hand, 
taxing fuels based on their carbon content infuses these incen-
tives at every point in the chain of production and consumption, 
from an individual’s choice of the type and usage of vehicles, 
appliances, and housing, to business choices of product design, 
capital investment, facilities location, and government’s choices 
when setting regulatory policy direction.2 
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Tax vs. cap-anD-TraDe
Regardless of whether creating a price for carbon emis-
sions takes the form of a tax or tradable emissions allowances, 
the cost of carbon emissions will 
be passed through to the ultimate 
consumers. This fundamental 
market result occurs while ninety-
eight percent of United Kingdom 
(“U.K.”) businesses recognize it 
is important to reduce the envi-
ronmental impact of industry.3 
Over fifty percent of U.K. com-
panies today are struggling with 
long-term strategic and business 
modeling decisions in the face 
of the current unstable policy 
and tax environment.4 Interest-
ingly, after global cap-and-trade 
emissions trading experience, 
almost sixty-six percent of U.K. companies welcome the use of 
the tax system to provide incentives for them to become car-
bon neutral.5 Only the public policy processes fail to recognize 
this current market-based distinction in managing what has been 
characterized as one of the greatest market failures in the world 
today—that failure to clearly account for the externalities of fos-
sil fuel use.
pRice pReDictability
A carbon tax sets a market clearing price that encourages 
predictable energy prices. Predictability is important because 
when future energy and power prices can be reliably calculated 
in advance, energy-critical decisions can be made with the full 
awareness of carbon price signals. Once these price signals are 
added to the costs that industry must factor into the cost of doing 
business, they can affect plant and building design consider-
ations, new clean technology development, electricity storage 
and deployment for industry, and appliance selection and the 
purchase of the family car for the individual.6 
The United States has had tradable permits for sulfur diox-
ide (“SO2”) since the enactment of the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1990. In that period, the tradable permits have varied in 
price by over forty percent.7 Yet due to carbon’s higher relative 
market penetration within the United States and global economy, 
compared to that of SO2, similar price fluctuations would likely 
affect all aspects of the U.S. economy, including consumer 
spending, budgeting, capital expansion, and inflation.8 
Simple aDminiStRation 
The carbon content of every form of fossil fuel is pre-
cisely known, as is the amount of CO2 released when that fuel 
is burned.9 This precision presents few technical problems for 
documentation or measurement. The type of fuel and the amount 
purchased or used is already tracked by most industrial and pri-
vate consumers. Thus, instituting a carbon tax would require 
few, if any, additional reporting or accounting burdens, while 
enjoying clarity and transparency.
In addition, administering the carbon tax could utilize cur-
rent tax collection mechanisms and existing enforcement, com-
pliance, reporting, and administrative resources. In contrast, 
the cap-and-trade approach 
embraced by the financial 
industry envisions creating a 
complex new system for com-
pliance reporting, audits, and 
verification with an uncertain 
value proposition in return. 
Without developing rigorous 
new accounting and verifica-
tion mechanisms, such a sys-
tem is unworkable and will 
be highly volatile and subject 
to gaming, thereby undermin-
ing confidence and certainty in 
planning the outcome. A carbon 
tax is much more feasible than 
a cap-and-trade system, except for the threat of its dire political 
consequences.
timing
A carbon tax can be implemented much more quickly than 
a cap-and-trade program. This factor is critical to the effective-
ness of any CO2 emissions reduction policy because time is of 
the essence from a scientific performance basis.10 So far, cap-
and-trade has proven to be unsuccessful in reducing carbon 
emissions in the European Union and other global markets.11 
Although a cap-and-trade system has been extremely success-
ful in the United States for reducing SO2 emissions in the past 
decade, the SO2 model is not dispositive for carbon. A carbon 
cap-and-trade program will have to be designed one hundred 
times larger in scale than its SO2 counterpart, which creates an 
enormous problem of scale, complexity, administration, and 
cost of compliance for cross-border purposes. In a comparable 
example, the success of the U.S. acid rain program required 
solid data collection and transparent verification combined with 
the use of continuous emissions monitoring technology. Read-
ily available technology does not currently exist for filtering or 
capturing CO2. Carbon storage or sequestration will likely take 
another decade to become cost effective and will create opera-
tional de-rating of ten to thirty percent, water supply demands, 
fuels shifting, and higher operating costs to succeed. 
Cap-and-trade systems are also complex and difficult to 
design. Issues concerning the proper level of the cap, timing, 
allowance allocations, pre-emption, certification procedures, 
standards for use of offsets, penalties and regional conflicts must 
all be addressed before the system can be implemented.12 These 
issues require complex operational and political considerations 
that surely would hinder any timely solution to regulating U.S. 
CO2 emissions. Further, while this design and implementation 
process is taking place, polluters are free to continue unchecked 
while uncertainty reigns for another decade. A cap-and-trade 
approach for CO2 will not be as effective as a carbon tax in the 
A carbon tax would 
directly influence 
both industry and 
individual behavior with 
transparency, fairness, 
speed, and balance.
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short term because it will lag behind the needs of the market-
place, scientific inquiry, and global policy making. It would not 
offer transparency, nor a clear stable price signal to support capi-
tal investment and new investment decision-making until 2020.
leSS FRauD anD manipulation
The protracted negotiations necessary to develop a compre-
hensive and politically acceptable carbon cap-and-trade program 
leave the process vulnerable to parties shaping the program to 
maximize narrow economic benefits, maximizing their market 
positions in industry sectors, or constraining competition rather 
than designing an economically 
efficient system that maximizes 
public gain and a competitive 
U.S. economy. In a cap-and-
trade program, although market 
prices will increase, just as with 
a carbon tax, the reasons for the 
increase are hidden in a maze 
of new bureaucracy, regulatory 
impositions, and cost partner-
ships that render it more opaque 
and politically attractive.
A carbon tax can be implemented with far less opportu-
nity for manipulation. Carbon taxes are transparent and easily 
understandable by the public. Once the market targets for carbon 
are set, they can be readily adjusted according to market suc-
cess or failure. However, it is this transparency and flexibility 
that makes a carbon tax politically undesirable because it is clear 
where and how society will have to take responsibility, make 
direct changes and improvements, and pay for the CO2 by-prod-
ucts of society. 
cap-anD-tRaDe iS a tax in anotheR FoRm
The key attribute of cap-and-trade that has made it so popu-
lar is that future emission targets for reductions are fixed and 
known. This is mostly propaganda, however, because most cap-
and-trade systems under development include a “safety-valve” 
provision. This safety valve would counter the operations of 
markets and provide for the auctioning of additional allowances 
if the price exceeds a certain predetermined value.13 In addition, 
the knowledge of the future trajectory of carbon emissions is 
questionably valuable because there is no agreed-upon trajectory 
for achieving climate stability and preventing disaster.14 
Cap-and-trade programs have traditionally provided initial 
allowances for free. Freely giving away financial assets prevents 
the government from reducing the economic costs of carbon con-
trol by cutting taxes elsewhere, or by providing rebates to pro-
tected classes of consumers. Certain industries capitalize upon 
the economic benefit and prioritize the costs in products regard-
ing services, which flow generally to utilities and traditional 
energy providers. Costs are passed through twice to consumers; 
this was the case in European electricity markets following the 
European Emissions Trading System. While the newer proposed 
cap-and-trade programs include a government auction of per-
mits to generate revenue and emulate the advantage of a carbon 
tax,15 I argue it is more effective to skip the middleman with 
its administrative costs and complexity, verification problems, 
and lack of transparency in favor of a clear tax. To succeed, the 
carbon tax would need to be coupled with other tax offsets in the 
tax code to be revenue neutral, and be managed in trust to avoid 
profligate political expenditures.
economic eFFiciency
Setting a clearing price for carbon that can be periodi-
cally evaluated for its effectiveness in achieving public policy 
and market performance objectives is a simpler and more eco-
nomically efficient approach 
than a cap-and-trade program. 
The cost of carbon can be set 
through a tax mechanism, and 
its progress in reducing energy 
intensity can be evaluated every 
five years. This built-in evalu-
ation process permits adjust-
ments to be made, which will 
ensure achievement of emis-
sion reduction goals. Technical 
inputs can be provided by DOE, 
EPA, NOAA, and the National Academy of Science each cycle 
for review with final economic evaluations of the tax conducted 
by Treasury and the Federal Reserve.
In the United States, potential economic harm could be 
diminished by offsetting the revenue resulting from a new car-
bon tax upon its enactment, with mirroring reductions in the 
payroll tax, the corporate tax rate, and the alternative minimum 
tax. Additional revenue can be reserved in trust for government 
funding of clean energy technology and advanced energy R&D. 
Economic feedback would be provided with balance to ben-
efit the corporate, small business, and individual tax payers to 
reduce the economic burden of the new carbon tax scheme by 
starting with a tax that is “revenue neutral.” The key effective-
ness of a carbon tax program that is currently being overlooked 
is that such a tax may become revenue neutral. Revenue neutral-
ity shifts the economic burden to industries requiring behavioral 
and competitive modification consistent with global policy shifts 
while preserving efficiency, energy intensity, and benefits of sta-
bility in the U.S. economy. No cap-and-trade proposal offers 
similar revenue neutrality and the specter of economic stability. 
Rather, cap-and-trade arguably creates some market winners, 
many market or industry sector losers, opportunities for gaming, 
and makes U.S. consumers the biggest losers of all.
Issues In DesIgnIng The carbon Tax
None of the current carbon tax discussions are ready for 
implementation yet for several reasons:
1.  lack oF aDequate enFoRcement anD  
StRategy FoR tax
Additional tax and energy specialists would need to 
be shifted from the U.S. DOE and EPA to the U.S. Treasury 
Department. Initially, additional staffing would be required for 
A carbon tax can be 
implemented much more 
quickly than a  
cap-and-trade program. 
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the additional rulemaking, audits, enforcement, and advisory 
work. Tax treaties and the World Trade Organization are in 
place to administer international consequences. Within a decade, 
administrative precedents could be established, and staffing 
management would likely decline as the tax system is largely 
self-implementing thereafter.
2. ability to Ratchet
The whole reason for implementing a tax for carbon is to 
harness economic power to quickly attack a serious environmen-
tal problem. The goal is to create a market for reducing green-
house gas emissions in order to avoid the extraordinary costs 
of climate change-induced adaptation. To ensure that emissions 
reductions are actually occurring, rather than simply permitting 
people to pay more in order to emit much like they are paying 
more to continue to drive, a ratcheting mechanism can be stud-
ied. The ratchet would periodically increase the tax rate depend-
ing on the emission reductions achieved, evaluated every five 
years through the processes shared above. This will provide a 
consistent price signal to encourage development of less carbon-
intensive technologies, accelerate clean technology deployment 
and planning certainty, and stimulate a societal behavioral shift 
toward sustainable business and commercial practices to main-
tain U.S. competitiveness.
This ratcheting plan was introduced to the House of Rep-
resentatives in April 2007 when Representative Stark (D-CA) 
introduced a bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 
to impose a tax on fossil fuels based on their carbon content.16 
This structure could be adapted to begin at $10 per ton of car-
bon content and increased by $10 per ton every five years until 
the United States reaches an annual emissions level that does 
not exceed a specified level of CO2 emissions. This structure 
would reward early company actions and establish an economic 
benchmark, while recording market reaction and response and 
managing price volatility.
3.  not aS woRkable FoR tRanSpoRtation  
anD commeRcial builDingS
The cap-and-trade system or carbon tax may not impact the 
transportation and commercial building sectors as effectively 
as the electric power production sector. More focus is provided 
on stationary sources through cap-and-trade while mobile and 
building sources are ignored. The new fuel efficiency standards 
for passenger and non-passenger vehicles, however, will create 
a more direct impact on the transportation sector. In addition, 
green buildings could benefit from a required market evaluation 
of energy efficiency improvements in building appraisals upon 
sale or resale. Moreover, a cost of capital, insurance reductions 
and resale valuation “adders” from LEED certified new or exist-
ing buildings could be implemented with clearer market signals. 
Federal tax credits, accelerated depreciation, state building codes, 
and state tax incentives could round out this market for construc-
tion where substantial CO2 savings are possible through funding 
with carbon tax revenues. The new recognition of forestry and 
agricultural impacts might also favor a tax solution to cut back 
administrative costs in these important carbon markets. 
4.  RequiReS an oveRhaul oF eneRgy  
anD enviRonmental taxeS in the tax coDe
Consistent with the enactment of a new carbon tax, exist-
ing tax provisions in the Internal Revenue Code would require 
review for consistency and “deadwood” overhaul. Legacy deci-
sions of the past are not the building blocks of our national 
future. The outdated or inconsistent provisions in the tax code 
must be removed as part of a carbon tax enactment. A tax or 
fee could be levied on CO2 emissions, which would establish 
the costs of such emissions with clarity. The market can then 
establish the emission level and degree of market penetration in 
a revenue neutral environment engaging in classic tax planning 
and capital investment in carbon tax avoidance strategies. This 
fosters a more productive market transaction than the artificial 
cap-and-trade scheme with uncertain prices, little transparency, 
additionality and verification concerns—with no corresponding 
guarantees of similar levels of capital support for investment in 
physical assets to reduce carbon. 
5. pRoblemS with Social StewaRDShip
The neediest citizens of our country need a set-aside of 
funds from any new tax revenues. This set-aside should be split 
between improving multi-family housing stock upon audit and 
Low Income Housing Energy Assistance Program fuel assis-
tance, and affordable housing incentives, structures and support 
administered through state, county, and city governments and 
foundations. A cap-and-trade system offers no contribution to 
our obligations for social stewardship.
6. wateR impact analySiS
No carbon strategy should be considered credible without 
analyzing the water impact of the technology choices and strate-
gies for the future. Specifically, the analysis should include the 
technology’s impact on water resources, water availability, and 
sustainability for CO2 purposes administered through EPA and 
the Army Corps of Engineers.
conclusIon
A fair assessment of these strategy alternatives and imple-
mentation consequences is critical because the national choices 
we make in managing carbon will become the foundation of 
the next environmental initiatives: water management, brown-
field restoration, and new patterns of U.S. real estate and com-
munity development. The business model, market solution, and 
strategies for CO2 will set the stage for the next global trading 
product—water rights—because of its implications for health, 
new power generation, food, and weather impacts on famine, 
economic growth, and power production.
Our future course in managing carbon may be unclear, but 
the stakes involved in the choice between a new trading system 
or the tax system are quite high. After watching market based 
responses artificially built around trading and financial risk 
management from savings and loans, dot-coms, electric power 
marketing, natural gas marketing, agricultural commodities, and 
sub-prime mortgage lending, a fresh innovative approach built 
around the federal tax system could become a powerful tool of 
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market-based action across stationary, mobile, and building emis-
sion sources. This true market-based approach also ensures that 
physical investment will match with financial risk management 
strategies to diminish volatility and achieve the desired result. 
Other financial derivatives wrapped around trading schemes do 
not provide that comfort, and limit the return and benefits to nar-
row sectors of society and create distortions in markets.
The consequences of a developed and imposed carbon tax 
should be consistently offset against other less desirable business 
and individual taxes striving for revenue neutrality. The reve-
nues should never be converted into sources of new funding for 
grand social programs or legislative earmarks that benefit politi-
cal elites, instead of benefiting true markets, U.S. companies, 
industries, and the underlying public policy objectives of the 
carbon tax operating in a global economy. Carbon can become a 
driver for innovation and job creation and technology advance-
ment in the 21st century as opposed to being a mere externality. 
Success will depend upon the choices we make managing the 
laws of science, economics, and politics with balance and true 
protection of U.S. markets and industry. In addressing honestly 
the greatest market failure of the 20th century, we can create an 
economic renaissance built on sustainable and sound technology 
and business practices.
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The snow that falls in the Rockies’ Sierra Sangre de Cristo range holds water during the winter months, slowly releasing water over the spring and summer months into 
the tributaries and aquifers that feed the Rio Grande basin.1 As 
the climate continues to warm, the ability of the Rio Grande basin 
to replenish itself may become increasingly threatened as snow-
pack decreases and evaporation rates increase.2 Past droughts 
and environmental catastrophes are archeologically preserved in 
the ruins of ancient southwestern cities such as Chaco Canyon3 
and serve as dire warnings of what may occur in a dryer climate. 
As the Southwest prepares for population growth and increased 
water scarcity, Albuquerque and El Paso’s stories illustrate how 
the destinies of all the communities in the Rio Grande valley are 
intertwined.
In the 1980s, New Mexico and the city of El Paso litigated 
and negotiated water rights in federal court and before the New 
Mexico State Engineer.4 New Mexico’s “beneficial use” provi-
sion in its state Constitution and related water management stat-
utes place strict restrictions on water exports.5 Eventually, New 
Mexico was not compelled to provide its water to El Paso, thus 
allowing farmers and cities in the state to keep part of an already 
limited supply of water from booming El Paso.6 As a result, El 
Paso was forced to pump more water out of its aquifer in the 
Hueco Bolson. El Paso and Ciudad Juarez, which both draw 
water from the Hueco Bolson water basin, have been estimated 
to have as little as two years of freshwater remaining in their 
aquifer and both face population growth.7
El Paso is experiencing increased growth because of mili-
tary base realignments, which will add nearly 28,000 soldiers, 
not to mention their families, to Fort Bliss through 2013.8 With 
limited groundwater or water from the Rio Grande to sustain 
growth, the city of El Paso turned to the federal government and 
Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson (R-TX) for federal assistance.9 
The solution was the largest inland desalination plant in the 
world, meant to treat the remaining brackish ground water and 
ensure El Paso’s future growth.10 It is estimated that depleting 
the Hueco will enable the city of El Paso to maintain an esti-
mated fifty years of projected growth.11 The Hueco, however, is 
not easily recharged and there appear to be no plans for the city 
if the Hueco is tapped dry.
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The lifeblood of multiple communities is the Rio Grande. Above is a portion of 
the Rio Grande Valley State Park near downtown Albuquerque. Photo taken by 
Matthew Padilla.
North of El Paso, Albuquerque, New Mexico’s largest 
city, is urgently trying to balance growth and make use of the 
San Juan-Chama diversion project instead of tapping its finite 
aquifer. Through a series of mountain pipes and dams, the 
project diverts New Mexico’s water from the Colorado River 
basin southwards towards Albuquerque via the Rio Grande.12 
The project was spearheaded by former Senator Dennis Chavez 
(D-NM) and signed into law by President Kennedy in 1961.13 
Senator Chavez spent nearly three decades of his Senate career 
working to pass the diversion project as a safeguard against 
drought.14 
Albuquerque, after learning that its aquifer was smaller 
than previously believed, has begun to rely on the additional 
San Juan-Chama water as a primary potable water source.15 It is 
believed that the San Juan-Chama diversion project will enable 
Albuquerque to sustain predicted growth for the next sixty years 
without draining its aquifer.16 In addition to the diversion proj-
ect, the city of Albuquerque has curtailed its water use by over 
thirty-percent in the past decade and begun efforts to promote 
increased water awareness and eco-friendly development.17 
Albuquerque is experiencing rapid growth rates, and will have 
to contend with proposed developments which will place greater 
strain on its water supplies.18
Population growth is not the only variable affecting the sus-
tainability of water supplies along the Rio Grande. Exacerbating 
the problems posed by population growth, climate change has 
the potential to derail any planning in the Rio Grande basin that 
is based on current water models.19 Declining water supplies 
due to decreased snowpack and increased evaporation in the Rio 
Grande system will lead to less water and increased litigation 
over what is left.  Ensuring there is enough water for all entities 
could impact agricultural land availability and result in bidding 
wars over water rights between stakeholders as has been the case 
in other water-scarce regions.20 
How the states monitor available water in light of global 
warming is also important. The Chair of the Senate Energy and 
Natural Resources committee Senator Bingaman (D-NM) and 
senior member Senator Domenici (R-NM) have both called for 
an accounting of western water in light of increased stress due 
to global warming.21 Such preparation is vital if the communi-
ties of the Rio Grande are to continue using the available water 
for the beneficial use of all in the warmer future. Regardless of 
the outcome, as snowpack lessens and evaporation increases, the 
thirsty Rio Grande will have less to share with the communities 
she sustains.
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a changing climate in the u.S. congReSS
by Emily Alves*
legiSlative upDate
When the 110th Congress convened last January, the new Democratic majority repeatedly pledged that comprehensive and aggressive legislation to address 
global climate change would be a top priority. Many freshmen 
members of Congress were elected on platforms of improving 
America’s energy security by investing in clean technologies 
and reducing our dependence on oil. Heightened interest in the 
connection between carbon pollution and U.S. energy consump-
tion has provided further incentive 
to follow through on such promises. 
An important cornerstone in 
developing a framework to address 
climate change was the passage of 
the Energy Independence and Secu-
rity Act, on December 17, 2007.1 
The most notable achievement 
in the bill was the first increase in 
Corporate Average Fuel Economy 
(“CAFE”) standards for automobiles in over three decades. Start-
ing in 2020, all new cars will be required to have a fuel economy 
of thirty-five miles per gallon. This mandate is expected to save 
up to 3.7 billion metric tons of greenhouse gas emissions by 
2030, which will go a long way towards reducing overall emis-
sions.2 Another important component of the bill is a mandate to 
increase the production of biofuels to thirty-six billion gallons 
by 2015, which will help shift energy production from foreign 
oil to domestic and lower greenhouse gas emitting sources.3 The 
bill further requires a whole suite of energy efficiency standards 
for appliances, most notably a new mandate for all light bulbs to 
use seventy percent less electricity by 2020.4 
Dropped from the bill at the last minute was a tax package 
intended to roll back tax breaks for oil companies in favor of 
incentives for renewable energies. Lawmakers were forced to 
remove the package under the threat of a filibuster as well as a 
Presidential veto. The House also conceded to removing a provi-
sion in their original bill that would have mandated a renewable 
portfolio standard. That provision faced fierce opposition in the 
Senate from lawmakers concerned that their particular regions 
had insufficient renewable resources to meet the standard. 
The Farm Bill, H.R. 2419, is another legislative initiative 
with global warming implications.5 The agricultural sector is 
responsible for seventy-one percent of nitrous oxide emissions 
and thirty percent of methane emissions in the U.S.—two green-
house gasses that are considered even more potent than carbon 
dioxide.6 While various environmental safeguards can be found 
throughout the Farm Bill, the most important in terms of reduc-
ing greenhouse gas emissions is the conservations title. The 
funding provided in this title, which supports programs geared 
at protecting wildlife, keeping water reserves clean, and pro-
moting energy efficiency, 
was in high demand after 
the last Farm Bill in 2002. 
There is a great deal of pres-
sure to expand the funding 
of this title so that farmers 
may engage in conservation 
practices that include no-till 
agriculture and general crop 
and manure management 
that will vastly reduce greenhouse gases. At the close of the first 
session of Congress in December, both chambers had passed 
their own versions of the Farm Bill, and the plan is to start merg-
ing the two in early 2008. 
In terms of climate specific legislation, more than 125 bills 
were introduced within the first few months of the 110th Con-
gress, compared with 106 climate specific bills introduced in the 
last two Congresses combined.7 The legislation varies widely in 
their methods and in levels of targeted reductions. The most com-
mon solution proposed is that of a national cap-and-trade system, 
which would assign permits to companies allowing them to emit 
a certain amount of carbon pollution. The debate around these 
proposals concerns whether the government should oversee such 
an operation, and whether the permits should be auctioned off 
or freely given. Another far less common proposal is to insti-
tute a carbon tax. Under this system, polluters would be required
to pay a tax based on the tonnage of their carbon emissions. 
Of all these bills, only one has actually seen a vote. The 
America’s Climate Security Act of 2007, S. 2191, was intro-
*Emily Alves is a J.D. candidate, May 2011, at American University, Washington 
College of Law.
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duced last October by Senator Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut 
and Senator John Warner of Virginia.8 The bill aims to reduce 
U.S. carbon emissions to a level somewhere between sixty-two 
and sixty-six percent of today’s level by 2050.9 The bill would 
set up a declining cap on U.S. carbon emissions that would cover 
eighty-six percent of all current U.S. emissions.10 The bill strives 
to achieve these methods through several means. It would set up 
a cap and trade system to be regulated by the Environmental 
Protection Agency, which would be required to implement an 
emissions tracking and monitoring system. It would also create 
a carbon market efficiency board to monitor any trading of emis-
sions and make necessary adjustments for permit allowances. 
The bill was successfully voted out of the Senate Environment 
and Public Works Committee on December 5, 2007 by a vote 
of 11-8.11 According to several capitol hill staffers, floor action 
is expected to be brought to the Senate floor around Memorial 
Day. 
It remains uncertain what further steps Congress will take 
to address climate change as it reconvenes for the second ses-
sion of the 110th Congress. With 2008 being an election year, 
lawmakers’ attention may be diverted elsewhere. If, however, 
lawmakers choose to continue making climate legislation a pri-
ority, they certainly have momentum to build upon. 
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litigation upDate
okeSon v. Seattle
by Matt Irwin*
InTroDucTIon
On January 18, 2007, the Washington State Supreme Court declared that the City of Seattle owned elec-tric utility company, Seattle City Light, could not use 
electric utility rate payments to buy offsets of greenhouse gas 
(“GHG”) emissions from companies unassociated with Seattle 
City Light. The suit was filed by four individual rate payers, and 
on behalf of all other Seattle City Light ratepayers.1 While the 
case has been legislatively overturned, it demonstrates the need 
for state legislatures to consider the traditional judicial limita-
tions of public utilities in crafting legislation to meet environ-
mental goals.
legal bacKgrounD anD argumenTs
On April 10, 2000, the City of Seattle passed Resolution 
30144 to accompany the 30th Anniversary of Earth Day.2 Reso-
lution 30144 stated that “[Seattle] City Light will meet growing 
[electricity energy] demand with no net increase in greenhouse 
gas emissions by . . . [m]itigating or offsetting greenhouse gas 
emissions associated with any fossil fuels to meet load growth.”3 
In the spring of 2001, the Seattle city council passed resolution 
30359.4 Resolution 30359 stated that because it is more expen-
sive to reduce GHG emissions locally in the Seattle area than in 
other areas, Seattle City Light was directed to pay other entities 
*Matt Irwin is a J.D. candidate, May 2009, at American University Washington 
College of Law.
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throughout the country to reduce their GHG emissions to off-
set Seattle City Light’s GHG emissions.5 An example of Seattle 
City Light’s agreements with outside entities was Seattle City 
Light’s agreement with DuPont in which Seattle City Light paid 
DuPont $650,000 to buy 300,000 tons of GHG emission offsets 
from a DuPont plant in Kentucky.6
Plaintiff ratepayers challenged the legality of Seattle City 
Light’s GHG offset contracts, arguing that under Washington 
law, utility expenditures must 
have a sufficient nexus to the util-
ity’s purpose.7 Therefore, under 
the plaintiff’s argument, Seattle 
City Light’s arrangements to 
pay entities such as DuPont to 
reduce their GHG emissions did 
not have a sufficient connection 
to supplying electricity to Seattle 
ratepayers.8 Defendant City of 
Seattle argued that it may choose 
any means to reduce GHG emis-
sions as long as it offsets the GHG emissions associated with 
supplying power to Seattle ratepayers, including paying other 
emitters to reduce their GHG emissions.9
holDIngs
The trial court granted summary judgment for the City of 
Seattle.10 The trial judge summarized the court’s position:
I think that City Light has the authority to reduce its 
own emissions. It can do that by managing its own 
facilities, its own producing facilities, or it can spend 
money to have its emissions, its contribution reduced 
by someone else. This all makes sense only because of 
the unusual nature of the greenhouse gas canopy; the 
fact that it is an envelope around the entire glove; that 
it’s not localized.11
Thus, the trial court upheld Seattle City Light’s agreements 
to pay unrelated emitters of GHGs because, considering the 
nature of GHG reduction, there is no difference between reduc-
ing GHGs in the Seattle area or thousands of miles away. 
The plaintiffs appealed the summary judgment order to 
the Washington State Supreme Court (“Supreme Court”). The 
state’s Supreme Court applied a longstanding Washington 
state rule that a municipal corporation is limited to the powers 
expressly granted to them, powers implied or incident to the 
express powers, or powers essential to the purpose of the munic-
ipal corporation.12 The Supreme Court stated that as a municipal 
corporation, Seattle City Light lacks the authority to take actions 
that benefit the public as a whole.13 Instead, as a municipal cor-
poration, Seattle City Light can only take actions that benefit 
ratepayers.14 The Supreme Court determined that by paying 
other organizations to reduce their GHG emissions, Seattle City 
Light is not actually reducing its own emissions and is therefore 
benefiting the public as a whole, not just the Seattle City Light 
ratepayers.15 Therefore, the Supreme Court held that Seattle 
City Light’s GHG emissions offset contracts were not within 
the utility’s proprietary powers because they were designed to 
reduce the world’s GHG emissions on an aggregate, not Seattle 
City Light’s own GHG emissions in regards to the operation of 
supplying electricity.16 
conclusIon
Individual plaintiff Okeson released a statement that the 
“lawsuit doesn’t mean he opposes fighting global warming . . . 
But he wants utilities to deal with their own pollution and cal-
culate the price into what they 
sell rather than paying someone 
else to deal with the problem.”17 
While under the previous statu-
tory regime the plaintiffs were 
successful in preventing Seattle 
City Light from paying other 
companies to reduce their GHG 
emissions, Washington has 
passed legislation that specifi-
cally overrules Okeson v. City 
of Seattle.18 The Washington 
State Legislature has passed H.B. 1929, which allows municipal 
utilities and public utility districts to mitigate their GHG emis-
sions through activities such as, “purchase, trade, or banking of 
greenhouse gasses offsets or credits.”19 Thus the state of Wash-
ington has overcome previous statutory and judicial limitations 
to allow Seattle City Light to mitigate its impact on global 
 climate change. 
Plaintiff ratepayers 
challenged the legality of 
Seattle City Light’s GHG 
offset contracts. 
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The majority of today’s environmental discourse tends to deal with current and on-going battles, and rightly so. Climate change, renewable energy, and species conser-
vation are issues that are still playing out in civil society, and 
thus draw heavily on the resources of environmental advocates. 
For this reason it is refreshing, even inspiring, to reexamine past 
environmental victories. 
The Montreal Protocol stands 
as one of the most effective envi-
ronmental treaties ever, and there 
are many lessons to be learned 
from its success. The collection 
of essays in The Montreal Pro-
tocol: Celebrating 20 Years of 
Environmental Progress, edited 
by Donald Kaniaru, traces the 
history of the Montreal Protocol, 
examines the mechanisms and 
organization which enabled its success, and finally teases out the 
lessons which can be learned and employed in today’s confron-
tation with climate change.
The primary aim of the Protocol was to halt the depletion 
of stratospheric ozone by chlorofluorocarbons (“CFCs”), which 
are chemical compounds commonly used as propellants and 
refrigerants.  Beginning in the mid-70s, scientists were noticing 
a disturbing trend in the breakdown of CFCs and their reaction 
with ozone. Though the science of the time was struggling to 
understand this process completely, by the mid-80s it was clear 
to many that a response was needed. The Montreal Protocol was 
that response. The Protocol was finalized in September 1987, 
but the final document was the culmination of a ten-year process 
of constructing frameworks, debating implementation strate-
gies, and building relationships. It included the themes of burden 
sharing and differentiated responsibility, which although they 
are common today, were quite novel at the time.
The agreement was for a fifty percent reduction in the use 
and consumption of five types of CFCs by 1999, using 1986 as 
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the base year. Signatories included the United States, Japan, the 
European Union, and the Soviet Union, which along with a few 
smaller consumers represented more than two-thirds of world-
wide CFC consumption.
As many of the authors included in this book argue, there 
are clear parallels between the challenges of ozone depletion 
and climate change. While 
the effects of CFCs and other 
ozone-depleting substances 
are common knowledge today, 
the science at the time was still 
uncertain in many respects. It 
did not deal with an immedi-
ate threat, but rather one that 
would fully manifest itself in 
the future. It would affect not 
just certain individuals, but 
everyone on earth. The Mon-
treal Protocol boldly instituted short-term economic costs to pre-
vent this threat from materializing, and in so doing, undertook 
preventive action on a global scale. In these ways, the Protocol 
demanded of its signatories the same commitments that treaties 
addressing climate change require today. 
Another argument running through the book is that the Mon-
treal Protocol itself has done much to combat climate change. In 
fact, many of the authors believe that further changes to the Pro-
tocol, such as an accelerated HCFC phase-out, would produce 
a valuable short-term reduction in greenhouse gases. Such a 
strengthening of the Protocol could serve to shift the Protocol’s 
focus from ozone-depleting substances to climate change more 
generally. This strategy is recommended because such a move 
may provide insurance against the slow progress of the Kyoto 
Protocol.
There are clear parallels 
between the challenges 
of ozone depletion and 
climate change.
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While opponents of an HCFC phase-out point to the relative 
absence of energy efficient and cost-effective replacements, a 
key lesson of the Montreal Protocol is that the knowledge that a 
market is in decline will often provide the creative stimulus and 
financial resources needed to develop alternatives. No alterna-
tives to CFCs existed when the Montreal Protocol’s ban on CFCs 
was first proposed, but when faced with a phase-out, chemical 
producers, notably DuPont, quickly developed alternatives and 
committed themselves to new production strategies. The book 
goes on to suggest that this realization is the missing element at 
the Kyoto Protocol. If energy producers were assured of immi-
nent changes, technological innovation would be the only means 
of survival, and society could finally expect the advances for 
which it has been waiting.
The authors of this book present a valuable and policy-
 oriented approach to understanding environmental protocols. 
They celebrate the success of the Montreal Protocol while at the 
same time seeking to translate that success into further environ-
mental victories. Their message is that as we turn to face the 
problems of today, insight and lessons from the past are perhaps 
our best hope.
Bjørn Lomborg, a professor at the Copenhagen Business School, is a self-described “skeptical environmentalist.”1 The Skeptical Environmentalist is also the title of his 
2001 book, a controversial volume proposing that, far from 
deteriorating, the state of the environment is actually improv-
ing.  The book set off a wave of criticism in Lomborg’s native 
Denmark, including allegations that his arguments were “scien-
tifically dishonest.”2 These allegations were later proved false 
by the Danish Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation.3 
The firestorm surrounding The Skeptical Environmentalist has 
not deterred the writer from continuing his pursuit of provocative 
arguments in the environmental debate in his latest book, Cool 
It: The Skeptical Environmentalist’s Guide to Global Warming. 
Lomborg sets an ambitious agenda from the start of Cool 
It, which seeks to reframe the international debate about the 
challenges and solutions presented by climate change. In a vol-
ume dedicated “to future generations,” Lomborg acknowledges 
the existence of global warming and its significant impact on 
humanity. Simultaneously, however, he asserts that the current 
societal debate is getting it all wrong by designing costly and 
inefficient solutions to a problem that is overblown. 
In recent years, the causes and effects of global warming 
have received increasing attention in the media. Most predictions 
have been dire. Lomborg attempts to persuade his readers that 
the media and many, if not most, environmental activists focus 
on data that is wrong or taken out of context. His central exam-
ple for this point is the emphasis on rising global temperatures 
and the deaths that will be caused by extreme heat waves similar 
to what Europe experienced in the summer of 2003. Lomborg 
maintains that while a warmer Earth will provoke more deathly 
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heat waves, it will also prevent hundreds of thousands of deaths 
caused by extremely cold temperatures. 
He returns to this point several times to illustrate what he 
emphasizes is the mistaken focus of the environmental debate. 
The comparative reduction in overall deaths caused by weather 
is a central factor in Lomborg’s overall cost-benefit analysis of 
global warming solutions. Under his analysis, most of the pro-
posed solutions to global warming that involve carbon-emission 
reduction are, economically-speaking, a “bad deal,” producing 
benefits that are not worth the effort.  
Lomborg is particularly critical of the Kyoto Protocol and 
similar international efforts calling for high taxes on carbon 
emissions. He stresses that the Protocol is too costly for the ben-
efits it would confer. According to Lomborg’s assessment, if 
implemented to the fullness of its provisions, the Kyoto Protocol 
would only yield a global temperature reduction of 0.3 degrees 
Fahrenheit by 2100. In Lomborg’s view, the billions of dollars 
spent implementing the Kyoto Protocol could be better spent 
elsewhere, combating disease, malnutrition and other global 
maladies. Lomborg also defends the United States’ reluctance 
to ratify the Protocol, because the United States would get the 
worst deal by spending the most money on implementation for 
the least return or benefit. 
Rather than follow a Kyoto Protocol-style model, Lomborg 
advocates a global carbon tax model that balances the cost of 
the tax with the tangible environmental benefits derived from 
the carbon emission cuts. A model of this type would avoid a 
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situation illustrated by the law of diminishing returns, where the 
more carbon emissions are cut, the fewer the “social benefits” to 
humans. Lomborg quotes economists who believe “going much 
beyond the small optimal initiative is economically unjustified.”
Lomborg urges the international community to consider the 
range of issues facing the world today, from epidemic diseases 
like HIV/AIDS and malaria to malnutrition and trade barriers. 
As a founding member of the Copenhagen Consensus, a con-
ference of economists whose stated goal is to “provoke inter-
national debate about prioritization,” Lomborg tries to steer the 
focus away from global warming to problems that have more 
feasible solutions. While recognizing that climate change and 
its attendant consequences are real, Lomborg and the members 
of the Copenhagen Consensus rank it low on the list of interna-
tional priorities. In a list of seventeen of the “world’s greatest 
challenges,” climate change comes in dead last behind solu-
tions to problems such as disease, malnutrition, migration, and 
corruption.4 
A prominent figure in Cool It is former Vice President Al 
Gore, whom Lomborg repeatedly cites as having misled the 
debate over global warming. Responding to the popular acclaim 
for the 2006 documentary An Inconvenient Truth, Lomborg won-
ders how the film and Mr. Gore, by showing the chain reaction 
of global warming, melting ice caps and rising sea levels, “can 
say something so dramatically removed from the best science.” 
Lomborg cites Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change data 
to refute the documentary’s images of coastal cities inundated 
by rising sea levels. According to Lomborg, the IPCC’s data 
indicates that as the Earth’s temperature increases, “Antarctica 
will not noticeably start melting” but there will be more precipi-
tation and “Antarctica will actually…[accumulate] ice, reducing 
sea levels by two inches.” 
Whether Bjørn Lomborg’s Cool It will succeed in changing 
the tenor and framework of the climate change debate remains to 
be seen. What is not in doubt, however, is that Lomborg’s ideas 
are provocative and his goals ambitious. Cool It is a challenging 
and interesting read for anyone concerned with global warming, 
whatever your reading of the current crisis may be.  
Endnotes: Cool It
1 Lomborg.com, About Bjørn Lomborg, http://www.lomborg.com/about/ (last 
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2 Lomborg.com, FAQ, http://www.lomborg.com/faq/?PHPSESSID=0a2156529
d1b075acd9d3d738131c6e7 (last visited Jan. 20, 2008).
3 Lomborg.com, id.
4 CopenhagenConsensus.com, May 29, 2004 Press Release: HIV/AIDS, Hunger, 
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woRlD newS
by Nathan Borgford-Parnell*
aFRica & aSia
U.S. scientists recently released a report showing that crops 
in Southern Asia and Africa will likely be the worst affected 
by climate change. Equally as important, the research showed 
that the people in these regions utilize the likely affected crops 
for a majority of their calorie intake, increasing the likelihood 
of mass-malnutrition and starvation.1 The most affected crops 
include millet, groundnuts, rapeseed, and wheat in Asia, and sor-
ghum and maize in Africa.2 To increase research and investment 
into developing foods that can withstand climate change, the 
Gates Foundation has announced that it will grant $19.9 million 
to the International Rice Research Institute (“IRRI”) to develop 
rice species to fill the role.3 IRRI will develop a strain of rice 
that is resistant to floods, droughts, and salty water, and distrib-
ute it to 400,000 farmers in needy areas.4 
ameRicaS
On January 30th, the U.S. Department of Energy (“DOE”) 
quit supporting the FutureGen project in Mattoon, Illinois 
because of predicted cost overruns and other concerns.5 Future-
Gen was to be a near zero emission coal plant and a prototype 
for the next generation of clean-coal plants around the world.6 Its 
goal was to convert coal into flammable hydrogen, which would 
power electric turbines, and carbon dioxide would have been 
sequestered underground.7 In response to the growing estimated 
costs, $1.8 billion, the consortium of private companies working 
on FutureGen with the government offered to split any overrun 
costs, however, the DOE acknowledged that costs were not the 
only issues.8 A report from MIT highlighted that a single power 
plant could not provide all the trials that clean coal sequestration 
requires.9 
With the United States relying on coal fired power plants 
for over half of its electricity, experts believe it is necessary for 
the United States to discover uses of coal that do not result in 
large releases of carbon dioxide.10 The DOE hopes to receive 
comments on clean coal sequestration technology and then build 
multiple plants like the previously proposed FutureGen, with-
out the previous issues of cost overruns and burdensome federal 
rules.11
euRope
Norway plans to cut its greenhouse gas emissions to nearly 
nine percent below 1990-levels by 2012 and become carbon 
* Nathan Borgford-Parnell is a JD/MA candidate, May 2009, at American Uni-
versity, Washington College of Law.
neutral by 2030.12 This is twenty years sooner than Norway’s 
announcement last year of going carbon neutral by 2050.13 Nor-
way plans to drop their emissions to forty-five million tons from 
their current production of fifty-eight million by 2012. However, 
scientists in Norway point out that there are very few planned 
cuts in emissions.14 In fact, Norway’s greenhouse gas emis-
sions are expected to increase in the coming years because of a 
growing dependence on gas and oil for energy.15 Norway cur-
rently gets much of its energy from its hydroelectric stations, 
but plans to increase natural gas use to satisfy growing demand. 
16 While Norway does plan to force industry to purchase quotas 
on Norwegian markets, that will only decrease production by an 
expected 9.7 million tons. 
The remaining cuts are expected to come from the purchase 
of carbon credits via the U.N.’s Clean Development Mechanism 
(“CDM”), and the planting of forests.17 The Norwegian plan 
includes spending more than $550 million a year on reforesta-
tion efforts around the world. Under the Kyoto Protocol, coun-
tries can only get CDM credits for planting trees in developing 
countries.18 Many groups have criticized the plan as vague and 
impossible, but Norwegian officials say that the far sighted goals 
are necessary and liken reaching the carbon neutral goal to the 
environmental equivalent of landing on the moon.19
miDDle eaSt
The United Arab Emirates (“UAE”) is planning to build the 
world’s first carbon neutral city, Masdar City, in the desert out-
side of the UAE capital of Abu Dhabi. Work has already begun 
on the massive project which is slated to open in 2016 and is 
expected to cost $22 billion.20 The government has put up $4 
billion for the project with the rest financed by private enter-
prise looking to make money from the carbon credits.21 Masdar 
City will use solar collection for power, be one hundred percent 
car free, with full waste recycling, and use seventy percent less 
energy and fifty to sixty percent less water than conventional cit-
ies.22 Masdar City hopes to use both rooftop solar panels as well 
as large concentrated solar power (“CSP”) outside the city for 
all their power needs.23 CSP is different from traditional photo-
voltaic solar cells because it uses mirrors to focus heat from the 
sun to produce power and is ideal for hot desert climates like in 
the UAE.24 
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polaR RegionS
New research is showing that the ability of trees to act as a 
carbon sink for the world may be decreasing as climate change 
increases. The higher temperatures created by climate change 
are beginning to alter the carbon cycle of trees taking in  carbon 
through photosynthesis and then releasing it when they decom-
pose or burn.25 Until recently, it was believed that climate change 
would spur greater growth in plants, at least initially, because of 
the increased growing season, thereby increasing their carbon 
uptake. This increased growth is already evident and can be seen 
from space. However, a research group monitoring forests in 
thirty northern polar regions for the past twenty years has shown 
that increased carbon uptake has not followed the increased 
growth.26 Their research focused on the autumn months when 
most forests release more carbon than they take in because of 
decomposition. The research shows that autumn is coming ear-
lier in the year, in some cases as much as a few weeks, meaning 
that the forests are producing much more CO2 than previously 
expected.27 Although the net effect of this finding is still not 
known, forest adaptation or the forestation of areas currently 
covered in tundra could make up for the extra CO2.
28
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